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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a theoretical enquiry into the financial policies of 
local governments in South Africa. 
The basic principles governing this issue are presented in Chapter Six. 
The theory of corporate debt capacity is drawn upon and an analagous 
model of local government debt capacity is presented. The Modigliani-
Miller approach is adapted, and the conclusions of this model applied in 
the local government context. The implication is drawn that local 
government officials see the incurment of debt as increasing the financial 
riskiness of the local area, just as corporate executives see corporate 
debt as increasing the riskiness of the firm. It is hypothesised that 
local governments which are very loosely linked, politically and econo-
mically, to the peopie they serve will be more risk averse than fiscally 
or electorally sensitive governments, and will display greater reluct-
ance to incur debt. In so.doing, they will sacrifice opportunities to 
improve the area by favourable capital development, financed by a 
judicious combination of debt and current revenue. Current available 
data on a cross section of local governments is presented which tentatively 
confirms this hypothesis. 
Chapter Seven contains an analysis of the currently experienced shortage 
of funds for local government. It is concluded that the curtailment of 
borrowing has been largely responsible for this shortage. 
Chapter Eight makes use of the framework developed to critically examine 
the trend towards internal financing. The shortcomings of this policy 
are presented, and some claimed advantages examined and rejected. Some 
specific methods of internal financing are identified and examined 
individually. 
Chapter Nine broadens the discussion beyond purely finance issues to the 
question of the constitutional position of local governments. The 
recommendations of the President's Council are examined critically, 
particularly those concerning tax sharing and metropolitanisation. 
The first section of the thesis, chapters One to Five, is concerned 
with presenting the theoretical basis on which the analysis of local 
governments rests. Chapter Two presents an historical introduction to 
/ 
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the theory of public enterprise. beginning with the Italians. covering the 
modern •pure theory of public goods• and focusing ultimately on the 
Public Choice school and the positive theory of public goods. This 
approach enables us to view government as a part of the institutional 
framework of the economY. rather than as a separate force. Public 
goods are seen as those commodities which can more efficiently be 
provided in an institutionalised. collective manner. Chapter Three 
presents the local municipal authority as one such institutional 
form. ·which exists in competition with other municipalities and with 
other institutional forms. This competition, it is suggested, becomes 
expressed in.the value of properties within the local jurisdiction. 
Evidence supporting this capitalisation .hypothesis is presented. 
Chapter Four presents.the.theoretical underpinning of the approach to 
revenue sources presented later in the thesis. Various funding options 
are examined, including taxin~ user charges, borrowing and grants. The 
arguments surrounding the .property tax and its incidence are presented in 
Chapter Five. The site value tax is placed under a spotlight, to see 
whether it really does have the potential to.encourage development of 
buildings and.improvements in a local area. 
/ 
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PREFACE 
The problem of local government financial policies first came to my 
attention in 1981, while employed as a researcher by the Urban Problems 
Research Unit of the University of Cape Town. The Unit was approached 
for help by a group of residents from Kleinvlei, a small community 
in the Stellenbosch Divisional Council area. They presented a problem 
which has become very familiar: their community was small and isolated 
and lacking in the most fundamental facilities. A field survey revealed 
that drainage was a very severe problem, particularly during the wet 
Cape winters. The area, as the name suggests, consists of very flat, 
low-lying, sandy terrain, with a high water table. Houses are often 
surrounded with water, roads are frequently impassable. Sewerage 
disposal, too, was badly provided, being by individual pressure tanks 
for the privately owned houses, and by bucket system for the council's 
sub-economic letting units. 
My initial response was to 'blame' this state of affairs on the rela-
tive poverty of residents, and on the high cost nature of the area as 
a location for residential housing. The explanation flowing from 
this would have concentrated on the income inequality of the coloured 
population group and on the nature of the location decision, of course 
a bureaucratic one. 
While this line of inquiry.would doubtless have been as fruitful for 
me as it has been for others, I was not able to ignore some of the 
features of the problem that drained force from this argument. Most 
importantly, the residents of Kleinvlei were not, for the most part, of 
the lowest income groups, but of medium, even of high income categories. 
The houses they occupied, aside from those of the sub-economic housing 
schemes, are of a price and quality indistinguishable from many 
properties in the nearby white suburbs of Brackenfell and Kraaifontein, 
which are very much better served. The population was at that stage 
growing very rapidly. The tax base was therefore, although small in 
extent, very promising. 
The problem presented by Kleinvlei was, therefore, ·indistin9uishable 
from the problems presented by any housing 'estate• in its early 
formative years. These problems are, in the case of white communities, 
inevitably solved. In the case of coloured communities they seem to 
/ 
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persist, and are ultimately resolved, if at all, by a massive inject-
ion of government aid. 
It was quite_understandable, therefore, that the community should seek 
the professional help of the Unit in presenting its case to the various 
government bodies involved. A successful application for massive grants 
would certainly have solved Kleinvlei's problems, but would have 
brought only disappointment to those many similar local areas with whom 
Kleinvlei is forced to compete for scarce government aid. 
From the perspective of the Economist and Social Scientist, therefore, 
-the problem remained unsolved. Indeed, its importance has increased as 
the present constitutional debate focuses more and more strongly on the 
local authority as the grassroots of democracy. The problem of 
financing their capital development takes on corresponding significance. 
It was in an effort to contribute to the solution of this problem that 
my attention turned in particular toward the debt policies of Klein-
vlei. I found that the community was in the 'happy' position of being 
almost debt free. This fact alone, I believe, provides the beginning 
of an explanation for the poor level of local amenities. The remainder 
of the explanation must certainly emerge from a study of the local 
authority as an institution operating within the economic and bureau-
cratic environment. 
This thesis, it is hoped, constitutes such a study, and, as such, 
provides a framework with which to answer many of the pressing social 
problems that confront South Africa. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The social problems facing South African communities have increased 
rapidly with accelerated urbanisation and the creation of new towns 
and villages. This, in conjunction with the limitations of the Group 
Areas Act and the decentralisation policies, has placed severe strain 
on the members of many communities, particularly on their finances. 
communities have voiced their anger and frustration at the limited 
scope of state housing, and at the performance of local governments in 
·the administration of subsidised housing schemes. As a result several 
changes have been made regarding state housing policy, most of which 
display an increasing tendency to move towards private and local 
government involvement. 
This concentration on local authorities, together with the concomitant 
demands made on their finances has come at a time when they are 
~xperiencing increasing difficulty in adjusting their policies to cope 
with inflation. This, for them, has -been characterised by escalating 
costs, high nominal interest rates and a lagging base on which to levy 
property taxes, their principal revenue source. 
In response to the resulting distress calls, the Browne Committee was 
appointed to enquire into the finances of local government. 1 The report 
of this committee offered little relief, however, recommending no new 
revenue sources, suggesting that authorities put their houses in order 
administratively and that funds for capital development should come 
from internal sources, through the 'Capital Development Fund'. These 
recommendations were not well received by local administrators, and the 
issue continues to receive attention from the Croeser working group. 2 
The role of the local government as a political institution in South 
Africa received considerable further attention from the President's 
Council, who, in their report3 recommended that the direction of 
constitutional change in South Africa should be toward greater local 
autonomy: ..... at the level of local government, the principle of 
maximum devolution of authority and decentralisation of administration 
be accepted as a matter of policy 11 • 4 
2 
Despite their exclusion from the tenms of reference of the Presidents' 
council deliberations, Black local government was not neglected in the 
legislature. The Black Local Authorities Act no.102 of 1982 was 
promulgated, providing for the establishment of Black local governments 
in urban and rural areas. 
Local autonomy_ is thus widely recognisect as one of the paths to consti-
tutional refonm in South Africa. Its advantages are very clear: 
- local governments are more responsive to local needs; 
- local officials are more accountable to citizens; 
- a wide variety of divergent. needs can be catered to; 
- local preferences do not have to take second place to national 
interests; 
- residents have a greater feeling of participation in decision making 
and do in reality have greater potential to affect outcomes. 
The dangers are however equally apparent: 
- that authorities will not be truly autonomous but merely be 
segregated, powerless entities; 
- that the parameters within which authorities operate, i.e. location, 
population mix, housing type etc, will be dictated from central 
government, not left to local discretion 
- that these parameters will become ossified as a result of the 
constraints on mobility and a property ownership that are presently 
in operation; 
- that the financial resources of local authorities will be inadequate, 
and will be incapable of expansion due to the many artificial 
constraints imposed on them. 
It is in this light that the present difficulties experienced by local 
governments take on a special significance. If we cannot understand their 
problems, the likelihood is that the problems resulting from the type 
of constitutional reform presently envisaged will go unsolved. 
This thesis is an attempt to address the problems of the financing of 
local government. It is a problem that has arisen not in the academic 
environment, but in the 'real world' of people and money. In so doing 
This area is identified as the most promising one to look into for an 
answer to the question of why many communities, even those of middle to 
high income groups, are badly served with amenities. 
The model developed presents the hypothesis that this may result from 
exaggeratedly risk-averse behaviour on the part of local officials, with 
respect to their borrowing for capital .development. It is further 
hypothesised that such risk-averse behaviour is a concomitant of the 
non-representative nature of some local governments. The implication is 
therefore that sound financial policies, and therefore maximum local 
development, can only be achieved within a suitable system of political 
representation. 
While this thesis does not attempt to prove this empirically, the ground 
work is hopefully laid for the more precise econometric specification 
of the hypotheses with a view to testing them in the future. 
Chapter Seven takes a closer look at the avowed shortage of local govern-
ment funds, and identifies a movement away from external financing as 
the fundamental reason for it, partially confirming the proposition 
of Chapter Six. Also identified is a movement away from local govern-
ment, toward central gov~rnment, a contradiction of the stated intention 
of the present administration. 
Chapter Eight makes use of the theoretical framework developed to provide 
a critical appraisal of the.growing movement away from external financing 
through borrowing, towards internal financing along the lines recommended 
by the Browne Committee and practised.by several local governments in 
South Africa. 
This application of conventional .financial and investment theory leads 
to the conclusion that self sufficiency in finance, as in all other 
things, is not an optimising policy. Communities would be better served 
if their officials followed the signals of the market place as embodied 
in interest rates. 
Because this conclusion meets with such an unenthusiastic reception 
among policy proponents, despite its ready acceptance in other fields, 
the specific claims made on behalf of internal financing have been 
subjected to special scrutiny and found, for the most part, to be 
wanting. 
.. 
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Also receiving the analytical attention of the institutional choice 
approach to public goods are the proposals put forward by the President's 
council. In Chapter Nine, some specific proposals are examined, 
including those concerning a metropolitan tier of government/and revenue 
sharing schemes. These are also found to be wanting in analytical 
foundation, and are shown to have detrimental consequences for local 
areas that adopt them. 
It is hoped that this thesis will make a positive contribution to the 
ongoing constitutional debate in South Africa, in which local government 
is playing a major role. It has become clear that the discussion of 
local autonomy is in need of a conceptual framework, which this thesis 
will help to provide, while at the same time, addressing explicitly 
the policy issue of capital finance • 
6 
NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE 
1. 
2. 
Browne, G.W.G., Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the 
Finances of Local Authorities in South Africa (Government 
Printer R.P. 80/1980). 
The report of the Croeser Working Group was released on the 30th 
March 1983, too late to be commented on in this thesis. 
3. Joint Report of the Committee for Economic Affairs and the 
Constitutional Committee of the President's Council on Local and 
Regional Management Systems in the Republic of South Africa 
( P. c. 1 I 1982) • 
4. P.C. 1/1982, op cit, p.105. 
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CHAPTER 2 THE THEORY OF PUBLIC GOODS 
1. Introduction 
Before we can discuss the financial arrangements surrounding the operations 
of local public bodies, we need to situate these institutions within a 
broader framework of analysis. We need to understand why they exist and 
under what constraints and for what objectives they operate. To this end 
we shall begin in this chapter with a review of modern economic analysis of 
public goods, tracing its roots in the European tradition of the late 19th 
century, and following it through to the current state-of-the-art which is 
practiced by the Public Choice school. 
In the following chapter, the Institutional analysis of this school will be 
linked to the well known 11 Voting-with-the-feet .. model of C. M. Tiebout as 
an approach to the specific analysis of local authorities. 
2. The Roots of the Modern Theory of Public Goods 
Much current thinking on the subject of Public Economy, particularly that 
in the Public Choice paradigm, is indebted to the Italian economists of 
the late 19th century, a fact which is handsomely acknowledged by 
1 J. M. Buchanan. Unlike the economists of the post-Marshallian era, the 
Italian theorists saw the public economy as a two handed entity with both 
a revenue side and an expenditure side, i.e. as an entity which exacts 
2 3 
payments in order to provide goods and services. Sax and Mazzola made 
an early attempt (1880) to distinguish this process from the provision of 
private goods which also involves paying a price and receiving goods and 
services in return. Their analysis identified the collectivity of wants 
and of production as the distinguistiif)g feature. Pantaleoni 4 made 
pioneering use of the (then) new marginal analysis to explain the actions 
of the taxing-spending authority in its budgeting choices. De Viti de Marco5 
extended this approach to cover the situation where both suppliers of 
public goods and receivers of public revenue are part of the same community. 
8 
The strongest contribution of the 19th century, however, came from 
Knut Wicksell. 6 He too viewed the revenue and expenditure functions of 
government in an integrated way, but went further than the Italians in 
pointing out that the fiscal decisions are themselves the result of a 
social process, not the arbitrary decisions of a king or despot. His 
analysis concentrated on the actual institutions through which the choices 
are made, rejecting the concentration on tax-fairness and allocative 
efficiency which were to become the primary concern of later writers. 
Perhaps his greatest contribution was to make a comparison of the private 
transacting process; involving two co-operating parties, a buyer and a 
seller, as well as all the many consenting potential buyers and sellers, 
and the political decision making process involving numerous voters. His 
seminal contribution was to point out that the private transaction involves 
implicit unanimity between buyer, seller and all consenting potential 
buyers and sellers. In order to replicate the private process in the 
public sphere, an equivalent unaminity rule should apply. Only in this 
way can the public sector approach the kind of optimal position suggested 
by Wicksell' s contemporary, Vil ifredo Pareto. 
This normative position laid the ground-work for the subsequent work of 
Lindahl 7 who attempted to clarify the link between the political 
bargaining process and economic efficiency. This work will be examined 
in more detail below. 
This voluntary exchange theory of public finance was introduced into the 
American economic tradition through the work of R. Musgrave 8 who 
subjected it to a critical evaluation. There followed, in the 1950's 
and 1960's, a period of rapid development, which Buchanan 9 places into 
four categories: The Demand for Public goods, in which Samuelson 
built on the work by Lindahl to analyse the necessary marginal conditions 
for allocative efficiency of Public goods; The Theory of Voting in which 
the unanimity condition imposed by Wicksell is expanded; The Theory of 
Voting Rules or Constitutions in which the Wicksellian consensus require-
ment is pushed back a step to include only consensus on the constitution; 
and The Supply of Public Goods, which concentrates on the responses of 
public bodies to anticipated demand for public goods. 
We shall discuss these categories in more detail and shall conclude this 
chapter with a presentation of the institutional approach. 
9 
3. Demand for Public Goods 
Lindahl:-
The absence of familiar preference revelation mechanisms inherent in the 
market process makes the discussion of the demand for public goods a far 
more complex one than the corresponding question of the demand for private 
goods. Lindahl addressed this question from the perspective of voluntary, 
unanimous exchange between individuals who demand public goods and pay 
taxes. Mueller 10 following Johansen 11 and Slutsky 12 presents the 
following formulation:-
Consider a world with two individuals, A and B. Both have preferences 
for public goods which relate to the amount of private goods to be sacrificed 
for them. Mapping their preferences from Public good - Private good space 
to Public good - tax space, we derive indifference curves for A and B. 
(Fig. 2.1). 
100/. 
% of tax 
paid by 
A. 
Fig. 2.1 
0 Quantity of Public Good 
10 
A4 is naturally a preferable state to A1 since it involves less tax 
and more goods. The characteristic shape of the indifference curves 
derives fundamentally from the changing elasticity of demand for public 
goods with respect to taxes or private_goods forgone. A1 and B1 
show a level of utility equivalent to the absence of any tax or public 
good. If A1 and B1 cross, then there exists scope, within the 
11 eye 11 
formed by the two curves, for mutually beneficial tax-share, public 
good arrangements. These agreements may, as in the orthodox Edgeworth 
Box formulation lie on the locus of the points of tangency between A•s 
and s•s utility functions i.e. between C and c1• Precisely where will 
depend on the relative power positions of the two parties concerned. A 
would naturally prefer to be at C, while B would prefer c1• A unanimity 
voting rule would require that, in the first position, both indifference 
curves are tangential not only to each other but also to the tax share 
line running horizontally across the diagram. ~here this takes place 
(at L) will be the Lindahl equilibrium, to which all parties will give 
consent. 
This analysis assumes, among other things, the absence of strategic 
behaviour on the part of participants. A and B are assumed to reveal 
their true feelings in the agreement procedure, showing no inclination 
to seek a free ride. The extreme restrictiveness of this assumption, 
together with the high cost inherent in the unanimity requirements led 
Black13 and Buchanan and Tullock14 to examine the voting process in 
greater deta i 1 • 
Samuelson:-
Samuelson, in his seminal article developing the .. pure .. theory of Public 
_Goods, examines the conditions for Pareto Optimal supply of Public Goods. 
He initially defines the two categories of goods: 
1 2 3 
xn Private: x1 = X' + x2 + x1 + 1 1 
X~ 2 3 X~ Public: x2 = = x2 = x2 = 
11 
Following Wickse11 16 he rejects the idea of the "mind of a benevolent 
despot" as a device to artificially suggest a coherent social indifference 
map. He creates in his diagramatic exposition17 a two person universe 
in which each person has a distinct preference map for Public and Private 
goods. 
Fig. 2.2. represents 
man 1's preference 
map for Private (x11) 
. 1 
and Public (X2 ) 
goods. 
Fig.2.3 represents 
man 2's preference 
map for Private 
and Public goods. 
Fig. 2.4 represents 
the societies' trans-
formation function 
for Private and 
Public goods~ x1 and X2 
Fig. 2.2 
Fig. 2.3 
Fig. 2.4 
The two individuals are perceived to 
act in isolation. Man 1's supply of 
2 
x, 
x, 
goods is seen as the residue after x1 
satisfaction of Man 2's demand. CD 
represents one of Man 2's indifference 
curves. When his demand is satisfied 
to this levels amount b of x1s the 
private goods remains for Man 1. 
Fig. 2.5 
X~ 2 = x2 
c 
"--== ~ 
= 
A 
u· 2 
0 
- u2 
12 
The amount of x2, the Public good, is 
undiminished. A point such as point E 
exists for each successive indiffe-
rence curve in Man 2's map. 
Together these points, cd, constitute 
a supply function for Man 1. This 
will be reconciled with his utility 
function at P, the point of tangency. 
This represents a pareto optimum in 
terms of the allocation of resources 
between Private and Public goods. 
There is an optimum of this kind for 
each pair of Man 1 and Man 2's 
indifference curves, so that a utility 
frontier pp can be generated illus-
trating the conflict between the 
individuals. Any point on this 
frontier is a Pareto Optimal point, 
in that no-one can be made better-
x, 
Fig. 2.6 
c 
w 
u, 
p 
Fig. 2.7 
p 
off except by making someone else worse off. The choice of an bptimum op-
timorum•,_g involves imputing a Social Welfare function, WW, incorporating 
interpersonal value judgements. 
Samuelson does not therefore depart substantially from Lindahl •s position, 
in that the public good question is placed within a framework of individual 
choice and exchange. The problem reduces to one of the absence of any 
mechanism for revealing preferences and establishing a working set of 
interpersonal comparisons. Resources do get allocated to private goods 
in practice because choices are expressed in an historical context, given 
an existing allocation of goods and the rights to dispose of them. No 
normative approach can resolve the question of what is efficient Public 
Goods production unless it accepts a Social welfare function, which implies 
a set of interpersonal normative conditions, as given. 
Lindahl implicitly did this by assuming, as a starting point, equal 
political power. Under these circumstances, a bargaining solution 
resulted, in which each party's demand was seen by the other as supply. 
13 
Presenting the Lindahl argument developed above in slightly different 
terms:-
Quantity A i31 I .. B 
of I 
Public / 1 / 
Good p/ 
Fig. 2.8 
0% Proportion of tax paid by A. 100% 
Thus line B is the Price-Quantity relationship facing A, with respect to 
the supply of Public goods, and line A is the supply curve facing B. 
Point P represents the community's equilibrium Quantity of Public goods 
and equilibrium "Price" in terms of relative cost shares paid by A and B. 
In the presence of exogenously determined concentration of political power 
in the hands of A, A will be able to force on B, his own preferences for 
Public Goods. A solution P1 will be derived as if B's demand for Public 
Goods was increased to B1• 
Lindahl concluded, rather lamely, that this exercise of power has political 
''cost" and that the weaker classes can redress the imbalance by convincing 
the powerful that their behaviour is "unjust". 
Samuelson has moved no further, therefore, than Lindahl did, except in so far 
as he added rigour and exactness to the theory of Public Goods. 
The real weakness of the Samuelson approach lies paradoxically in the very 
area which has won him acclaim, i.e. in the definition of a public good. 
14 
Samuelson concentrates on public goods as a specific category of commodity, 
recognizable by its characteristics, and more or less distinguishable from 
"ordinary" private goods. Private goods (X 1 ... Xn) can be parcelled 
out among different individuals (1,2 ••• i •.. s) according to the 
relations: 
x. = 
J 
That is to say, they are divisible, rival, in that one person•s consumption 
diminishes the possible consumption of others, excludable in that they may 
be "packaged" and sold to an individual so that effective ownership changes 
in exchange for money or goods of equal marginal value. In short, private 
goods are goods which may be unambiguously designated as private property, 
and may accordingly be adequately allocated through the price mechanism. 
Public goods on the other hand are goods which essentially fail to qualify 
as private goods and consequently became the responsibility of the "public .. 
or the government. Their "publicness .. rests, therefore, on their quint-
essential nature. This consists of the relationship that 
" ••• each individual •s consumption of such a good leads to 
no subtraction from any other individual •s consumption of 
that good, so that xn + j = xn + j simultaneously for 
each and every ith individual and each collective consumptive 
good ... 19 
A public good is in this way distinguished from a private good. It is 
thus possible to refer to goods which are .. Public" but which are in some 
specific circumstances privately produced, such as police or security 
services, or to goods which are by their nature private, but which through 
historical process are produced by government, such as electricity, 
education or old age pensions. 
By presenting such a polarised view of Public and Private Goods, Samuelson 
laid himself open to considerable criticism from, amongst others, Margolis, 20 
who pointed out that the majority of goods which are publicly provided do 
not match Samuelson•s rigorous description. "Clearly this is not the case 
in such common public services as education, hospitals, and highways ... 21 
Houghton, commenting editorially on the debate, says: 
15 
"The public good concept has not passed easily into general 
acceptance: a dearth of real world goods and services 
portraying the characteristics of pure publicness has been 
an embarrassment ..... 22 
What has been embarrassing, however, has not been the absence of pure 
public goods. (Economists' constant task is the construction of straw 
men and .. straw goods .. , to be struck down or fleshed out in the course 
of enquiry). The most important shortcoming of Samuelson's approach 
' has been its inability to integrate an explanatory model of the public 
sector into the body of positive economic theory. Instead, Samuelson 
is led to the lame but nevertheless important conclusion that 
..... no decentralized pricing system can serve to determine 
optimally these levels of collective consumption ... 23 
Samuelson is left, as was Lindahl, with the necessity of invoking the 
welfare economist's deus ex machina, the objective social welfare function, 
the expression of society's .. real .. needs and preferences. This, it is 
hoped, is more or less adequately exposed and given substance in the 
political process. 
4. The Theory of Voting 
Because of the central role of political decision making in deciding 
economic outcomes,attention turned to the logic and rationality of voting, 
and the stability of democratic outcomes. 
Median Voter: 
Hotelling24 and Downs25 presented a model in which the outcome of the 
voting process will go to the candidate who chooses a platform closest to 
the position of the median voter,i.e. no.50 to 51 in a field of 100. The 
assumptions of this model were, however, unduly restrictive, in that it 
assumed no abstentions, and a unidimensional issue set. Voters were held 
to be deciding on one issue only: liberalism vs conservatism. The 
implications of relaxing these assumptions have been carefully examined. 
" 
' 
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Cycling 
Black26 and Arrow27 examined the possibility that in a multi-issue 
election, with a majority rule constitution, there may not be a stable 
political solution which expresses the preference of the majority. For 
example, if a community were to choose among three alternative uses of a 
piece of land: rugby field, bowling greens or tennis courts. The 
preferences of the members of the community can be expressed as in tab~e 
2.1. 
Table 2.1 
Voters Rugby Bowls Tennis Rugby 
A > > < 
B > < > 
c < > > 
Community > > > 
In a pairwise vote, i.e. a vote on two issues at a time, no clear solution 
would emerge. Despite the fact that individuals' preferences are rational 
and transitive, the community's preferences are not transitive, when 
tested on a pairwise basis. As a result, cycling occurs in which a new 
outcome is generated by each vote. 
Logrolling 
Majority rule has the well-known defect of not taking any account of the 
intensities of individual votes. As a result an apathetic majority can 
do harm to a minority who feel very strongly on the issue. As a conse-
quence, scope exists for vote trading or 'logrolling.' 
! 
I 
f 
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Costs A C 
Fig. 2.9 
0% a I 100% 
percentage of consensus 
The horizontal axis models the level of consensus, ranging from 0 to. 100%. 
The vertical axis represents costs, in real terms. Cost function AA1 
models the cost of reaching decisions which are unfavourable to some 
members i.e. conformance costs. These are naturally highest when the 
decisions are made by a very small proportion of the population. This situa-
tiGn at a, for example, presents a very great potential for decision makers 
to harm non-decision makers. Where 100% con5ensus is required on the 
other hand, no-one can be harmed by the collective decision. 
Cost function BB 1 represents "participation costs" i.e. the cost of 
reaching a decision at a certain level of consensus. These costs are low 
for a single decision maker, but are high where unanimity is required. 
The summation of these two costs, cc1, will be at a minimum at some inter-
mediate point, I. The precise position of I will depend on the potential 
of the issue at hand to affect the individual •s welfare, and on the ease 
or difficulty of reaching a decision, given the specific mix of individuals. 
:osts 
0% 
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I 100% 0% 
I I I 
Percentage of Consensus Percentage of Consensus 
Fig. 2.10 Fig. 2.11 
In fig. 2.10, depicting a decision of a technical nature, such as the 
building of a sewerage works, costs are very low, since people tend 
to be fairly homogeneous as regards their demand for sewerage disposal. 
The decision of any one individual is likely to be a close proxy for 
100% 
the_ community as a whole. In this case collective decision making costs are also 
very low, but rising as high levels of consensus are reached. One would 
_expect, therefore to find such decisions being delegated to a relatively 
small group of people, and this is indeed the rule in local governments. 
Fig. 2.11 illustr~t~a decision with a great potential to do harm to 
individual interests. The conformance costs are accordingly high. High 
also are the costs of reaching consensus among a population which is hete-
rogeneous with respect to the issue. The minimum cost situation I' • is 
likely, therefore, to be at a level of high consensus. 
Buchanan and Tullack show, therefore, that it is completely rational to forgo 
the safeguard of the individual veto for the sake of cheaper and more 
expeditious decision making. Conceptually, they shift the Wicksellian 
unanimity requirement from the level of specific decisions, to the level 
of deciding on the decision-making procedure or the constitution. 
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6. The Supply of Public Goods 
Thus far we have outlined various approaches to the articulation of demand 
for public goods. It remains to perform the same service for those who 
have analysed the patterns of response to this demand. 
30 Anthony Downs produced the seminal work in this regard, drawing an analogy 
between the profit maximizing firm and the vote maximizing political party, 
both within a competitive framework. William Riker31 built on this by 
presenting political parties as maximizing power potential, rather than 
vote totals. They would, for example, seek to win elections by making 
the minimum of concessionary promises. Small sized winning coalitions 
would be preferable to landslide victories, from this perspective. 
The behaviour of the bureaucrat was examined by Tullock32 who saw him as 
a maximizing entity, responding to his own career objectives, and by 
Niskanen 33 who portrayed bureaucratic departments as budget maximizers. 
The theory of supply of public goods is, as yet, undeveloped. It is only 
in the Public choice school, with its concentration on the institution, 
that any attempt is made to integrate it with the theory of demand. 
7. Institutions 
Buchanan34 in his analysis of the demand and supply for public goods 
directs attention at the process through which this demand and supply occurs. 
"Public goods are demanded and supplied through processes that are 
themselves selected at some stage, and apparently for reason." 35 
The reasons he presents for the institutionalisation of decision making 
are essentially reasons of cost saving. For example, individual private 
goods purchases are often institutionalized if it is expected that the 
decision making costs saved by this means will outweigh the extra costs incur-
red, say, of having a paper delivered when it is not wanted. 
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While it is true that many private goods decisions are institutionalized 
in this way, through contractual and other means, it is in the field of 
Public Goods that costs of decision-making among large numbers of people 
become particularly important. When the outcome of a decision is 
indivisible, for example, the siting of a nuclear power station, the 
building of a public road or the provision of national defence, then large 
numbers of people are necessarily involved in it. As we have discussed 
above, such decision-making can be costly. It is rational, therefore, to 
create institutions which are cost-saving, for example the creation of 
nuclear, road-building and defence authorities with their own circumscribed 
frames of reference. The scope of operation of these institutions must 
f necessarily be limited, so as to constitute a decision "rule". While the 
rule may yield some intra period inefficiencies, its existence suggests 
that it was expected to place a burden no heavier than the decision-making 
costs saved over the whole period considered. The nature of the "rule .. 
or institution is, of course, defined by its frame of reference, which is 
conrnonly reviewed through either bureaucratic or democratic process, often 
through the appointment or election of a director, minister, management 
committee or council. The entire set of community decisions thus becomes 
concentrated, through delegation, in one single choice, that of an 
executive body or individual. Costs are thus saved, despite the fact 
that costs are also incurred as a result of delegation. 
,This institutionalisation of choice procedures lies, for Buchanan at the 
heart of the Public Goods question. Th~ distinction between this approach 
and the 11Samuelson" approach outlined earlier can best be illustrated by 
looking at their respective definitions of Public Goods. 
Samuelson implicitly states that 11 Public Goods should be Public" 36 , 
effectively avoiding a definition in favour of providing a rigorous 
solution to the problem of the allocation of resources between the two 
categories of goods: 
"I explicitly assume two categories of goods: ordinary private 
consumption goods ••• and collective consumption goods" 37 
Buchanan's enquiry is aimed at providing an explanation of observable 
institutional choice. His definition is phrased in a positive way, rather 
than the normative way pursued by Samuelson, Musgrave et al. Buchanan asks: 
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"Under what circumstances will individuals as participating 
members of a politically organized community select collec-
tive organization as the means of supplying a particular 
. ?"38 good or serv1ce. 
In analysing the choice between lighthouses and cinema performances, the 
"Samuelsonian" would categorize lighthouses as clear examples of Publi~ 
Goods, being non-excludable, non rival and indivisible. Attendance at the 
cinema performances is, on the other hand, clearly divisible, excludable 
and rival in that showing the film to a specific person may deprive some 
other person of access to the facility. Once the seats are filled, there 
is no space to accommodate more people. The cinema attendance is thus 
clearly a private good. 
Having categorized the two on the basis of their characteristics, the 
analyst goes on to tackle the thorny question_ of how to allocate resources 
between them. If confronted with a private lighthouse or public cinemas, 
the analyst would presumably allude grandly to the diversity of the universe, 
blaming unusual political circumstances. 
In terms of Buchanan•s institutional approach, however, the question 
presents itself in the form: .. Why are lighthouses publicly produced and 
cinemas privately?.. In truth, both goods are collective in the sense that 
once they are switched on, simply looking at them does not diminish them. 
What does decline in the case of the cinema is its accessibility. Even 
an outdoor showing on a large screen would at some point become crowded 
and congested. Such, however, is equally true of the lighthouse in that 
shipping lanes can become congested. The distinction between the two 
goods rests not in the possession or non-possession of the characteristic 
11 rivalness .. but on the technical (and political) ability to define and 
enforce individual rights or shares in the final product. 
The theoretical capability of doing this is almost always present. 
Cinema showings can be made private by the construction of a building with 
a ticket office, etc. A lighthouse can also be made excludable by denying 
access to non-payers by means of naval enforcement procedures. Again, 
the distinction does not lie in the possession of the characteristic 
.. excludability .. , but in the relative costs of exclusion. 
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At this stage, it is possible to venture a tentative answer to the 
question: "Why are lighthouses commonly Public?" We could say it is 
because exclusion is expensjve relative to expected revenues likely to 
result from private provision. Firms do not provide lighthouse services 
in the main because it is not profitable. It is therefore "left" to 
the government to do so. 
Public provision itself, however, carries considerable costs in relation 
to private provision. Public Provision, as an institutional framework, 
has to be financed through coercive taxation, i.e~ a reduction in other 
kinds of consumption. This, in relation to private provision at prices 
equal to Marginal Cost, imposes costs on participants in that even goods 
which may not be wanted must be "bought" and "paid for" in taxes. 
Both private and public modes of provision of services impose costs on 
society. Private provision requires exclusion which is costly, while 
Public provision implies the indiscriminate provision to all people 
whether they choose the service or not, together with coercive taxation. 
Costs of 
Exclusion 
and 
Coercion 
Fig. 2.12 
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Inde~ of Indivisibility 
EE1 is the cost function associated with private prov1s1on. This is 
shown as low for a good which is easily and cheaply made divisible, through 
the statutory definition of property rights, but is high for the goods, 
such as lighthouses for which the securing of property rights, although 
possible, can be accomplished only at high costs. 
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CC 1 is the COSt function associated With public prOVlSlOn, i.e. the 
costs of coercion. These will be high for easily divisible goods for 
which the benefits are individual, but will be low for indivisible goods, 
which, like the lighthouse, bestow benefits very widely. 
To the left of line xx1, the costs associated with Public provision are 
greater than those associated with Private provision. In terms of our 
illustration,-the costs incurred by being forced to pay for films you do 
not watch is greater than the possible savings arising from not having 
to set up and pay for exclusion apparatus. Freely associating individuals 
will derive greatest advantage by producing these goods privately. 
To the right of the line xx1 lie goods such as the lighthouse, for which 
costs of coercion are low since even non-mariners benefit from safer, 
cheaper shipping. Costs associated with private provision are high. 
Twenty-four hour radar surveillance and naval enforcement procedures are 
very expensive, more expensive than the coercion costs that may be poten-
tially saved by selecting a private institutional framework. These goods 
will tend to be publicly provided. If Public institutions were not yet 
available, this would be a strong incentive for citizens to create them 
through voluntary association. 
This approach introduces into the question of institutional choice a 
calculus based on the criterion .. indivisibility... While .. indivisibility .. 
is itself a problematic concept resulting in circular reasoning, (we know 
the goods are indivisible because they are publicly provided), this calculus 
does take us away from the Public-Private polarity arising from the 
Samuelson approach. 
The significance of this departure is very great. By looking upon 
government or quasi-government enterprise as a rational response for the 
satisfaction of some human wants, Buchanan places public goods analysis on 
the same positive footing as private goods analysis. The need to impute 
a social welfare function to provide answers to the normative questions 
of 11Which goods shall be public. and how shall resources be allocated to 
public goods? .. no longer exists. Economists are able to merely look at 
the economic world and.attempt positive explanations for what they observe. 
Government is brought within the realm of economic thought with the happy 
result that it is no longer necessary to look upon government enterprise as 
a cancer in the breast of Free Enterprise or as evidence of .. creeping 
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It is also possible, within this framework, to see local government, as 
does Buchanan, as one among a wide variety of institutional forms 
generated by the economic process. 
Buchanan classifies goods across a range of institutional arrangements, 
using the characteristics indivisibility and the size of the group over 
which the indivisibilities hold.40 
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The classification ranges from fully private goods which are fully divi-
sible, and whose indivisibility (being non-existent) affects a very small 
number of people (0). These are represented at (1} on the diagram 
(fig. 2.13). At the other extreme, category (5) consists of goods which 
are fully indivisible, affecting many people i.e. pure Public Goods in 
the Samuelsonian sense. Intermediate categories are described (2}. 
These goods are partially divisible, but limited in their effect to small 
groups. Goods in this group are substitutable in some degree, amon~ 
consumption units. The example of a Fire Extinguisher is given. If I 
give my neighbour my fire extinguisher, I do not fully lose its use-value. 
My risk of fire is still somewhat reduced, though not as much as if I 
had kept it at home. 
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Category (3) consists of goods which are only partially divisible, but 
which affect large numbers of people. Buchanan gives, as an example, 
innoculations against infectious diseases. This is only partially divi-
sible in that some, but not all of the benefits accrue to the "purchaser" 
of this good, while some benefits accrue to all other members of the 
society, in that the risk of an epidemic is reduced. 
Category (4) refers to goods which are fully indivisible but which affect 
only small groups of people. These kinds of goods will be normally pro-
vided through club-like organisations, 'Sports clubs, swimming clubs 
being examples. The sports facilities, br the swimming pool is equally 
available to all members, provided that the size of the club is limited. 
Buchanan's approach to Public Goods is thus broadened to include goods 
provided under a wide range of institutional forms. Public and Private 
goods are made into two polar positions in a more general theory of the 
organisation of Production. 
Buchanan hastens to point out that this categorisation is by no means 
immutable and may be radically changed by circumstances. A good securely 
categorized as (5), a fully indivisible good affecting all people, may 
change its category to (4) if the size of the political unit changes, or 
the social and physical technology is developed for defining and enforcing 
property rights. 
A sports facility may be a public good, category (5) with respect to a 
small municipality, but may become more efficiently a category (4) if 
the municipality were to become part of a metropolitan government. In 
this case one would predict an organisational change, with the facility 
being transferred to a club or society. 
In a similar way, the structure of statutory property rights has a 
fundamental impact on the effective divisibility of a good or resource. 
In a society which recognizes and defends private ownership of land, 
grazing rights are fully divisible goods of category (1). In a similar 
situation in which private property rights in land are not recognized, 
grazing becomes a good of category (4) or even (5), a fully public good. 
r 27 This analysis has provided the beginning of an approach which will enable 
us to view local authorities as an appropriate organisational framework 
within which certain goods and services are provided. In following 
chapters, the specific questions of which goods are efficiently produced 
on a local 1evel, which on a private and which on a national level, will 
be more closely examined. 
8. The Theory of Clubs 
The Public Choice approach, outlined above, requires that Demand and Supply 
be dealt with simultaneously, since the institutional supply of a commodity 
establishes the means by which demand is articulated and preferences 
revealed. A category (1) good is supplied privately and demanded through 
individual purchase. Category (5) Public goods are supplied by central 
government and demanded through a political process such as voting. 
Other 11 intermediate .. situations have their own institutional frameworks, 
often consisting partly of prices, e.g. membership fees, and partly political 
processes, voting procedures, lobbying and committee representation. Demand 
and Supply can only be discussed within the framework of the relevant 
institutional form. It is always true that producers and consumers of 
goods are, as De Viti de Marco41 points out, identical. To discuss 
demand and supply separately is to look within the institution to uncover 
its internal workings. 
Buchanan, extending the Public Choice approach, presents us with an inside 
look at a specific institutional arrangement: the Association or Club.42 
We have briefly discussed the circumstances which give rise to the club as 
an institutional form. We will now follow Buchanan _in his analysis of 
optimal club size, and optimal facility size. 
a) Optimal Membership 
It is presumed that existing members of a club will encourage new members 
if the new member adds more to the total benefit of belonging to the club 
than he adds to the total cost. Both Costs and Benefits are presented 
in Fig. 2.14. 
c1 is the cost per person 
of membership. This de-
creases as the total cost 
of the facility :is shared 
among more people. 
B1 is the benefit of 
membership per person. 
This may be initially 
Costs 
Benefits 
per 
person 
Fig. 2.14 
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lower than the costs, indicating that one person would not supply the 
facility for his own use alone. The initially rising part of this 
I 
B,-B, (membership) function indicates possible increasing conviviality 
of membership of a group of people. At point S, the maximum of this 
curve, congestion sets in and additional people reduce one•s benefit, 
while also reducing cost. At point T, B-C is at a maximum. Beyond 
this point savings resulting from the additional members• contribution 
to the collective purse are insufficient to compensate for the 
congestion created. 
b) Optimal size of 
facility: 
c1 shows the positive re-
lationship between the 
Total 
Cost per 
Member 
size of facility and the Fig. 2.15 
Total Cost. This func-
tion will fall toward Ck Size of facility 
as the membership increases. 
B1 shows the positive 
relationship between the 
size of the facility and 
the benefit accruing to 
the members. This 
function is also affected 
by membership, possibly 
increasing benefit at low 
Total 
Benefit 
Fig. 2.16 
levels of membership but reducing 
at high levels, towards Bk. 
Size of facility 
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The single member "club", may never be optimal as its cost and benefit 
patterns diverge with size. 
c) Size/Membership Optimum 
Larger groups of people, clubs 
of larger membership sizes may 
be viable as en falls below Bn. 
The optimum size of facility 
which a club of n membership 
would choose will be at Qk where 
Bn - en is at a maximum. 
Putting together the schedules 
of Membership optima, depending 
on size 0•1) and size optima de-
pending on membership, (S) a 
Cost, 
Benefit 
per 
Member 
Fig. 2.17 
Cost, 
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point G is reached, a size-membership 
optimum. A Club which installs a large 
facility will find itself under pressure 
to expand membership. A club with large membership 
Size of Facility 
Size of Facility 
s 
No. of Members 
will tend to increase its facility size or reduce membership. 
Thus Buchanan presents us with a view of the internal demand and supply rela-
tionships within a collective, co-operative institutional form, that of the 
club. Similar internal relationships are inherent in every institutional 
arrangement from the nuclear family to central government. It remains the 
task of economic studies to lay bare these relationships as they manifest 
themselves in specific instances for example in the case of membership of a 
local authority. 
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9. CONCLUSION 
In choosing among instit~tions, and in selecting the appropriate means 
for reaching institutional decisions, individuals are engaged in the 
rational minimisation of transaction costs and internalisation of costs 
and benefits external to the individual. Public Goods, when seen in 
this perspective are simply goods which are commonly provided through 
the range of institutions representing "government". Changing circum-
stances can result in goods that were "public" becoming "private", and 
vice versa. 
All goods can be seen as being provided through one or other institu-
tional form, a form which is itself selected in a competitive process. 
Government is, in this view, not the antithesis to Private enterprise. 
Both are, on the contrary, institutions which co-exist to the benefit 
of individual consumers. 
In the following chapters we will attempt to place the institution of 
the Local Authority within this framework, and to examine the circum-
stances under which it makes decisions. 
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CHAPTER 3 LOCAL PUBLIC GOODS 
1. What is a 'local Public Good'? 
Local Public Goods are, in terms of the approach outlined in the previous 
chapter, simply those commodities which are produced by the wide range 
of institutions known as local authorities. Precise definitions for these 
authorities are not easy to construct. They range in size from the 
government of a city like New York, which is larger and more influential 
than most small nations, to small school boards, water boards, or most 
commonly, small municipalities. The commodities which they supply are 
equally diverse, varying from personal .welfare services, including health 
care, unemployment benefits or citizens• advisory services, to the provi-
sion of industrial sites or properties, and the construction of freeways. 
Most of these services can be provided through institutional forms other 
than the local authority. For example, sewerage can, and is, disposed of 
privately by means of septic tanks, schools are often privately and as 
often, nationally, provided. Even police services can be produced 
privately (Security Guards, private detective agencies) at local authority 
level or at State, Provincial or central government level. The character-
istic of these goods and services that categorise them as 'Local Public 
Goods' is simply the fact that they are supplied and demanded through the 
institution of local government. Whether they are simultaneously supplied 
through other institutions does not concern the an·alysis, which examines 
the choice of local government as an institution. The analysis which 
follows is accordingly concentrated on the institution, and not on the goods 
and services as such. 
We must however address ourselves to the question of how the production of 
, ··certain goods emerges as the legitimate sphere of interest of local 
':_:·.-\.,:· -; \.">·. 
-,. :· · ~-:;:·• }Vernments • 
. '·/·1: -
The institutional choice approach suggests that this will occur if the 
commodity in question has externalities of production or 
consumption which extend over a group of people which may usefully be . 
· constituted as a local jurisdiction. For example, sewerage installation 
can provide scale economies in production which make it worthwhile for a 
group of contiguously situated people to co-operate in its provision. 
The costs of reaching agreement between such people concerning matters 
such as the quality and design of such a service is likely to be very 
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low, and the potential to impose costs on community members through 
compulsory provision of an unwanted facility are also likely to be low, 
since there is usually consensus among neighbours regarding sanitation. 
As a result the costs of collective, institutional action are likely to 
be low, in this specific case, while the potential savings are likely to 
be substantial. It is for this reason that we find collective action 
prevailing in the competition between private and communal sewerage 
provision. There is always a strong incentive for people to abandon the 
individual institution in favour of the collective. There is however 
equally strong incentive for people to.abandon, or try to abandon, an over-
collectivised institution in favour of smaller, or individualised, 
institutional fonms. Over the whole of Greater Cape Town, for example, 
there is not the degree of consensus regarding the disposal of sewerage 
· that exjsts in the average white suburb or town. The very poorest members 
of the community have displayed and continue to display a willingness to 
sacrifice services such as water-borne sewerage for the sake of other goods 
or services, which may be of higher priority. The universal metropole-
wide provision of water-borne sewerage and other services will therefore 
have the effect of imposing costs on these people, or any others, who do 
not value the service as highly as the next available alternative. The 
calculus described above and in the previous chapter may, as a result, 
disfavour the very large jurisdiction. 
Costs 
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Figure 3.1 illustrates the position: on the horizontal axis is a 
measure of the diversity or non-homogeneity of the community, assumed 
to be positively related to size. 
On the vertical axis are the costs and benefits (in real tenms) 
associated with Local Public Goods. Function C = the cost function of 
collective decision making. This has two components, the cost of 
-imposing unwanted facilities on some members and the cost of reaching 
an appropriate level of consensus through voting or other decision 
making techniques. Both of these are assumed to be positively related 
to the size of the jurisdiction. A small jurisdiction of size (a) 
is assumed to house people of fairly similar tastes and preferences 
as regards local Public Goods. As a result the cost of reaching 
collective decisions and the costs of imposing these on the community 
will be low at Ca. The benefits to be gained from collective action 
are likely to be very much greater at Ba. One can predict therefore 
that in the absence of other dominating factors, collective action will 
result. On the other hand, at size b, collectivisation costs will have 
risen to Cb, as a result of the growing diversity of the population. 
Benefits resulting for example from Scale economies will also have 
risen, but at a different rate so that in the example they are at Bb, 
which is below Cb. Members of this community will seek to break their 
relationship with the oversized local government and establish services 
and private bases. In so doing the population will be· reduced, and 
political pressures will rise to force a change of scale on the local 
government unit. Only at size C will a stable situation exist where 
there is no incentive to leave or to join the community. 1 
Competition between different institutions thus results in the social 
solution of institutional fonms appropriate to the functions they 
perfonn. 
B,C 
B 
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Figure 3.2 illustrates a commodity produced in a community where costs 
are always in excess of potential benefits. An example may be public 
television in a very diverse community. One would expect, and indeed, one 
does observe, that such services tend to favour individual, non-communal 
institutions (video hire, cable TV). 
Figure 3.3 illustrates the situation where benefits of collectivisation 
are always h1gher than the costs, even at very large jurisdiction size. 
An example of this might be National Defence. 
Figure 3.4 shows the situation in which the small sized collective 
institution is chosen. 
The initial example of sewerage disposal -~ervices chosen allowed us to 
refer to the benefits of collective action at local level as economies 
of scale. This is however only one of a number of reciprocal external 
effects which could give rise to collective action. 
Among the best-known of these are non-r.ivalness 
in consumption referred to above in our discussion of Samuelsonian 
Public Goods. In effect this means indivisibility in consumption. 
Almost all goods possess these externalities to some extent. Even 
clothes are indivisible in the sense that while only one person may wear 
them, others may look at them, with resulting benefit or cost. What 
dist~nguishes the commodity as one which is likely to be a Public Good 
is not therefore the mere presence of indivisibilities, ,but the extent 
of this externality and, consequently, the extent of the benefits to 
be gained by institutionally internalising them. Where:these are 
expected to .be greater than the extra costs associated with the institu-
tional form of supply and demand then we are likely to observe the good 
being publicly provided. The consideration that makes the good a local 
public good, rather than, for example a national public good, is simply, 
as we discussed in the previous chapter, the area of land or number of 
people over which the kind of externality extends. 
Fig 3.5 
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local Public Goods occupy the area A, being goods of moderate to high 
indivisibilities, which extend over a group of medium size. 
Davis and Whinston2 discuss real estate services in this context. 
They show that Pareto optimum service levels cannot be reached where 
there are reciprocal externalities related to the consumption of real 
estate. Prices on their own do not hold sufficient information in the 
presence of such externalities. Group action however can internalise 
these externalities, resulting in a solution which will be closer to 
optimum. The specific group action they examine is the zoning of 
property, which is seen as a collective good, providing information, 
creating certainty about the future, and minimising the costs of 
contracting. 
Harvey, commenting on the Davis & Whinston.model states: 
'What this analysis of the housing market shows 
is that a free market cannot give rise to prices 
conducive to a Pareto Optimum and that the 
housing market, for reasons of its own spatial 
internal logic must contain group action if it 
is to function coherently.•3 
It is the contention of this.thesis that the group action involved is 
the provision of local public goods through the agency of the local 
authority. 
2. Articulation of Demand for local .Public Goods_ 
In the previous chapter we showed why Samuelson is 
pessimistic about societies' ability to allocate resources efficiently 
to public goods production. This, as we observed, is fundamentally 
because of an absence of any mechanism for revealing people's preferences 
for public goods, which is analagous to the private act of purchase • 
. Where public goods are collective in consumption, 'free riding' is 
rational and refusal to pay for a good does not function as a signal. of 
not wanting it at that price. Other means of preference articulation 
are needed, including voting, with its many problems such as those 
outlined by Black,4 Arrow, 5 Buchanan & Tullock.6 
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Charles Tiebout7 suggests that while this may be true for centrally 
provided public goods, it is not so for local or neighbourhood public 
goods. He presents a model in which public goods are provided at a 
local level to residents whose domicile in the area is the outcome of 
a·maximising decision process in the course of which a neighbourhood 
is freely chosen in preference to a large selection of competing neigh-
bourhoods. Among the factors affecting this choice, such as location, 
proximity to work, to markets etc., local fiscal variables loom 
particularly large: 'The consumer-voter may be viewed as picking that 
community which best satisfies his preference pattern for Public 
Goods •. 8 
A house-seeker whose family consumption patterns are strongly influenced 
by the needs of the children in the family may look with favour upon a 
local area which taxes residents to provide schools, parks, safe walking 
and cycling places and other child-oriented facilities. Such a con-
sumer would prefer a residence in a neighbourhood which is well served in 
this way to a, residence in an .area which is ,poorly served, or served in 
a non-preferred way, for example, in a 'downtown' area. In the act 
-of choosing where to. live, where .to purchase housing, ,the resident is 
expressing a preference for the set of local public. ·goods on offer. 
'Spatia 1. mobility~~ :-Writes Ti ebout, • provides the 1 oca 1 pub 1 i c goods 
counterpart to the private market's shopping trip~. 9 
There exists, therefore, in the choice-between competing residential 
areas a potentially effective instrument for registering preferences 
for some categories of public goods. It is possible that under the 
right conditions_a Pareto optimum in the allocation of resources to 
Local Public Goods could be reached. Included amongst these conditions 
are mobility between neighbourhoods, knowledge of the fiscal character-
istics of different areas, heterogeneity, absence of mobility 
restrictions resulting from employment opportunities. There must be no 
externalities between communities, and long term cost structures must 
be such that there is an optimal community size. This will ensure that 
towns which are smaller than optimum will benefit their residents by 
attracting new members. 
Within the local authority, decisions are made in relation to the 
property market mechanism and through the political mechanism, which 
may be representational, autocratic or of any other kind. The 
4U 
efficiency of the decisions taken as well as the efficiency of the 
' decision-making process will in a Tiebout world be ensured by the 
responses of accommodation-seekers in their choice and purchase of 
property in competing jurisdictions. 
Having thus stated the Tiebout 'Voting-with-the-feet• hypothesis, 
we will turn briefly to some of the attempts that have been made to 
justify it empirically. 
3. Capitalisation 
The first real attempt to demonstrate the Tiebout Hypothesis empirically 
came from Wallace Oates in 1969, fifteen years after its statement in 
1956. In his seminal paper, 10 Oates suggested that a utility 
maximising consumer compares the benefits of a public programme with 
its costs and chooses that which gives the greatest surplus of benefits 
over costs. 
'It is the present value of the future stream of 
benefits from the public services relative to 
the present value of future fax payments that 
is in this case important.•1 
This suggests that a tax which finances a useful public programme may 
not reduce net rental income to property owners, but may in fact 
increase it if the present value of the benefit stream exceeds the 
present value of liabilities generated.· The capitalised value of this 
surplus provides a measure of the differences between the fiscal 
packages provided by different jurisdictions, other things (particu-
larly tax rates) being equal. By measuring fiscal capitalisation, 
Oates suggests that a major proposition of the Tiebout hypothesis, 
that fiscal variables matter, is tested. 
His empirical test, a cross sectional study of 53 New Jersey residential 
areas, yielded favourable statistical results showing the fiscal proxies 
choseg, (tax rate and expenditure per school pupil) to be significant 
in the explanation of house values, and to_affect them in the 
directions predicted, i.e. taxes negatively, expenditure positively. 
Moreover, the magnitudes of the co-efficients supported the notion 
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consumers migrate into the area, congesting local services, bringing 
about a Tiebout equilibrium, in which no rent is earned. 
In order to maintain this rent, zoning restrictions may be used to 
impose minimum entrance qualifications on prospective entrants. In 
this case the counterpart of the fiscal haven, the fiscal slum, may 
also earn a rent. If the demand for low cost housing exceeds supply, 
for example, in the wake of 'urban renewal' slum clearance, (or in 
the South African context squatter clearance) programmes, the price 
of remaining low cost housing goes up, reflecting the rent earned by 
a fiscal slum. 
Thus although ••• 'The Oates test does what he claims for it ••• 
it should be pointed out that the results do not follow necessarily 
from the Tiebout hypothesis ••• •14 
This controversy over the precise econometric specification of the 
Tiebout hypothesis was further advanced by Epple, Zelenitz & Visscher 
in 197815 who show that Oates does not adequately test capitalisation 
because the capitalisation parameters are not econometrically 
identified • 
••• an investigation·indicates that the parameter 
on t (Property tax rate) cannot, in general, be 
identified using only median voter data or without 
imposing particular functional forms or 
restrictions.•16 . 
The essential features of the Tiebout hypothesis are individual ration-
ality, in the sense that people.choose .their place to live, based on 
housing and fiscal variables subject to.mobility and zoning constraints. 
The second feature of the model forms the basis of their econometric 
specification of the hypothesis. This is that voting-with-the-feet 
results in.Pareto optimal allocation of local Public Goods. In other 
words, the deadweight loss of taxation is eliminated by mobility. 
• ••• the questions are whether and to what extent 
the mechanism of rational locational choice can 
reduce the deadweight loss of taxation, and 
whether the degree to which that reduction is 
achieved can be distinguished ~~ examination of 
fiscal and housing variables.• 
In order to specify and test this question, Epple, Zelenitz & 
Visscher set up two models, one of a Tiebout community, in which fiscal 
variables do not feature as explanatory variables, having been 
•neutralised' by the Tiebout process. The other model is of the non-
Tiebout, heterogeneous community in which voting-with-the~feet has 
not eliminated fiscal differentials. 
Tiebout Community: 
log Hj = a + a. log Ij + £·. 0 lJ 
log Gj = b + b, log Ij + £ 0 2j 
log tj = 1 og G j - 1 og H j +E_ • 3J 
Heterogeneous Community: 
log Hj = a 0 + a 1 log Ij +a log t. 2 J 
log Gj = B + B. log I. + B 1 og t. 0 J 2 J 
log tj = log G. - log H. + l1 . J J 3J 
in which 
H. = housing in community j 
J 
+ ll• . 
- J 
+ l1 . 2J 
G. = Government services in community j 
J 
tj = tax rates in community j 
E and l1 are error terms. 
Significance in the tax variable tj would be an indication that the 
Tiebout model should be rejected. This test was not however carried 
out by the authors since, on further reflection, they found that the 
two models could not be distinguished from each other by reference to 
median voter data. They are led to conclude that 'to date no meaning-
ful test of the Tiebout hypothesis has been conducted•. 18 
Subsequent papers have indicated that the Tiebout hypothesis does work, 
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particularly in metropolitan areas with a substantial degree of 
jurisdictional variety. Gramlich and Rubinfeld19 use both macro-
and survey data to test the Tiebout implication that residents will 
group themselves as regards demand for public goods. Constructing 
a demand function for public goods, they find the median community 
income positively and significantly related to the level of spending. 
looking at the variances of the demand so derived, they find signifi-
cant grouping occurring. They conclude therefore that this aspect at 
least of the Tiebout mechanism is observable empirically. 
4. .Competition and Politics 
.. 
Epple and Zelenitz20 point out that previous studies have taken the 
approach of viewing jurisdiction·s in isolation from their neighbours. 
They return to the fundamental Tiebout principle of competition, 
concentrating on the proximity-of local authorities .to one another. 
They attempt to establish whether.the Tiebout analysis leads to a 
purely 'invisible hand' ·solution to the social welfare problem or 
whether the political process has a role to play. They frame their 
questi.on in such a way as to eliminate the specific objectives of 
local officials from the optimising process: 
'Does competition among a large number of local 
governments assure efficient public goods 
provision even if governments of individual jurisdictions pursue objectives that are not 
necessarily public-regarding?•21 
Their answer to this question is 'no', for two separate reasons: 
firstly, they cite technological reasons why Pareto efficiency may not 
be attainable: 
a) . local governments may not be diverse enough to meet the many 
demands of residents; 
b) the specific taxing and spending policies may be such as to 
cause prices for buyers and sellers to differ; 
c) economies of scale in local public good production may lead to 
a differential between marginal and average cost. 
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In the second place, local officials may be no more public-serving in 
their outlook than anyone else. Governments which are self-seeking in 
that they seek to maximise •profits•, expenditure or local property 
values, may to the extent that land is immobile between jurisdictions, 
expropriate a proportion of the rent accruing to land within their 
boundaries, by taxing at a high rate and expanding their activities 
beyond the level desired. 
Epple & Zelenitz thus .show that interjurisdictional competition cannot 
alone explain local authority behaviour. A theory of local politics 
must also form part of the picture. 
The actions of local government, supplying local amenities, and the 
actions of property purchasers and sellers, demanding local amenities 
must be explained in an institutional context which explains both 
economic and political mechanisms. 
Constitutional arrangements, voting rules, and the nature of relation-
ships between variocs governmental bodies, are of central significance 
in this regard. 
s.·. Migration 
The importance of constitutional provisions for government at different 
levels is stressed by the conclusions of a study by Buchanan and 
Goetz. 22 In their examination of migration as a market clearing 
process in the market for public goods, they set up a Ricardian 
increasing cost model of two regions, A and B, in which region A is 
more abundantly supplied with land, a fixed factor, than is B. In a 
migration.model without public goods, labour would move, if perfectly 
mobile, between Band A to equalise marginal products of labour. In 
a model .with public goods, however, the movement of labour to A reduces 
the tax-price.of public goods in A and increases it in B, the region 
which the mi.grant is leaving. As a result, the spatial equilibrium 
which results.will be characterised by a lower marginal product of 
labour in A than B, a differential which is offset by a lower tax-
price for public goods in A than B. 
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This equilibrium may be sub-optimal because the effect of the migrants• 
move on the area he leaves (an increase in the tax price of public 
goods) or enters (a decrease in the tax-price of public goods) does 
not enter his calculus of utility. It is an externality which imposes 
, costs on some and benefits on others. 
Flatters, Hendersvn and Mieszkowski 23 comment: 
'If this externality is not internalized by 
centralized decision making, then one 
region may be overpopulated and the 
other underpopulated.' 
£. Conclusion 
Thus the institutional approach .to government and public goods 
provision is reinforced by much of the available evidence. Not ·only 
does the market for public goods require collective action on the 
local level, but for specific public services collective action at 
the central level is appropriate -and necessary to approach an optimum 
of Social Welfare. Institutions are.chosen in a process of free 
association which, because of the competitive process of choice among 
alternatives, either by voting, migration or 'bureaucratic entrepre-
neurship', will tend to be the most suitable ones available. 
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CHAPTER 4 THE FUNDING OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
The previous chapters have situated the institution of the local authority 
within the context of the market economy, and have outlined in theory the 
process through which resources are allocated towards specific local 
public goods and through which local governments are selected as the most 
efficient institution for providing them. 
This chapter will explore the different ways in which the local government 
can finance its activities. Various categories of taxes will be examined, 
as will grants, subsidies and user charges. Discussion of borrowing by 
local governments, a fourth source of funds, will occupy a later chapter. 
This will be followed by commentary on some frequently encountered 
practices and on some of the proposals embodied in the President's Council 
Report. 
1. Sources of Funds 
There are four basic sources of funds for local authorities: 
(a) Taxes of various kinds 
(b) Fees and user charges 
(c) Subsidies from other government bodies 
(d) Borrowing 
In Figure 4.1, the sources of funds for the City of Cape Town are 
illustrated, as an example. 1 Rates and Taxes account for only 114 of total 
revenue, while Fees and other user charges make up the lion's share at 
almost 60%. Both of these figures are higher than the national average 
of 16,3% from Rates and 56% from Trading. 
2. The Relative Merits of Alternative Sources 
Moak and Hillhouse2 point out five criteria for evaluating a revenue system: 
a) It must be adequate to meet the needs of the community, both in the 
present and in likely future economic conditions. 
p ~u 
Fig 4.1 Sources of Revenue of the City of Cape Town 1978 
\ 
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Rates 25% 
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\ 
Tariffs and Charges 59% 
Source: . Rating Review 
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b) It must engender community consciousness, by making spenders 
responsive to the communities' needs. 
c) It must not harm the local economy, either by distorting resource 
allocation or by inhibiting growth. 
d) It must be easy and cheap to administer. 
e) It must fall fairly on the community. 
In terms of these criteria, the four sources of finance all have both 
strengths and shortcomings. 
3. Taxes 
Local authorities are faced with a choice among a number of taxes from which 
they must choose a set which, as far as possible, meet the criteria of a 
good revenue system. 
What this means, with respect specifically to taxes, is that they must be:3 
- productive, in that they raise adequate revenue for local purposes; 
- elastic, in that their productivity is linked to the burdens placed on 
them. Local taxes should rise proportionately to the growth of the 
area; 
- stable. Revenue should not suffer precipitous fluctuations as a 
result of external effects, such as the business cycle; 
- certain. There should be no ambiguities about who pays taxes or about 
which authority gets the revenue. Uncertainty leads to evasive 
behaviour which can harm the local economy; 
- convenient. Payment or collection should be convenient for taxpayers; 
- economical. Administration should be cheap. 
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- efficient. They should not adversely affect the economy; 
fair. Payment of the tax should fall in an equitable way on the 
population. 
a) Equity 
The question of equity is a thorny one, and not amenable to a simple answer. 
Musgrave & Musgrave state: 
'Everyone agrees ••• that each taxpayer should 
contribute his 11 fair share 11 to the cost of 
government. But there is no.such agreement 
about how the tenn 11 fair share .. should be 
defined. •4 
Attempts to define fairness centre around concepts of 11ability to pay 11 or 
11fiscal capacity .. , and of 11 benefits 11 • 
i) Ability to pay 
•correct• taxation is seen as .imposing equal sacrifice on all taxpayers, 
whatever their.level of income or of wealth. When incomes are equal, comnon 
sense tells us that taxes should be equal. This, however, holds the.assumption 
that the marginal utility of income is the same .for all taxpayers. That is 
that the loss of the tax is of equal significance to people of equal income. 
This, of course, entirely ignores the variations in personal circumstances, 
such as needs (reflected perhaps in the number of dependants) or differences 
in wealth. (A taxpayer who owns his own home is clearly better off than one 
who does not, despite equality of income.) Also ignored is the amount of 
sacrifice made to earn the income, both currently and in the past. To 
treat a labourer, working 60 hours a week, as the taxable equal of a 
professional who elects to work 3 mornings a week, is clearly inequitable. 
The value of property owned is an equally unsatisfactory measure of fiscal 
capacity, although it is widely used. The purchase and ownership of a large 
house is evidence of the size of one's family, rather than one's ability to 
pay taxes. Renters of property, particularly when protected by rent control, 
are likely to be blessed with as much •ability to pay• as anyone else! 
i i) Benefit 
This approach considers a tax to be fair if those who pay it derive benefit 
from the services it finances. This approach does indeed sound •fair•, but 
on closer examination, falls short in a number of ways. 
- No mention is made of how much is paid and how much benefit is 
received. Individual evaluations of services differ, differences which 
are expressed on the market in the:act of purchase. No such expression 
takes place in the public sphere, so the fairness or unfairness of the 
tax remains unresolved by appeal to •benefits•. 
- If benefits are as clearly assignable on an individual basis as the 
benefit principle presumes, then the services could equally be provided 
through private institutions. It is because they are not easily 
assignable that the issue of equity arises: collective characteristics 
of the good or service result in a public institution emerging as the 
cheapest, most effective form of provision. This public institutional 
.mode.may derive revenue from taxes, giving rise to the issue of fair 
taxing. Alluding to.a benefit which is in some way related to the amount 
of the tax is to put the cart before the horse, and to assume away the 
initial difficulty- non-divisibility. 
- Implicit assumptions are made about the present distribution of income, 
i.e. that it is appropriate. No concept of redistribution flows from 
;~his principle. 
As ·R.L. Bish points out: 1 The concepts of fiscal capacity and need have 
proved very difficult to operationalize•. 5 Fairness remains a term which 
is defined by the user. Governments which seek to tax the rich to feed the 
poor remain faced, as was Robin Hood himself, with the odious task of select-
ing victims and beneficiaries.according to some criteria. 
Positive economics can have very little to say about the equity of a tax. 
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The definition of this tenm remains finmly in the realm of political 
negotiation and bargaining. 
b) Efficiency 
Taxes operate on an economic base, and as such, affect peoples' economic 
response to the base. If imported goods are taxed, people respond to the tax, 
inherent in .the price of the good on the ,market, by buying less of it, and, 
to some extent, more local products. If a commodity is taxed as such, 
people buy less of it, responding to its purchase price. By adjusting the 
market prices of goods and services, taxes distort the allocation of 
resources among them. The result is that output is to some extent diminished 
and welfare is forfeited for the sake of the goods to be financed from the 
tax. This forfeit is particularly regrettable since no one at all benefits 
from it. If the same objective .could have been achieved without the tax, 
welfare would have increased in a Pareto sense. 
Very few taxes are immune to the charge of inefficiency. The personal income 
tax discourages work and investment, while encouraging leisure and saving. 
Taxes on wealth discourage those who wish to provide for an uncertain future 
by speculative.or precautionary holdings. Import.duties discourage merchants 
from buying in the cheapest markets and passing on the savings to consumers. 
Almost every.tax is inefficient in some way, distorting the cybernetic 
signalling system of prices. 6 
.c) Categories of taxes 
Taxes are categorised on several nimensions: 
i. Current output taxes and income taxes: 
There are, strictly speaking, identical, but the specific point chosen at which 
the tax is imposed varies. 
Fig ·4.2 
Points of Tax 
Impact in the 
Circular Flow7 
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The diagram 4.2 depicts the circular flow of income and expenditure in the 
economy. Income taxes are shown to have their formal impact at points 1 
(personal) and 7 (corporate). Output taxes such as the sales tax impact at 
point 3. 
ii. Taxes on buyers vs taxes on sellers: 
Again these are formally identical, representing nothing more than the two 
sides of the shop counter, shown diagramatically at point 2 and point 3. In 
... practice, the ~f~~~ these taxes can differ because there may be some 
·. · .;:::::~ffect on the incidence of the tax. 
i ·i .... _ Taxes on sources vs taxes on uses: 
Again these are identical, but the specific items chosen may have their 
own incidence characteristics. 
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iv. Taxes on holding vs taxing on transfer of wealth: 
The distinction made is between stocks and flows of wealth. These are chosen 
on the basis of ease of administration and enforcement. 
v. Taxes on people vs taxes on things: 
Otherwise known as direct and indirect taxes, a distinction which flows more 
from the perspective of the tax administrator than that of the economist.8 
d) Criteria for selecting local taxes: 
Taxes which are suitable for use by local authorities are characterised by 
Maynard and King9 as follows: 
i. The subject of taxation must be widely distributed throughout the 
country~ This eliminates the chance that owners and potential 
owners of the subject of the tax will avoid the area to avoid the 
tax. 
ii. In the interests of productivity, the local authority must be capable 
of varying the tax rate in order to raise enough revenue to cover 
rising costs. 
iii. Like all things, it must be cheap to administer. 
iv. There should be no ambiguities about who is entitled to the revenue • 
. v. The_yield should be appreciable in relation to expenditure. 
In addition to these features, a local tax should have the effect of binding 
together the interests of local government and local citizens, and of giving 
expression to local priorities. 
~I 
4. Fees and User Charges: 
Harris and Seldon, in their evidence to the Layfield Commission, gave the 
10 following reasons for favouring user charges in preference to taxes: 
a. Accountability: 
Users of a service signal their liking or disliking for the service by 
using or not using it, just as they do for any good on the market. The 
local authority is made very much more sensitive to the wishes of the 
people, wishes that they may not be able to articulate in any other way. 
b. Increased Local Revenue: 
User charges on local services provide an opportunity for people to pay 
more than the local or national subsidy and to get a better service in 
return. Local preferences can thus be catered for and paid for from 
otherwise untapped resources. 
c. Efficiency: 
Services which do not have a captive market, but have.to serve paying 
customers who can, if dissatisfied, take their custom elsewhere, will 
be forced to be more efficient, both in the kind of service provided 
and in the level of costs. 
d. Democracy: 
Byreducing reliance on central subsidies. local accountability, democracy 
and autonomy is enhanced. Councillors have more powers, but are forced 
to use them in a way which .is responsive to the will of the community. 
This point is more relevant to the English environment than to our 
present South African position, since our level of subsidies is very low 
indeed. 
The five criteria discussed earlier are thus very largely met by this fonm 
. of revenue-raising. 
There remain, however, some important factors against user charges: 
a) Profits made on these trading services ar~ often used for general 
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purposes. This amounts to a subsidy from those who use the facility to 
those who don't. This is a very crude redistributive technique which 
commonly misses the 'target group• entirely. 
b. The form of pricing policy is very important. Marginal cost pricing 
has its problems which remain unresolved, and block tariffs, involving 
quantity discounts place.the burden heavily on the low user, and are 
regressive. 
5. Subsidies .from Central Government 
This is not an important source of revenue for South African local govern-
ments, constituting only 4,7% of income. {Table 4.1) Subsidies in other 
countries often match and even exceed ·tax .revenues, contributing as much as 
50% {UK) to local government revenue. 
Central government subsidies to local government suffer from some severe 
defects.as a revenue source: 
a) Grants are often made subject to.the discretion of central government 
who may use this discretion in order to control the actions of local 
government, with respect to capital expenditure, or to social programs 
of a redistributive nature. 
b) Being discretionary, grant money is a very unreliable source of income. 
It is, for example, considered unwise by U.S. municipal investment analysts 
to count grants as part of the income stream available to service debt. 11 
Grants may therefore enable local government to pay for certain services, 
but cannot constitute a revenue base against which borrowing can be 
secured, and capital development financed. 
c) Withdrawal of grants may force local governments to finance some planned 
capital expenditure out of current.income, which is very costly. The 
alternative, to abandon planned projects, may have a seriously 
deleterious effect on the environment. 
d) Grants are often earmarked, and as such, may result in severe resource 
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misallocation. It is not uncommon to encounter subsidised communities 
which lack the most basic facilities, yet are the proud possessors of 
expensive sports grounds or community centres. Both of these facilities, 
which we hesitate to call luxuries yet must surely be of lower priority 
than sewerage, street lights and drainage, are financed by special purpose 
grants which have no opportunity cost, not being allocatable to any other 
purpose. 
e) Pressures ·from central government,'through the granting or withholding 
of funds make themselves felt in an uneven way, resulting in uneven 
local development. 
For these and other reasons, acceptance of subsidies from central government 
represents a very significant loss of local autonomy, and therefore a loss 
in both the ability to serve local property owners as well as the incentive 
to do so on the part of local officials. 
6. Conclusion 
In this discussion of the funding options available to local government, 
we have examined local taxes, user charges and subsidies. The conclusion 
has been reached that while user charges are the preferable form of 
· funding, the nature of local government goods and services makes the charge 
ii.evitably an arbitrary one, with the result that user charges often act 
-
in a redistributive way, with donor and target groups very badly specified. 
The :ontinuing importance of the property tax was stressed, despite some 
diff~culties in defining the final incidence of the tax. 
In the following chapter the incidence of the property tax will be more 
fully discussed, and the effects of site value taxation examined. 
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CHAPTER 5 LOCAL TAXES 
1. The Incidence of the Property Tax 
The suitability of the property tax, as a source of local funds, 
depends very much on who pays the tax, and whether the final tax-
payer is also the recipient of benefits resulting from local 
expenditure programme. There has been considerable controversy 
surrounding this question. H. Simon, in his review article of 
19431 categorises 4 schools: 
.a) The Classical School 
i) Pierson 
Simon chooses the work of Pierson2 to represent the classical school, 
which has been the conventional wisdom of economists, if not of policy 
makers for the best part of a century. This approach divides the tax 
into par-t land tax and part improvement tax. The land tax part is 
seen as unshiftable from the legal base, i.e. the owner of the land. 
Because land is seen, in the Ricardian way, as fixed in supply, 
landowners cannot respond to the tax by reducing supply. They must 
accept,therefore, a lower rate of return than they previously 
received, before the tax was imposed. A purchaser of the land will 
of .course pay a lower price for it, earning normal after tax returns. 
The tax is borne in this view by the owner at the time of-imposition 
of the tax and cannot be shifted from him. (See figure 5.1) 
Fig 5.1 
Rental 
Value 
s 
D 
Taxable Asset 
(land) 
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Consumers demand is unaffected by the tax and remains at D. The 
effective demand facing the seller falls to D' due to the tax (or 
expected tax). Before-tax rental therefore remains at R0 , but after-
tax rental falls to R,. The inelastic supply curveS reflects a 
fixed supply of land. 
This reduction in the rental becomes a fall in the real wealth of the 
owner of the land as a result of a fall in the value of the land, i.e. 
a capitalisation of the tax. This takes place on a once-and-for-all 
basis when the .tax is levied, or becomes anticipated. The return, after 
tax, on property is unaffected, but the income of the owner, being 
derived from a smaller asset base, is reduced~ 
Thus, as long as land is in.fixed supply, the owner must pay the full 
amount of the tax. Improvements, however, are not in fixed supply, 
so the property developers' rational response is to reduce the quantity 
supplied, thus raising the before-tax price to consumers of housing, 
forcing them .to bear some of the tax, insofar as it applies to 
improvements. (Figure 5.2) 
Figure 5.2 
Rental 
Value 
s 
Taxable Asset 
The imposition of the tax results in after-tax rental falling toR,. 
Supply is discouraged, reducing the housing stock to A,. The 
consumer price rises to R2• The extent of these changes, and the 
incidence of the tax depends on the relative elasticities of supply 
and demand. 
The land component of the tax was thus seen as unshiftable and non-
distorting, in that it does not affect the supply of land to the 
community. This aspect was applauded by many who felt that there 
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was a certain justice in taxing 'undeserved' profits from land. The 
tax on the buildings component was seen as an excise tax on housing 
services, which is borne by consumers of housing to a greater or lesser 
extent, depending on how much the price affects their demand, i.e. on 
the price elasticity of demand. If the tax-induced price rise deters 
people from consuming housing, then the tax will be borne by the owners 
who must accept a lower price or allow their housing to go unused. 
If people are largely unaffected by the increased price, that is, if 
demand is very inelastic with respect to prices, they will not reduce 
their demand for housing, and will have to bear some of the tax. 
Since, in this classical view, a large part of the improvement 
component of local property tax falls on consumers, in proportion to the 
extent of their consumption of housing, the effect of the tax on income 
distribution must be affected by the distribution of housing consumption 
among various income groups. It is generally agreed that low income 
groups spend a greater proportion of their income on housing than do 
high income groups·: 3 Therefore,. the property~tax falls more heavily 
on the poor .than on the rich, that is, it is regressive. 
ii) Edgeworth 
The second. school. presented by Simon is based on. the work by 
4 F.Y. Edgeworth. He rejects the distinction between land and 
improvements, saying that housing services are only quantifiable in 
terms of the price they command on the market. Where two identical 
houses are built on dissimilar sites, the house on the better site 
will be, in effect, 'more' house than the one on the inferior site. 
The value of house and site are thus intimately related in a way that 
precludes separation either theoretically or operationally. The tax 
falls, therefore, fully on the occupier, and is avoided only by the 
extent of his reluctance to buy at higher prices, i.e. on the price 
elasticity of demand for housing. 
In Edgeworth's view, the property tax is thus fundamentally an excise 
tax, borne by consumers in relation to their consumption of housing. 
Like the classical school, he considers it to be highly regressive. 
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b) The Harberger-Mieszkowski Model 
Concentrating on reproducible capital, Mieszkowski makes a number of 
simplifying assumptions. Total supplies of capital are assumed fixed; 
product and factor markets are assumed perfectly competitive, so that 
factors receive the value of their marginal product. Capital is 
perfectly mobile between industries and regions, so that equal risk 
investments earn the same return over the whole economy. The value of 
capital in any use will be equal to its reproduction costs, taxes will 
not be capitalised. For simplicity, the expenditure side of the budget 
is ignored, only the tax being examined. 
i.) . Genera 1 Property Tax 
Given -these assumptions, Mieszkowski shows that.a unifonn tax on all 
capital will be borne by owners of capital in general. This hypothetical 
tax is put forward as the general case of which the property tax is a 
specific part. Since there exists no-asset which capital owners can 
turn to to avoid the tax, all capital owners must bear_ it. They cannot 
shift the tax forward to consumers, or back to workers, since a rise 
in commodity prices compared to wages will constitute a reduction of 
the real wage which will encourage employers to.use more labour. This 
increase in demand-for labour will restore the relative real wage to 
its original level, and leave the tax-finnly with capital. The relative 
prices of capital assets.will remain_unchanged, but the rate of return 
to capital will fall. 
Thus in this general case, there is no effect on.the price of housing 
nor on rents. Owner-occupiers pay the tax in their capacity as 
owners, not as occupiers, and, as house owners .they pay the same tax as 
owners of any other asset. The property tax is not, in this context, 
a benefit tax, since the overall marginal productivity of capital is not 
affected by an equal increase in tax and expenditure over all communities. 
It is an income tax, falling exclusively on capital incomes, i.e. 
profits and therefore progressive in nature. 
While no such tax exists in reality, these conclusions are relevant in 
that all local authorities levy some property tax, approximating a 
general tax. Capital employed in property is mobile to other uses, so 
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that the effect on the rate of return applies to all uses of capital, 
not only property. 
ii) Local Tax Differentials 
It is the differentials in the tax rates of different communities that 
result, says Mieszkowski, in excise tax effects. Because capital is 
mobile between communities, the after-tax return on capital will be 
equalised. A town that imposes a higher than average tax will find 
capital moving away, to areas where after-tax returns are higher. In 
so doing, it will increase supply of capital to other areas, resulting 
in a fall in the price, and decrease the supply in the home area, 
resulting in a rise in the price. This will take place until after-tax 
returns are equalised. The price .paid by local users.of capital, local 
industry, commerce etc., will rise, increasing costs, which will be 
passed on .to some extent to consumers of final commodities. 
The extent to which this can happen is of course limited by the elasticity 
of demand for local capital. Where this is not perfectly elastic, there 
will be a .simultaneous fall in the prices of local land and labour until 
after-tax returns on capital.are equalised and prices reach geographic 
uniformity. 
The tax will thus be capitalised in the prices of property and labou·r 
and there will be an excise.tax effect, an effect on relative prices 
which will lead to a different allocation of resources than would have 
occurred in the absence of the tax. A community that taxes at less 
than the average rate will .attract capital, by raising the returns on 
real estate. Capital will flow in until prices fall enough to equalise 
the rate of return. 
The inflow of capital will, in this case, attract labour, which will 
earn a wage which is uniform over the country as long as labour is mobile. 
i 
\ 
68 
iii) Immobility of Labour and Land 
Relaxing his assumption of factor mobility, Mieszkowski analyses the 
case where labour and land are not able to move f1•eely in and out of 
the area, and are not able to freely allocate themselves to different 
uses. 
If labour were excluded from this hypothetical area which levies a 
lower than average tax rate, local wages would rise. Local labour 
would be able to earn a higher marginal .product when combined with 
additional capital. Looking at the opposite example where a district 
applies an above average tax on property, capital will look for 
alternative employment until.after-tax returns are equalised, i.e. less 
building activity will take place, and less labour will be demanded 
at the current wage. If labour is unable to leave the district, wages 
will fall locally, but remain the same in the rest of the country. 
The tax on reproducible capital is thus borne by labour, if it is not 
mobil e. 
In the same-way, imrnobile land will fall in price when a tax is 
·increased capitalising the .tax in local land values. This capitalisa-
tion may be very much less than the,actual tax change, since the land-
capital ratio :can be varied to.keep returns at a maximum. Similarly, 
the .effect.on wages may·be cushioned by the possibility of using less 
capital or land and more labour. Thus the actual incidence of the 
tax will depend on the .substitutability of labour for capital and 
land. In practice land and capital are not close substitutes for 
labour in the production of urban services. The fall in land prices 
is likely to be more severe, in Mieszkowski's estimation, than any 
likely fall in wages. Because land is.a very small .component of costs, 
these falls may not offset the tax leaving local firms uncompetitive. 
Commodity prices will rise to make up the difference, shifting the 
burden of the tax onto.consumers of final commodities. 
While his conclusions are arguable, based as they are on empirical 
. -estimates of elasticities of demand and of substitution, Mieszkowski's 
general model, based on rate of return analysis, possesses greater 
power than previous models, resolving and encompassing many of the 
previous theories. 
J 
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c) Netzer and the 'Neo-Georgists' 
Dick Netzer,9 principal contemporary exponent of the 'classical', 
'excise tax' 'regressive' Old View, is able to accept the Harberger-
Mieszkowski approach while concluding that because residential property 
is taxed at above average rates, there are positive excise tax 
effects which result in the tax falling partly on the owner of capital, 
and partly on the occupier as consumer. He concludes that although 
conventional wisdom overstates .the forward shifting of the tax, this 
does not mean that the tax is less regressive than thought. He 
estimates that 20% of the tax is likely to fall on land and be 
distributed progressively, 35% on business property, with mild 
regressivity, and the remainder on residential property will be very 
regressive: Netzer's position therefore is that taxes on reproducible 
capital, including housing, are on.balance regressive in their impact 
and distort the allocation of resources. He favours the nineteenth 
century views of Henry George, advocating.complete reliance on taxes 
on .non-reproducible capital, .including land. This 'unreconstructed 
Georgist' position is based.on his empirical estimates of relative 
elasticities rather than any.theoretical disagreement. Even Netzer 
appears to accept the Mieszkowski capital-theoretic, revenue side, 
competitive approach. 
Aarons, 10 in his critique of the 'traditional' view, points out that 
prior to Mieszkowski's synthesis, the conclusion that the final users 
bear the tax rests on a model with some very special assumptions. 
The model must ignore land-capital substitution, must ignore labour 
and capital mobility and must indeed ignore the fundamental demand-
price relationship in housing. The 'new idea' has shown that this 
model is in fact a special case.of.the more general one. Significantly, 
the general model gives the 'Georgist' views a new validity. It is 
now possible for Netzer to argue, using the same model, for the 
opposite result. The model is by no means deterministic, but must 
be estimated in specific contexts to determine the incidence of the 
property tax in a particular town. 
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d) Some Objections to the 'New View' 
i) Variable Supplies of Capital 
Two serious theoretical objections to the Mieszkowski approach come 
from R.A. Musgrave, 11 the first of which attacks the assumption that 
supplies of factors are fixed. Hankering after a general equilibrium 
approach, he points out that house building is both consumption and 
saving, and as such, can increase supplies of capital. If this is the 
case, labour may have to bear some of the burden of a tax on property. 
ii) Non~Competitive Markets 
Musgrave also calls.attention,to the.Mieszkowski assumption that housing 
markets are competitive •. He suggests an administered.pricing model 
in which landlords behave like.restrained monopolists, not raising 
rents for fear of public outrage and possible imposition of rent 
control laws. Tax .increases may be. passed on to tenants, since the 
public finds this morally acceptable. Rolph, in discussion of this 
paper, calls this monopoly power to question since, as he puts it, 
'landlords number in the.thousands•, 12 making it very difficult to 
hypothesise any significant collective action. 
iii), Balanced Budgets 
Other discussants in.this debate (Friedlander13 and Peterson14 ) point 
I 
out that the expenditure side, explicitly ignored by Mieszkowski is 
of vital importance. Friedlander uncovers a further hidden assumption: 
that any change in the property tax is compensated for in the local 
budget by an.offsetting change in a hypothetical neutral tax. This 
does not occur in practice. The choice to be made is always between 
two distorting taxes, and the task of empirical analysis to explore 
the actual adjustment process which will occur. 
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iv) Immobility of Capital in Low Income Housing 
Peterson draws attention to the fact that due to zoning and other 
restrictive practices, themselves a result of high local taxes, 
capital allocated to low income housing is not able to move freely 
to the region where the best return is available. As the average 
rate of taxes increases, the incentive for fiscal zoning increases, 
which results in stratification of communities, poorer communities 
with small tax bases paying high tax rates. The Harberger-Mieszkowski 
model would suggest that this tax differential would be capitalised 
into a price differential, resulting in lower prices in low income 
areas. The mobility of capital for low income housing is restricted, 
however, by zoning and other land use restrictions. Low income 
housing (when produced privately) is pr~duced under a high tax rate, 
low tax base regime. Under these circumstances, capital must accept 
a lower rate of return, or move to. other sectors, A low income capital 
owner who.builds a house, receiving real income ·from it in the form 
of shelter, must accept.a capital loss due to the above average tax, 
or a reduced capital income. 
Capital leaving the area takes labour with it, leading to reduced 
wages if labour is immobile, or increased consumer.prices if it can 
migrate. 
When seen on a local level, the.tax is therefore regressive, falling 
disproportionately on low income house-owners and low income consumers. 
e) ~mmary 
Classical controversies on.the incidence of the property tax have 
been.brought under the umbre1la of a single general theory of local 
and general property taxes. 
Taxes are seen to fall on owners .of capital where 
i) All capital assets are taxed at a uniform rate in all communities 
ii) All factors of production are mobile, but 
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iii) are not substitutable for each other and 
iv) the demand for housing is not less elastic than the demand 
for other goods. 
To the extent that these conditions do not apply, the tax will be 
borne by other factors of production, labour or land, by consumers 
of housing, or by consumers of all final commodities. A definitive 
allocation of the tax must depend on the use of a model which relates 
and quantifies the effective rate of taxation on various classes of 
property and over different competing regions; the relative elastic-
ities of substitution between land, labour and capital.; the relative 
elasticities of supply of factors to the community; and the relative 
elasticity of demand for housing and other commodities. 
General statements about the-incidence of the property tax can't be 
made at present until empirical studies of this kind have been 
completed. 
2. The Site Value Tax {SVT): 
Local governments in South Africa have increasingly turned towards the 
taxation of property on the basis of the value of the site, rather 
than the total value of the property, site and improvements. Some, 
like the City of Johannesburg, calculate the tax on the basis of site 
value alone, while others levy a tax on both, but charge a lower rate 
on buildings than on the land. 
The stated reason for this policy is to encourage the development of 
vacant land and to raise the intensity of land use generally. 15 In 
this objective, there is both a theoretical and an empirical basis 
for expecting success. In an empirical study in Hawaii, for example, 
Pollock and Shoup =oncluded that a change to SVT would increase 
property development by as much as 25%. 16 
In order to .understand the reason for this, it is necessary to 
distinguish two separate aspects of the site value tax. In the first 
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place, the SVT is in effect a non-proportional tax on owners of real 
estate. Despite the fact that the tax is levied in proportion to 
the value of land held, it is not proportional to the value of the 
property as a whole, of which the land is, as Edgeworth pointed out17 
an integral part. The SVT is therefore a constant, or lump sum, 
tax on property levied on the basis of the value of the site. It 
is eminently feasible, of course, to levy this tax on any other 
basis, such as a tax per house, per hearth, per person, per head of 
livestock, per plot or per room. Most of these methods are indeed 
to be found in the history, both past and present, of local government 
finance. Each of these taxes, or any other constant tax on property 
owners, will have a similar effect. It is very important to notice 
that the effect of the tax is not related to the fact that the base is 
land, rather than some other factor. Any base will do, as long as the 
tax has some constant element in it, i.e. as long as the tax formula 
is of the form: 
T = c:(s) where T = tax liability 
c(S) = constant tax, related to S, 
site value. 
In Figure 5.3 and 5.4, the difference between a lump sum tax and a 
proportional tax can be seen. 
Rw is a revenue function of the type: 
Ts is a SVT and is constant with 
respect to capital employed: 
Ti is a tax on improvements: 
Rw 
Ts 
Ti 
= aKa. 
= cS 
= gK 
Subtracting the SVT from revenue: Rx = Rw - Ts 
Rx = aKa - cS. 
c is the tax rate 
s is the site value 
g is the tax rate 
K is the value of 
improvements 
lhis is represented by means of a line vertically parallel to the 
line R. The marginal function of Rw is unchanged, 
i.e. dRw or 
dRx 
OK 
a-1 
aaK 
Subtracting the proportional tax from Rw does, however, change the 
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slope of the revenue function, and therefore the marginal function of 
Rw: 
Ry = R - Ti 
= aK - gK 
so that dRw ~ = maKa-
1 is not equal to ~~y = aaKa-1 - g. 
The optimum amount of capital in the absence of taxation is to be 
found at a point where the marginal revenue dR is equal to the 
~ 
marginal cost ~-, shown at K: on Figure 5.4. The introduction of 
the tax Ts has no effect on this point at.all, since the marginal 
revenue function is unaffected. Introducing the proportional tax 
I 
Ti, however, reduces the optimum amount of capital to Ki. 
Abandonment of a proportional tax in favour of a lump sum tax there-
fore has the opposite effect .of increasing the optimum amount of 
capital in relation to land. The.contention that a thange in the 
method of taxation to a site value.tax will increase the intensity 
of development is therefore well-founded •. The reason for this does 
not rest, however, on any special characteristic of the site as a tax 
base, but on the non-proportionality of the tax with respect to the 
va1ue of th~ total inve~tment. 
The second aspect of the SVT which we need to distinguish is its 
effect in that it is.an increase in the tax on ·]and in relation to 
the tax on other fo~s .of wealth. As such it serves to discourage, 
at the margin, the h6l~ing of land for speculative purposes. 
Land is held in the form of vacant plots as a part of investors• 
wealth portfolios, in the expectation of future capital gains in 
excess of holding costs over the period. The future selling price 
of vacant land is expected to exceed the purchase price by an amount 
at least equal to the capitalised value of taxes payable plus the 
opportunity cost of vacant holdi"ng, i.e. rents foregone over the 
holding·period, capitalised at the market rate of interest on an asset 
of the same risk class. 
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As was shown in Figure 5.1, reproduced here as Figure 5.5, an increase 
in the tax on land, where land is immobile, will have no effect on the 
absolute value of the rental charged to the tenant (R0 ). The rent 
available to the landowner as a return will, however, fall toR •• 
fig 5.5 
Rental 
Value 
Ro 
0 
Taxable Asset (Land) 
As long as capital markets are efficient and capital is mobile, this 
reduced rent will result.in a lower land value when capitalised at a 
market rate of return. There.will be.no reduction, therefore, in the 
rate of return to land, but equal relative chang~s in the value of 
the land and of the after-tax rent. 
The perspective confronting the individual holder of. land is depicted 
in Figure 5.6. 
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The diagram shows the flows of costs and revenues associated with a 
holding of vacant land. Revenue accrues as a result of a capital 
gain, additional revenue (MR) being the gross proportional gains 
resulting from holding the asset for an additional time period. 
This is shown in the example as falling over time, a situation which 
may happen, for instance, if the neighbourhood in which it is 
situated began to approach full development. It is likely that the 
'pioneer' gains to be reaped by landowners (basically returns to 
uncertainty) would begin to tail off. Land prices may continue to 
rise but at a slower rate. 
The costs of holding are shown as rent foregone per year (R') which 
in the absence of taxes or other costs represents-the marginal cost 
with respect to time. A holder, situated at time m will observe 
potential land rents available-from construction and development, 
R' to be lower as a proportion of the land value than the gains from 
holding the land vacant, i.e. P, -Po > R'. The decision is made 
P, 
to continue holding until period p, when the falling MR equals the 
opportunity cost. 
The imposition of a tax, T', however, raises the effective marginal 
cost toR'+ T'. The absolute value of R',+ T' remains the same as 
R', as was pointed out above, but the additional annual opportunity 
cost. per rand rises toR' + T'. The land holder, situated at m will 
see his marginal cost (R' + T') as greater than possible gains (MR) 
and·will convert his capital to other .uses, either improved land, 
earning R' or any other use of wealth. Figure 5.7 shows how the 
quantity of vacant land held will fall from L1 to L2 with the imposi-
tion of the tax. 
Return, 
Cost 
(% p.a.) 
Fig 5.7 
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These results are, as pointed out in the above discussion of tax 
incidence, dependent on the mobility of capital and labour. If such 
mobility does not exist, then the tax on land will be borne by all 
owners of capital and labour, through a fall in the rate of interest 
and wages and not borne by present owners of land through a once and 
for all loss of wealth. The marginal cost of holding vacant land 
may thus be reduced, mitigating to some extent the tax's disincentive 
on land holding. 
Theory does suggest that the SVT has the potential both to increase 
intensity of development and to discourage the speculative holding 
of vacant land. The first effect is due to the nature of the SVT on 
a 'lump sum• tax, while the second.is due to the discrimination against 
land as a form of wealth holding. 
,3. General..Sales Tax (GST) 
The imposition of this type of tax represents a further option for 
local governments. The effects of a GST differ widely depending on 
the method of imposition. They may be imposed at retail, wholesale 
or manufacturing levels~ or at.all three .stages. This form of tax 
is. known as a turnover ·tax. Turnover taxes can have very severe 
economic effects, providing artificial incentives for vertical inte-
·,,< gration of firms, and resultant market concentration. To avoid this 
pitfall, Value Added Taxes are .sometimes used, taxing only the 
additional value created by the concern. 
The advantage for the local authority of this form of tax are: 
i) High yields for low tax rates. In 1971, a 1% sales tax yielded 
15% of the revenue of Chicago, 20% of the revenue of Los Angeles 
and 12% of the revenue of San Francisco. 18 
ii) Low cost of collection when centrally administered. 
iii) The yield is fairly elastic with respect to local incomes. 
iv) It is more stable than a similar income tax. 
v) It obtains revenues from non-re sidents. 
vi) Extends the tax burden to all income levels. 
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vii) Creates community tax consciousness. 
This last factor is disputed by Buchanan and Flowers, 19 who list among 
the principal disadvantages the fact that sales taxes foster the 
illusion that it is paid by consumers. This, they say, is not so. 
Where markets are competitive, owners of factors of production, land,-
labour and capital, pay the tax. In the presence of.sticky markets, 
unemployed labour, land or capital carry a disproportionate burden. 
Thus community tax consciousness, they say, is destroyed, by 
fostering illusory incidence assumptions, and by concealing the true 
cost of taxation. 
The conventional view of the r~gressivity of the sales tax is also 
rejected by these two authors, as a consequence.of .the conclusion that 
the tax is not borne by consumers but by producers. It is, they say, 
equivalent to a proportional income tax. 
There is, thus, dispute as to how inequitable the sales ·tax really is. 
A more damaging critique rests on the inefficiency which results from 
intercommunity tax differentials. Location of economic activity can 
be seriously affected by taxes which vary from place to place. 
Efficient administration.also requires record keeping, auditing etc. 
which can be very costly for the small authority. Collection at the 
central level presents a viable alternative, which can be implemented 
at small cost. 
4. Selective .Sales Taxes (Excise Tax) 
Being, by definition, discriminatory in their nature , these taxes 
are usually used for goals other than pure revenue raising. Sumptuary 
goals may be pursued, such as discouragement of smoking, drinking or 
gambling by means of taxes.on these activities. The reasons for 
pursuit of these goals are usually moral ones, and as such are beyond 
objective comment. 
I 
, 
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Excise taxes are often used for regulatory purposes, to protect one 
or other section of consumers, or producers. Taxes on the sale of 
margarine are used to protect dairy interests, or on the import of 
textiles to protect textile manufacturers. In each case, some other 
section of the economy suffers as a result. Consumers must pay more 
for breadspreads and clothing. Buchanan and Flowers ask the question: 
'Why should the producers, processors or consumer s of this or that 
good or services be discriminated against (or in favour of) by the 
fiscal system?• 20 The answers.to this often-asked question are 
fundamentally political in their nature and can only be provided in 
the political arena. 
Whether used for sumptuary or for regulatory purposes, the use of a 
selective tax is always predicated.on a presumed knowledge of its 
effects. In practice, this knowledge is often very hazy. The true 
effects .of a tax are often not fully researched. 21 
a) Public Utility Taxes: While currently of more relevance to the 
USA than to South Africa, these taxes become important when the 
idea is mooted of putting local services out to public tender. 
The price paid.by the supplier for a monopoly of, say, bus 
services can take the form of. a tax. This tax will generally 
be passed on to the consumer,.who will pay it in the form of 
higher prices. • 
b) .Tobacco Tax: This tax has been in use .in the USA since ·1921. 
In 1972, 22 states taxed.a pack of 20 cigarettes as much as 15 
cents. This is a sumptuary tax aimed at discouraging smoking. It 
is not very suitable for local use due to the ease of evasion, by 
purchasing outside the area, smuggling etc. 22 
c) Amusement: Although this tax is easy to administer, is a 
benefit tax and obtains revenue from non-residents, it is an 
unimportant tax because the revenue potential is very low. 
d) Motor Fuel: Also a benefit tax, with its revenue often earmarked 
for road development. This tax is a popular one for local use, but 
suffers the defect of being very easy to avoid, by buying in 
neighbouring areas. 
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e) Business Licences: This is a highly discriminatory source of 
revenue, commonly serving local sectional interests through price 
policies, sale of publicly policed monopolies and other restrictive 
practices. The theoretical possibility exists to use this device 
for allocation of property rights in such locally owned collective 
resources as crayfish stocks, common grazing etc. The likelihood 
of corruption and favouritism is, however, great. 
f) Motor Vehicle Licences: This tax is favoured by Maynard & 
King23 for local use since it is very strongly a benefits tax. and 
raises revenue from outside the area. 
g) Gross Receipts Tax: This is very similar to the general sales 
tax falling on all levels, but has wider impact. This is a 
highly discriminatory kind of tax, having no relation to ability to 
pay. It can have ver,y ·harmful effects, encouraging unsuitable 
industrial structures, discouraging expansion, penalising 
efficiency. 
5. Local ,Income Tax 
Taxes on income are the best 'ability·to.pay• related tax in our 
armoury. Nevertheless, it remains .imperfect if no account is taken of 
differential needs. Income taxes-are appropriate for local use if the 
income is earned within the taxing boundary. Buchanan & Flowers 
comment: 
'The appropriateness of Income Taxation for a unit 
of government is directly dependent on the extent 
to which its boundaries are co~incident with the 
extent of the market.•24 
The advantages of this form of taxation are: 
i) Bejng broadly based, the tax touches all aspects of the local 
economy. 
ii) It is a high yielding tax, despite relatively low rates. 
iii) Collection at source is easy for a local authority. 
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iv) The tax is not regressive, but proportional, and may even be made 
progressive, for redistribution reasons. 
v) Revenue is collected from non-residents, as well as residents, 
extending the base. 
vi) While not 'efficient' it is one of the less inefficient taxes. 
Indiscriminate use of this kind of tax for all local authorities is 
inadvisable, since proper administration is costly, and problems of 
overlapping jurisdictions can be quite acute. It could be used if 
centrally administered along with the Central Government Income Tax. 
While all forms of taxation.have their faults, the most suitable ones 
for local use are: 
- The property tax: this is essential ·for the link between tax 
policies.and local interests. 
The local income tax: is appropriate when administered in con-
junction with central government. 
- A local sales tax: can be very effective for revenue raising but 
must be handled carefully, again in conjunction with central 
government. 
- Selective sales taxes: .specific taxes. on certain corrmodities and 
businesses can be carefully used. Motor vehicle licences·, and 
certain specific business licences are suitable. 
These taxes shoul~ be used in conjunction with the other sources of 
revenue, such as user charges, discussed above, and borrowing, which 
will be discussed in the following chapter. 
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A MODEL OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES' 
DEBT CARRYING CAPACITY 
1. The Role of Debt in Financing local Expenditure 
We have, in preceding chapters, shown that the policies of local authorities 
can have a very strong effect on the local economic environment, or on the 
'Supply side' of the local economy. Commenting on the poverty of Demand 
Theory, J. F. Kain states: 
'The ••• (Demand Analysis) ••• approach of the local economy 
inevitably focusses attention on matters over which local 
governments have little or no control - the exogenously 
determined components of demand - while distracting attention 
from the very thing local authorities can influence - the 
nature and attractiveness of the local economic environment.• 1 
It is clear that the cost and availability of credit will very strongly 
influence the local government's ability to affect the environment. Well 
chosen capital projects can, as Brooks and Gripaios confirm, generate 
2 
local growth and employment. 
The absence of such capital investment, or even worse, the presence of ill-
conceived projects can have a powerfully depressing effect on the local 
economy compared to neighbouring competitive areas. Residents of a local 
authority which allows itself to lag behind its neighbours with respect to 
the development of infrastructure and amenities, will not only suffer from 
the immediate lack of facilities, in the form of unmade roads, inadequate 
lighting or sewerage, but will find the relative value of the local property 
falling. As a result, the authorities' tax base will be diminished and 
the capacity to provide amenities in the future eroded. 
The ability to undertake capital development depends very largel~, on the 
cost and availability of finance. Access to low cost sources of finance 
in the form of various kinds of loans or accumulated taxpayers• money, 
has the effect of enhancing local capital development prospects, allowing 
projects to be completed which could not otherwise be done. 
J 
There are a number of methods of financing development available to local 
authorities in South Africa, ranging from all borrowing policies to 'pay-
as-you-go• policies financing capital from current sources. 
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The different methods are discussed below: 
a) All borrowing: 
This method is looked upon as an emergency measure suitable for use only 
in the direst of emergencies, for example, local floods or disasters. 
In such an event, local taxes may not be available, and recourse must be 
had to borrowing from outside agencies to meet both capital and current 
expenditure. In such a case, future reserves will be heavily committed 
to servicing this debt, leaving only a small proportion available for 
future services and amenities. Any unexpected shortfall in revenues 
would severely jeopardise the financial health of the local authority. 
If, on the other hand, revenues rise as expected, the local authority will 
find itself in no danger at all and will have greater and greater resources 
available to repay debt and to meet any further obligations it may experience. 
Aside from its role as an emergency measure, 'all borrowing' policies are 
~ 
often encountered in the very early stages of township development. 
Developers often find themselves in a position prior to the marketing of 
stands, and hence prior to the receipt of appreciable revenues, of having 
to finance all local facilities from sources external to the fledgeling 
local authority. This they do in the expectation that sufficient revenues 
will flow from the sale of the property and from subsequent taxes to-retire 
part of the debt, to service the remainder and to provide local amenities. 
b) 'Pay-as-you-go': 
At the other end of the spectrum of financial options would be a policy of 
meeting all requirements, whether capital or otherwise, out of current 
revenues. This is an approach which is popular with the financially con-
servative, since it is regarded as imposing a discipline on local officials, 
forcing them to 'make do with what they've got', and preventing them from 
committing future generations to heavy interest payments and hence heavy 
tax burdens. Indeed, by avoiding interest payments altogether, this 
policy seems to 'save money' in the sense that future payments of interest 
do not place a burden on future revenue. 'Pay-as-you-go' financing must, 
,however, involve present taxpayers, either in very high taxes or a reduced 
capital development programme. This merely shifts the burden of capital 
expenditure into the future, imposing costs on future residents which may 
be higher than the costs of borrowing in the present. This option is, 
therefore, not necessarily a 'future regarding' one, and may unnecessarily 
restrict present development potential. 
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c) A Capital Reserve: 
The intention of this policy is to accumulate current revenue in a 'sinking 
fund', earning interest, until enough has been accumulated to initiate a 
capital programme. Historically, this policy has been very unpopular with 
taxpayers, since it taxes the present to pay for the future. A policy of 
accumulating capital revenue became prominent in the U.S.A. during the war 
when materials and labour were channelled away from social infrastructure 
towards the war effort. Special legislation was passed at State and 
Federal level to enable local authorities to 'shelve' projects, and accumu-
late tax surplusses for use after hostilities had ceased, apparently in 
expectation of the post-war deflation that had marked all American wars up 
till then. When 'price levels' continued to rise after the war, the value 
of accumulated development funds was rapidly eroded. Many cities, faced 
with unexpectedly rising costs were forced to use these funds to meet 
current requirements. 
~ 
Thus the American venture into capital reserves ended in failure due to 
an unexpected turn in the American economy. 3 
This is an historical lesson which must be properly learned. in the local 
context: The success or failure of a Capital Reserve Policy depends on 
the ability to manage the Fund so as to earn returns in excess of the 
opportunity cost of the money to local Authority or to the taxpayer himself. 
This managerial ability is limited in the case of South African local 
Authorities, not by the skill of local officials, but by Provincial require-
ments regarding the investment of these funds. The ability of a local 
authority Capital Development Fund to bring a rate of return comparable to 
that of commercial investment funds is accordingly limited. 
Despite these considerations, the application of these financial practices 
has become standard with many local governments in the Cape and is highly 
commended by officials in other provinces and at central government leve1.4 
It is likely that reserve funds are seen as a means to limit the risks 
associated with borrowing, and as an aid to central government 'demand 
management' policies. 
The reserve fund policy is, however, not likely to serve the interests 
of local residents and property owners who would do better to reduce 
taxation and meet capital requirements by judicious borrowing. 
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d) 'Pay-as-you-use': 
A popular approach to public financing policy is to match the term of the 
loans raised to the life of the equipment in question and to retire the 
loan by means of a sinking fund which terminates simultaneously with the 
asset. This policy is considered to amount to paying for the facility 
in instalments equal to the amount 'used up' or depreciated over time. 
This results from a number of confusions: 
Firstly, each project forms only a part of the total capital programme. 
Spreading payment over the life of the asset does not, by itself, accom-
plish the goals of financial management, including an optimal scheduling 
of cash payments. Uncomfortable peaks and troughs in the pattern of 
payment obligations may still occur, placing unnecessary strain on the 
financial resources of the community. The 'pay-as-you-use' authority 
is forced to carefully arrange the scheduling of the projects themselves 
in order to avoid this discomfort. The physical development plans are 
thus linked unnecessarily to purely financial considerations with a 
resulting loss of flexibility. 
Secondly, the 'life' of an asset is not clearly definable and depends on 
technical and physical characteristics, on the costs of repairs and 
maintenance and the relative value of the service provided. Items such 
as roads may never be replaced, only maintained at a specific level in 
perpetuity. Financing over the 'life' of the asset has no meaning in 
this context. 
Lastly, recent approaches to financial theory separate the financing 
decision from the 'investment• decision of the firm. The financial policy 
is shown to have no effect on the value of the firm, while the investment 
decision does. Financial decisions must be made, therefore, purely on 
the basis of the overall cash flow and on the values of relevant market 
interest rates and yields. The life of a specific asset is relevant only 
insofar as it affects the overall cash flow, and for this reason alone is 
a factor in estimating future financing requirements. 
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These then are some of the options available to local governments. In 
the following pages an attempt will be made to develop a coherent theory 
of local authority financial policy. The analysis will draw on important 
recent developments in financial economios, particularly the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM) and the Modigliani-Miller approach to capital 
structure (M-M). 
The section that follows will trace the development of approaches to 
capital structure, culminating in the M-M position which will then be 
applied to local Authorities Financial Policy. 
2. Theoretical Approaches to Corporate Capital Structure 
While it is true that local governments differ from private firms in many 
important ways, particularly in that they do not seek to maximize profits, 
they are similar in that they try to minimize costs. and to maximize the 
local benefits resulting from their expenditure. This means that they too 
are faced with the problem of acquiring capital at minimum cost, by some 
judicious combination of internal and external finance. For these reasons 
the literature on Corporate Finance is drawn upon to gain insight into the 
local-Authorities financing decisions. 
The key elements of the optimal Capital Structure deci~ion are to be 
found in the Net Income Approach.5 
Rate of 
Return to 
investor 
or creditor 
Fig. 6.1 
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Cost of Equity (Ke) 
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-----------
Cost of Debt (K;) 
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This approach sees the problem as essentially one of minimizing the cost 
to the firm of financial resources. As may be seen in Fig. 6.1, costs 
of debt and shareholders• equity are shown on the vertical axes as rates 
of return (%). The horizontal line K shows that the return on equity e . 
is not affected by the Debt Equity ratio (8/S) depicted on the horizontal 
axis. Equally unaffected by 8/S is the cost of debt Ki, but this is 
shown as cheaper (earning a lower return) than equity. This means that 
both lenders and investors are unresponsive to the debt/equity ratio and 
would lend and invest at the same rate (%) whatever the 8/S ratio. 
It is evident that the overall cost of capital (K0 ) in this simple model 
without growth, corporate taxes, personal taxes or bankruptcy costs, is 
a weighted average of the costs in percentages of debt (Ki) and of equity 
(Ke) which are both constants: 
8 . S 
Ko ~ Ke 8 + S + ~i 8 + S (2.1) 
where 
8 = market value of debt and 
S = market value of shareholders• claims. 
The cost of capital, therefore, falls continuously as cheap debt is 
substituted for more expensive equity, i.e. 8/S rises. As a result, the 
value of the firm (V} rises, since overall returns are capitalized at 
a lower interest rate: 
v = 8 + s (2.2) 
I 
8 = c 
K. 
1 (2.3) 
NOI 
- Ic 
s = 
Ke (2.4} 
where v = market capitalization of the firm 
Ic = interest charges 
NOI = net operating income 
r 
I 
I 
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Substituting (2.3) and (2.4) in (2.2): 
v = + 
i.e. The value of the firm is equal to interest flows and income 
flows discounted by relevant rates of return. 
Equation (2.5) with Ki and Ke regarded as autonomous variables, 
represents the NI (Net Income) model. 
(2.5) 
The shortcoming of this approach is that it ignores the fact that investors 
and lenders are both discouraged from lending to firms with high 8/S ratios, 
because of the increasingly risky nature of such loans or investments. 
This aspect is portrayed in the 'Traditional Approach' as represented in 
Fig. 6.2. 5 
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This represents lenders and investors, reflecting their aversion for placing 
money with a highly levered company by requiring higher interest rates at 
higher 8/S ratios. Investors and lenders are, moreover, differently 
affected by the 8/S ratio, so that there exists some point 81, representing 
'the degree of leverage which minimizes the cost of capital, K0 • 
To show this, we must modify the simple Net Income model presented above to 
1 . reflect the relationship between Ke and the debt/equity ratio, 8/S;and Ki' 
I ~ the interest rate on debt and 8/S. 
I 
: 
I 
i' l 
I: 
1
·;, 
. 
I 
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To do this, we leave the value of the firm unchanged: 
v = + NOI - IC 
But the values of Ki and Ke are not independent of 8/S, but are: 
where 
Ki = f(B/S) + r 
Ke = g(B/S) + r 
r = the rate of return on a riskless asset. 
So that the weighted average tost of capital is: 
where 
= K. 
1 
B 
B + S 
V = B + S. 
+ K 
e 
s 
B + S 
This financial orthodoxy came under severe attack in 1958 from 
F. Modigliani and M. Miller.6 
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Modigliani and Miller argued that arbitrage between personal and corporate 
debt in efficient capital markets would operate to offset the use of cheaper 
debt by increasing the return to equity (Ke). As the firm acquires more 
debt, it becomes more risky for investors who see personal debt as exchange-
able for ownership of a levered company. Higher risk to investors would be 
I 
... 
f 
t 
r 
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compensated by higher returns, which will just offset the lower cost of 
debt in efficient markets. This would imply that the value of a firm is 
independent of its capital structure, in a world with efficient markets, 
no corporation taxes and no bankruptcy costs (see fig. 6.3). 
To illustrate this, the traditional model must be modified to incorporate 
arbitrage between personal and corporate debt. 
Modigliani and Miller initially state as a first proposition: 
S. +D. 
J J 
where 
... 
for any firm j 
in risk class k. 
E(Xj) is the expected income from assets in firm j. 
Dj is the market value of the debts of the company 
s~ 
J 
is the market value of its ordinary shares 
v. 
J 
is the market value of the firm 
pk is the market's capitalisation rate for a pure equity 
in the same risk class. 
(2.6) 
This proposition contradicts the traditional approach outlined above which 
asserted that the cost of capital would be reduced by the choice of a 
specific optimal level of debt in relation to the equity of the firm. 
The contradiction results from Modigliani and Miller's proposition that 
in efficient asset markets, personal and corporate debt are substitutable 
for each other as long as both are subject to equal treatment with respect 
to taxes and other institutional factors. They illustrate this substitut-
ability as follows: 
Two companies are considered; Company 1, which consists purely of share-
holders equity, and Company 2 which is a levered company, having some debt 
in its capital structure. As a starting point, they c~nsider a position 
/where the value of the unlevered firm v1 is less than that of the levered 
one V2 • An investor holds a portfolio consisting of the fraction a 
of the shareholders equity of firm 2, i.e.aS2 • This portfolio will 
bring a return (Y2 ) equal to the fraction a of the expected income E(X2 } 
available to shareholders, after payment of creditors claims, i.e. 
interest charges (rD2 ), i.e. 
(2. 7) 
If this investor wanted to change his portfolio from Company 2 to Company 
1, he could do so by selling his Company 2 shares, worth aS2 and purchasing 
a(Sz+Dz) of the shares of Company 1. This he could do by using the 
amount realized on the sale of shares in Company 2, aSz and borrowing, 
on his own account an amount equal to aDz possibly by offering his new 
holding in Company ·1 as collateral. He would now own a proportion 
a(Sz+ Dz)/S1 of Company 1, but be personally liable for interest payments 
ar.Dz. The net return v1 on his new portfolio, consisting of, equity and 
debt, will be 
(2.8) 
Since Modigl iani and Miller assume homogeneity of investments, i.e . 
. implying that different equities in the same risk class are substitutes for 
.. 
each o!her, they are able ;o combine E(X1) (expected income from firm 1) 
and E(Xz) in one term E(X) Thus equation (2.8) above is changed to 
4 •• __ --r. 
Substituting V2 for (S2 + 02 ) and v1 for s1 in equation (2.9) 
y 1 = a~~ E(X) - arD2 I 
(2.9) 
(2.10) 
Comparing the returns from the two portfolios, v1 and Y2 (equations (2.10) and (2.7) respectively), we find that as long as v1 is less than 
V2 ~ Y1 will be greater than Y2 • 
Investors will therefore find advantage in divesting themselves of holdings 
in Company 2 and acquiring holdings in the unlevered Company 1, financing 
the additional value through personal debt. As a result of this process, 
the value of S2 and hence V2 will be depressed and the value of s1 = v1 
will be raised. 
The final position after all possible gains have been made from portfolio 
adjustments, will be v1 = V2 • This is a result of an arbitrage process 
between levered companies and their alternative, unlevered companies and 
personal debt. 
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Thus the value of the portfolios is independent of the level of gearing 
of the companies in which equity is held:- 'We conclude, therefore, that 
levered companies cannot demand a premium over unlevered companies because 
investors have the opportunity of putting the equivalent leverage into 
their portfolio directly by borrowing on personal account.' 8 
A premium is earned, however, by owners of the stock of a levered company 
to compensate for the additional financial risk incurred as a result of 
the leverage. 
Thus the return on equity (Ke) is: 
Ke = Pk + (Pk-r) D ./S. 
' J J 
i.e. 'The expected yield of a share of stock is equal to the 
appropriate capitalisation rate, pk for a pure equity 
stream in its class, plus a premium related to financial 
risk equal to the debt-to-equity ratio, D./S. times the 
9 J J 
spread between pk and r. 
(2.11) 
Thus a change in the debt/equity ratio has no effect at all on the value 
of the company for shareholders. It does, however, involve shareholders 
in a choice among categories of diversifiable financial risk, for which 
commensurate returns are earned. A risk averse company would finance 
primarily from equity, a risk seeking company chooses to lever more strongly 
earning higher returns to equity. 
Modigliani and Miller add realism to their model by incorporating company 
taxes and some institutional factors, such as bankruptcy costs. 
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The company tax acts as a tax on equity, or a subsidy on debt, making debt 
relatively more attractive than equity. This is offset at high leverage 
by the existence, and increasing probability of bankruptcy costs. Thus 
M-M return to the idea of an optimum debt level (81) which minimizes the 
cost of capital in a world which taxes equity but not debt, and which 
penalizes financial failure. (See fig. 6.4). 
3. Application of Corporate Theory to Local Authorities 
The Modigliani-Miller analysis can be very helpful when applied to the 
issue of Local Authority policies. A difficulty arises, however, with 
the definition of 'equity' since local governments are not 'owned' in the 
same way as shareholders' capital is. One way around this problem could 
be to define equity as the balance sheet residue after subtracting external 
debt. There are a number·of difficulties with this procedure. Firstly, 
the balance sheet is not market related. This is of particular importance 
in inflationary times. Secondly, the value of the assets does not express 
the net capitalized value of the local governments' services, since there _ 
is no trading of shares in these assets. 
A more suitable way of modelling a local authority is.to look upon it as an 
institutional arrangement for the provision of local services to property 
owners. The value of these services is captured by the act of purchasing 
real 'estate in the area. As was shown in the previous chapter, the value 
of the expected stream of services and the value of expected taxes is 
capitalized and forms an integral part of the price paid for real estate. 
The act of buying a house or land implies purchase of an asset that yields 
housing services arising from the building and site, and simultaneously 
net local public goods services, arising from the activities_of the local 
government. The capitalised value of these services less the capitalized 
value of expected taxes represents the value of the residents' shareholding 
in the local authority. A Local Authority which is successful in the view 
of the· local residents would follow policies which maximize the net present 
value of its services and so result in higher property values. (See fig. 6.5). 
A Local Authority which imposes more of a burden than it benefits local 
people will find local real estate values falling as the market capitalizes 
the net cost represented by the shaded portion in fig. 6.6. 
,• 
Rands 
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Rands 
Costs 
Benefits 
Time 
Fig. 6.5 Fig. 6.6 
Rands 
Time t 
Fig. 6.7 
Fig. 6.5 illustrates the value of a shareholding, the value of which is 
the PV of the shaded area, the excess of benefits over costs. 
Costs 
Time 
Fig. 6.6 shows a local authority with a n~gative value to its shareholders. 
Fig. 6.7 shows a local authority which is expected to become of negative 
value in the future at time t. 
To illustrate this we construct a property valuation model which endogenizes 
local fiscal variables: 
where 
V = S + H + Tn 0 0 0 
V
0 
= The Value, or market price of the property at time o. 
5
0 
= Net present value at time o of the shareholding in the 
local authority, i.e. the net benefit stream flowing 
from amenities. 
H
0 
= The present value at time o of the expected stream 
of housing benefits flowing from the actual building 
and site. 
Tn = Terminal Value at time n. 
(2.12) 
Expressing this stock relationship in terms of flows, i.e. discounted by 
relevant rates: 
..... 
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v = 
where 
5
0 
= E - VA, i.e. Expected benefits less the Value times 
the tax rate. {A) 
{2.13) 
Each flow of amenities, taxes and housin~ benefits is discounted to the 
present at rates of interest Pe Pc and Ph which, because of arbitrage in 
efficient markets are each equal to the return" on any other equity stream 
in the same risk class. Each discount rate incorporates a premium over 
and above the risk free rate: 
7 
. 
Ph = r +a, i.e. the risk free rate, plus a premium as related to the 
uncertainty of the asset, its durability, the effective location of the 
site and any other factors affecting the replacement cost of the site and 
building. 
Pc = r + b, i.e. r +premium b, the premium related to the uncertainty 
of future property prices. 
Pe. = r + c, i.e. r + c the premium earned on an equity of the same 
risk class as the local authorities services and taxes. 
The risk attached to a local authority shareholding is not, as in the case 
of the corporation, the risk of financial failure, but is the risk, illus-
trated in fig. 5.7, of the local authority imposing greater costs on its 
residents than benefits. This might happen, for example, if the authority 
contracts large amounts of debt. In this event, local property owners 
run the risk that present levels of tax payments may not be enough to meet 
future debt servicing and services costs. In such an event, debt servicing, 
being contractual, would have to take priority, leaving the quality of 
services to bear the brunt. The net benefit of being part of a local 
community would then become negative or at best reduced, a situation which 
would be reflected in the price of local real estate. 
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The present value of the property thus reflects the risk of this event 
occurring by discounting the expected services stream at a rate_Ee 
relevant to this risk. Therefore, real estate in a highly geared local 
authority will be bought and .sold at prices which reflect financial risk 
in the form of a high rate of discount on local services. 
Purchasers of this property will be able to buy a higher level of real 
services at a cheaper price thus earning the required retur~n their 
shareholding in the geared local authority, which compensates for the 
greater riskiness of the stream of real services in the future. 
Applying the portfolio value equation developed earlier (equation (2.13)), 
we can see that an increase in Pe would result in a lowering of V, the 
value or price of the property. 
When properties of equal V are considered, an increase in expected Et 
(amenities) a decrease in At (expected tax rate), an increase in Ht 
(replacement cost) or of Tn (Terminal Value) can be predicted. 
In this way the value of local authority debt is treated analogously to 
corporate debt in that increased debt-equity ratio is offset by increasing 
returns to equity on the levered authority. 
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ln fig. 6.9, an adaptation of the M-M position which was applied to debt 
policy with respect to corporations, we see the effect of gearing (B/S) 
on the cost of capital to local authorities. Ki remains the rate of 
return paid to lenders. Ke is the real return on property ownership, 
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the return to a shareholding in the local authority. This rises as 
gearing is increased to offset the additional risk at a rate which 
exactly compensates for the lower cost of debt. In efficient asset 
markets, with arbitrage between personal and local authority debt, the 
weighted average cost of capital K0 will be constant, unaffected by gearing. 
4. Substitutability of Local Government and Personal Debt 
Following the Modigliani and Miller approach for this trade-off to occur, 
personal debt must be fully substitutable for local government debt. 
While this is an hypothesis that required careful empirical testing, it 
does seem intuitively plausible. A local authority which history has 
endowed with a high level of amenities can provide a high standard of 
services at a low average cost to taxpayers and with a low level of local 
government debt. 
Property values in such a community will be high, and the value of private 
mortgage bonds issued by residents will accordingly be higher, offsetting 
the low debt of the local government. Any property owner.would realize 
the full price after repaying personal debt outstanding. The value of 
the owners equity in the property would be equal in equilibrium to the 
purchase price of an equivalent property in a levered community. Similarly9 
a resident of a geared community will9 on selling his property, be able to 
acquire an equivalent property in an ungeared community only by increasing 
personal gearing. This he can do either by buying a more expensive house 
in a well served community and increasing his mortgage bond, or by buying 
a similarly priced house in a poorly served community, and borrowing money 
with which to replicate the local services sacrificed. In both cases, 
arbitrage between markets and between personal and public debt will ensure 
equivalence of geared and ungeared communities. 
The value v1 of the individual's holding in a levered community consists 
of the value of local services s1, plus the value of the building H1, less 
the value of the mortgage bond P1 held by the individual, thus: 
This must, in equilibrium be equal to a new holding in an unlevered community 
~= 
if 
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= = v1 
H2 = H1 i.e. the quality of buildings are identical 
S2 > s1 i.e. the value of the same level of services in 
the unlevered community is higher due to 
a lower risk premium P e 
. Then for v1 = V2 to hold, P2 > P1 must be true. 
i.e. For an equivalent holding, in an unlevered community, more personal 
debt must be substituted for local government debt. 
There are, however, a number of factors which reduce the substitutability 
of local government and personal debt. 
i) There are bankruptcy costs associated with local authorities. 
While the province and central government stands ready to 
salvage financially troubled towns, this help may not be im-
mediate. Waiting to be paid out, even if the payment is 
certain, involves costs. The form of the help may coincide 
with obligatory increases in the tax rates, or· other levies 
to be paid by present taxpayers. 
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The existence of bankruptcy costs will have the effect, 
shown in fig. 6.10, of increasing the cost of debt and 
therefore the overall cost of capital K0 at high levels. 
8/S 
K. 
1 
102 
ii) The property market suffers from greater transactions and 
information costs than does the securities market. Adjus-
ting one's portfolio between local authorities has a far 
greater cost than a similar adjustment among traded securi-
ties. Not only must brokerage charges of a fairly substan-
tial nature be paid, but, for the seller, advertising costs 
may be high and for the buyer, search costs may be high. 
For both, the costs of moving family and possessions may be 
large. For these reasons, the capitalisation of local 
authority debt in the yield on property may be less than 
complete. This has the effect of raising the price of the 
levered authority to the house buyer. 
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Fig. 6.11 shows how these considerations would make the Ke 
line less steeply-sloped, reflecting the incomplete adjust-
( 
ment to increasing risk. As a consequence, the overall cost 
of capital declines as the authority becomes more highly 
levered. 
iii) In South Africa, the debt of local governments is much cheaper 
than personal debt as a result of their semi-gilt prescribed 
investment status. This further encourages local government 
debt in preference to personal debt. 
iv) Adding further to this bias is the "limited liability" nature 
of ones local authority shareholding. The homeowners' perso-
nal liability in the local government extends only as far as 
the potential the local government has to harm or to enhance 
the value of property. While this potential may be conside-
rable, it can never extend beyond the value of the property 
itself. In this sense then, the individual benefits from 
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'limited liability' with respect to the local government, 
and his wealth may be maximized by extending his 'share-
holding' in local government debt, rather than incurring 
personal debt with which to buy the same services. 
v) Local government debt is often directly subsidized at low 
levels. Certain projects such as libraries, roads, sports 
fields, schools may be able to attract low interest loans, 
from provincial ~nd central government. Intuition may 
suggest that this should have the effect of extending the 
level of debt financing. Fig. 6.12 shows why this is not 
so. Subsidies have the effect of making debt cheap at low 
levels, but do not affect the cost of debt at higher levels 
except insofar as they push the 'danger' level of B/S further 
towards debt. 
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Adjustment for this subsidy takes place in the asset market, 
increasing the returns to property by lowering its price 
relative to the stream of real services flowing from it. 
In the diagram the K line is shown as kinked reflecting dis-
e 
continuities in the debt subsidy. It can readily be seen 
that the optimum debt level B1 will only be affected by the 
subsidy if it occurs in range I. If B1 occurs in range II 
there will be no affect since only in range I is K0 affected 
by subsidies. 
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It is clear that the local authority is similar in many ways to the 
corporation in the choice of its capital structure. Like the corporation, 
the local authorities may find an optimum level of debt which maximizes 
the benefits it can provide to the residents. This optimum exists because 
of an environment in which debt is subsidized. Corporate debt is subsi-
dized in that interest is deductable from profits for tax purposes. For 
the local authorities debt is subsidized by the semi-gilt status of local 
government stock. In the remainder of this chapter, we will explore the 
criteria used for evaluating debt levels, and examine some implications of 
the theory for local authorities in South Africa. 
5. The Amount of Debt 
Following the logic of the Modigliani-Miller thesis, the amount of debt 
would be of no importance at all to the local authority, or to the lender, 
as long as there are efficient asset markets, and institutional influences 
are even handed with respect to debt and taxpayers' contributions. Where 
these factors are not even handed, the intuition suggests that there are 
factors which favour debt, then there will be some level of debt which 
maximizes the value of the residents' shareholding. The amount of debt 
in this case will affect residents both by affecting the value of their 
property and by changing the riskiness of asset portfolios and therefore 
the rate of return • 
. 
The amount of debt will reflect a number of factors: 
i) The attitude of the community at large toward fluctuations in 
property values. Any existing community is likely to consist 
of people who look upon property prices as properly reflecting 
all important aspects about the attractiveness of the site, 
building and the area generally, including indebtedness of the 
local government. People who are averse to additional risk in 
their wealth portfolios in the form of uncertain property 
values would tend to gravitate towards low-geared local authori-
ties. Governments which unexpectedly incur large amounts of 
additional debt will find some previous residents leaving, and 
being replaced by those who are less averse to property related 
risk. This will not necessarily reduce property values unless 
the new gearing is less preferred in the society generally. 
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ii} The extent to which the local bureaucracy is responsive to 
local preferences will affect financial policy. Local offi-
cials are, like economic actors generally, averse to risk and 
will only be willing to accept additional risk if accompanied -
by greater expected rewards. Additional local debt adds to 
the riskiness of their positions but it will bring no direct 
reward other than through the political process. Officials 
who are politically unresponsive will therefore tend to encou-
rage the authorities they serve to minimize the amount of debt. 
iii) The amount of debt will also depend on the intrinsic ability of 
the community to make valuable public investments. A community 
which is much sought after residentially but is badly served 
with amenities will have great scope for making public invest-
ments which are highly productive. Debt incurred by such a 
community would be efficiently converted into amenities, thus 
into property values and hence augmenting the tax-base. By 
contrast, a declining village, being unexpectedly abandoned by. 
its inhabitants who are attracted by superior income opportuni-
ties in the large cities will have a surfeit of local amenities. 
Roads, schools, parks and other infrastructure may have been 
constructed and paid for by past taxpayers in the expectation of 
population growth, and may now stand largely unused by present 
residents. The creation of further amenities in such an envi-
ronment would clearly be unproductive and unlikely to generate 
tax or fee revenues to pay for itself. Such a community is 
likely to be very slightly levered, if at all. 
iv) Steiss sums up as follows: 'The capacity of .the community to 
incur debt must be gauged by the amount and quality of its 
resources, and by its practical ability to draw on these resour-
ces.•10 As we have discussed, the 'amount and quality of its 
resources• must be interpreted broadly as the capacity of the 
community to establish a revenue base at.competitive cost. The 
'legal and practical ability to draw on these resources• refers 
to the existence of legal and constitutional limits to debt. 
Moak and Hillhouse mention five types of limit: 11 
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and debt servicing, their stability and their relationship to each other. 
These expected flows are converted into values by the tax rate and the 
interest rate. Where these rates are stable, as has been the case in 
the past, the stocks and flows are, for all practical purposes, inter-
changeable. Where the rates vary, this practical rule of thumb becomes 
faulty and it becomes necessary to concentrate directly on the flows of 
Revenue and of Debt Servicing. 
For example, a decrease in the rate of interest relative to the tax rate 
will reduce the debt servicing obligation without affecting the book value 
of the debt in relation to property values. In such an environment, 
higher gearing will increase the premium on local authorities services 
risk, c, to offset the reduced interest rate r, without affecting the value 
of property. ,A control on debt, in such an environment, expressed in 
terms of the stock values of property and debt would be overly restrictive, 
preventing local government from benefitting from a favourable borrowing 
environment. 
6. Rating of Local Authority Debt 
American investment analysts look at four sets of information when asses-
sing the standing of a debt issue: 14 
a) Debt Factors: 
The nature of the issue itself is of primary significance, whether it is 
secured by specific assets or whether it is a general obligation bond. 
Also of relevance here is the existence of specific requirements and limits 
to the local authorities' authority to issue bonds. An authority which 
has borrowed up to its constitutional constraints and compared with trends 
and averages for similar authorities. Debt per capita, Debt per capita 
in relation to income per capita, Debt per R of Valuation are commonly 
used ratios, all of which are, as pointed out above, conceptually problematic. 
The key questions in this regard are: 'How does t~e amount that must be 
borrowed compare with the amount of debt already outstanding?', and 'How 
does the amount outstanding compare with the revenue flow, against which 
the debt ~s a claim?' 
r. 
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Where there is friction preventing full capitalisation, particularly 
resulting from uneven treatment of personal and local government liability, 
increasing leverage will be accompanied by a fall in the overall cost of 
capital and a rise in the present value of local property. These benefits 
from'debt will, however, be exhausted at high levels as the risk of incur-
ring bankruptcy costs become greater. In consequence, there is a level 
of debt which minimizes the overall cost of capital to the local authority 
and maximizes the value of the local authority to its residents. 
The occurrence of local areas with debt levels which are lower than the 
optimum may be evidence of differences in the impact of debt risk on the 
local residents and on local government officials. As we discussed above, 
city treasurers and town clerks are, like anyone else, risk averse to a 
greater or lesser extent. This does not mean that no risk will be taken, 
but that risks will be taken only in expectation of commensurate reward. 
It is thus understandable that officials will be inclined to add to the 
riskiness of their positions only if they are under pressure from the 
electorate either directly or indirectly. 
Where there is no such pressure, as a result of political or constitutional 
arrangements, risk will be avoided, and leverage kept low to the detriment 
of the area. The political sensitivity of the constitution can thus have 
a profound effect on the financing of local amenities and thus on their level. 
A local government which is politically sensitive to its community can be 
expected to approach the optimum level of debt in relation to its tax 
potential. A government which is unresponsive will tend to borrow very 
litte, and to provide very little capital development. 
8. Evidence 
This prediction of the Local Authority Financial model is tentatively 
confirmed by examination of the data presented by the Browne Committee: 
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Table 6.1: Some Financial Ratios of Local Authorities 
in South Africa: 1977* 
I II III IV v VI VII I-VII VIII IX X XI VIII I-XI 
- XI 
1) 
2) 
3) 
25 26 23 23 20 17 21 23 
9,9 7,2 6,1 14,5 11,7 11,5 9,8 10,2 
395 292 202 400 270 202 116 328 
1) Debt Servicing as% of Expenditure. 
2) External Debt as % of Rateable Value. 
3) Debt per Capita. 
4 3 14 na 4 
4,2 
59 20 21 -
Table 6.1 compares the eleven categories of local authority analysed by 
20 
10,9 
-
the Browne Committee by three different measures. Line 3 compares debt 
per capita, and illustrates quite dramatically the difference between 
Administration Boards (classes VIII and IX) and municipal-type authorities, 
(classes I-VII). The 6 metropolitan cities (class I) and the large towns 
(class IV carry about R400 per capita debt, a level which U.S. Municipal 
Bond rating services consider •normal'. The non-municipal, non-represen-
tative bodies carry only R20-R60 per capita. This extreme difference 
can be explained partially in terms of the predicted reluctance of unelected 
bureaucrats to incur even reasonable debt on behalf of •captive• ratepayers. 
This measure is unfortunately not an entirely useful one since it takes 
no account of the relative wealth of the citizens. Richer people-whose 
local authority runs on a larger budget, will clearly carry more debt than 
a poor community. The measure of debt per Rand of Valuation (line 2) 
performs the function of screening out mere relative wealth effects. The 
disparity between municipal and non-municipal communities remains, however, 
dramatic. Municipal, representative local authorities have debt of about 
10c/R of Valuation, Administration Boards less than half, or 4,2c/R 
(excluding Housing debts). 
··Source: Browne Committee Report RP8 of 1980, own calculations. 
1. Table 5.6. 
2. Schedule 7.5 and Table 8.5. 
3. Table 8.5 and Schedule 8.1. 
. -
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The most acceptable measure used is the Debt Servicing as % of Income/ 
Expenditure figure (line 1). This is an important improvement on the 
previous two since it compares streams of cash flow, not stocks of wealth 
or Debt. .It can, however, be mi s 1 ead i ng when Revenue consists to a 1 a rge 
degree of grants in aid, or when large portions relate to capital-intensive 
operations. These factors cannot, however, account for the contrast 
between 23% for municipal local authorities, and 4% for non-municipal local 
authorities {line 1). This can only be accounted for by a systematic non-
borrowing policy, which particularly in the recent, inflationary conditions, 
and considering the central government subsidy on loans, represents a severe 
limitation to these areas• potential to develop. 
Table 6.3 shows the same pattern occurring in the Cape Town context. 
External debt per rateable valuation {line 7), and debt per capita {line 5) 
are significantly lower in the Divisional Council Local Areas of Grassy 
Park and Ocean View than they are in the independent Municipalities of 
Cape Town, Parow and Stellenbosch. {Goodwood's figures are anomalous in 
this respect, partially due to their very conservative policies and lack 
of growth of the municipality. 
Table 6.2 comparing Municipal Authorities and Administration boards, 
again points out the .extreme-disparities between Debt per Capita in the 
two groups {line 5). While Municipal Authorities have external debt of 
R65 per capita, Administration boards have only R5 per capita • 
The evidence available seems to indicate, therefore, that representativeness 
of local governments is closely related to debt policy in a way consistent 
with risk averse bureaucratic behaviour. 
TABLE 6.2 
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Some Key Financial Ratios of local Authorities 
in the Five Metropolitan Areas of South Africa 
1977/1978 
Municipal Auth. Admin. Boards 
Tota 1 Pop. excl.Blacks 
1. Total Expenditure on General Services R89.22 Rl35.32 R33.47 
per capita 
2. Property Tax income per capita R45.80 R 69.56 R 6.87 
3. Capital Expenditure per capita R79.40 R120.~5 Rll.99 
4. External Debt per capita R64.15 R 97.32 R 4.67 
5. Internal Debt per capita Rl5.24 R 23.12 R 7.32 
6. External Debt/Rateable Valuation 1.65% 1.65% -
7. Rateable Valuation per capita R3885.00 R5894.99 
-
(Source: Calculated from Schedule 1.5 of the Browne Committee 
Report, Vol.III (RP80/l980)) 
TABLE 6 .• 3 Some Key Financial Ratios ofSelected locaLAuthorities 
in the Cape 1980 
l.Expenditure on General Ser-
vices per capita 
2.Property Tax per capita 
3.Capital Expenditure per capita 
4.External Debt per capita 
5.Non Recoverable Debt/Capita 
6.Rateable Valuation per capita 
7.External Debt/Rateable Valuatio 
8.Expenditure on Roads per capita 
,, 
9.Expenditure per Rand of 
valuation 
Cape 
Town 
109 
59 
143 
710 
350 
2509 
119% 
23.08 
.04 
Parow Good-
wood 
122 131 
45 66 
1 455 
228 
157 
3393 6816 
2.3% 
40.20 13.57 
.036 .019 
Stell en- Grassy 
bosch Park 
115 56 
43 47 
108 38 
449 234 
328 234 
3025 1645 
10.6% 8.6% 
10.14 7.18 
.038 .034 
(Source: Calculated from Municipal & Divisional Council 
Financial Statements) 
Ocean 
View 
26 
11~50 
-
10.10 
10.10 
151 
7.0% 
2.14 
.172 
i 
,, 
I 
' i 
\ 
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9. Conclusion 
This chapter has built upon the foundations of previous chapters, which 
situated local government within the economic framework, characterizing 
them as institutions, developed in a social process of institutional 
choice, for the most efficient provision of certain goods and services. 
As such, local governments are acted upon by a set of economic and 
political forces which influence them in what are, under suitable condi-
tions, optimizing directions. 
~n order to spell out the nature of the forces acting up~n the authority 
in respect of its financial policies, the well known Modigliani-Miller 
i 
approach to corporate finance has been used, with suitable adaptation. 
The conclusions of this model include a relationship between debt, risk 
and returns, which when applied to local governments can provide an 
indicator of local government risk preference. The implication is 
drawn that local governments which are very loosely linked both economi-
cally and politically to the people they serve will be more risk averse 
than fiscally or electorally sensitive governments, and will display 
greater reluctance to incur debt. In so doing they sacrifice opportuni-
ties to improve local areas by favourable capital development, financed 
by a judicious combination of debt and current revenue •. 
This conclusion is tentatively confirmed by the data currently available. 
Further chapters will use this framework to examine and criticise 
current financial arrangements in S.A. and those embodied in various 
policy proposals. 
~:: 
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CHAPTER 7 THE SHORTAGE OF FUNDS FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
1. Introduction 
The rapid urbanisation of the South African population has rP.sulted in 
a growing demand for urban local amenities. The ability of local 
authorities to meet this demand has been severely limited by numerous 
institutional and statutory restrictions, not only the specific local 
~overnment ordinances,< 1> but also the wide range of statutes which 
affect the mobility, place of residence, and security of real estate 
.tenure of a large proportion of the South African population. 
The effect of these restrictions has been to prevent local governments 
~ 
from emerging where they are demanded, and to hinder existing local 
governments in the performance of their functions. This hindrance 
makes itself felt in the form of a shortage of funds with which to 
provide amenities. 
This chapter will examine the fiscal role of local governments in 
South Africa and will attempt to identify which of the sources of 
finance ~re_most strongly affected. 
2. The Fiscal Role of Local Government in South Africa 
Local government in South Afric~ plays a relatively small role in the 
economy as a whole when compared with local government in other countries. 
A comparison of eight countries undertaken by the Browne Committee<2) 
shows the share of local government expenditure to be 4,2% of GOP 
(see Table 7.1 line C(2)). 
This is small indeed when compared to local government in Sweden (24,7% 
of GOP) and even to Canada and Switzerland (9,3% and 10,0% respectively). 
Of the eight, only Greek local authorities play a smaller role in 
financial terms than do those in South Africa. The role of local 
governments in this country has, furthermore, been losing importance 
over the past decade. Line B (c) of Table 7.2 shows the proportion of 
local authorities contribution to GOP (at factor cost) over the years 
1970 to 1978. This has been falling from 3,6% and 3,7% in 1970 and 1971 
l J. 
ll 0 
to 3,1% in 1978, a relative decline over a period of 8 years at a rate 
of 2,2% per annum (adjusted by OLS linear regression). 
This fall contrasts sharply with the central government's share of GOP, 
which rose dramatically from 16% in 1970 to 27% in 1978 (see Table 7.3). 
local governments share of general government declined as a result from 
18,4% in 1970 to 16,4% in 1978 (Table 7.2 line A3c). 
It is clear then, that local government in South Africa is accorded a 
relatively unimportant place both in the economy as a whole and in 
government, and that this role, small though it is, is declining in 
relative terms. 
·This impression is confirmed when we ·examine the contribution local 
government makes to Gross Domestic Fixed Investment. In the period 
under consideration, local governments share of GDI declined from 
8, 9%, more than double its share of GOP, to 7,2% at an (adjusted) 
rate of 2,6% pa. (Table 7.4 line B(c)). 
Thus it is clear that South African local governments are highly 
investment orientated institutions whose contribution to Domestic 
Investment has been two to three times as big as their proportionate 
contribution to Domestic Product. Their function is however declining 
relative to the economY and to general government, with the investment 
function being particularly strongly affected. 
In the light of these statistics the suggestion that local authorities 
are short of funds does seem to have some substance, in the sense that 
they are being forced to curtail their activities in relation to central 
government.and to the econOmY as a whole. The question remains:-
"which specific sources of revenue are suffering most acutely?" 
• ------··-------------------------------------------~------~ 
TABLE 7.1 LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE IN A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES 1~175 
South . Canada -·: USA UK Switzer- Sweden ~lKY Greece Arrica mi 11. Can.-$ miD.$ milT.£ 1and . mi 11. Kr. m • mi11. Orach. 
A. ExQenditure + income miTT:"tr 
1. Current+ capital exp. 2) 1 311 17 776 93 956 19 304 1¢ 019 79 '870 40 445 7 810 
2. All tax revenues 402 6 449 33 795 4 708 7 607 39 082 17 97B 1 840 
3. Other current income3) 429 1 984 28 107 3 525 3 696 11 851 13 871 3 520 
4. Subsidies4) 62 8 270 31 490 9 575 2 560 22 012 6 562 1 870 
5. Tota1 current income 893 16 703 93 392 17 808 13 863 72 945 38 411 7 230 
6. Total deficit5) 418 1 073 564 1 496 156 6 925 2 034 580 
8; %of current+ ca~ital 
expenditure 
_. 
_. 
1. Current + capital exp. 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100 ,o 100,0 100 20 100,0 -....J 
2. All tax revenues 30,7 36,3 36,0 24,4 54,3 48,9 44,5 23,6 
3. Other current income 32,7 11,2 29 ,9. 18,3 26,3 14,8 34,3 45,1 
4. Subsidies 4,7 46,5 33,5 49,6 18 23 27,6 16 12 23!9 
5. Total current income 68,1 94,0 99,4 92!3 98!9 91,3 95,0 92,6 
6. Total deficit 31,9 6,0 . 0,6 7,7 1,1 8,7 5,0 7,4 
C. Agtregates of local 
au-norities in relation 
to the GOP 
1. Gross domestic product, 30 970 191 882 1 526 457 121 978 140 710 323 300 170 811 813 700 
amounts 
2. Current + capital exp-
enditure as a % of GOP 4,2 9,3 6,2 15,8 10,0 24,7 23,7 1,0 
3. Total deficit as % of GOP 1,3 0,6 0,04 1,2 0,1 2,1 .1,2' ....... . 0,7 
• 
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Table 7.1 
1)' 
2) 
3) 
5) 
6) 
7) 
Sources: Government Finance Statistical Yearbook, Volume II, 
1978, International Monetary Fund; Statistical Abstract of the 
unTted·states 1977, U.S. Government Printina Office 1977; 
Yearbook of National Accounts·statistics 1977, United Nations 
Organisat1on, New York, 1978; various sources for South Africa. 
The data cover most types of local authorities in every country. 
Covers only current expenditure on General Services, but also 
capital expenditure on General and Trading Services. Redemption 
of loans is excluded from current expenditure. Housing has been 
treated as a trading service. 
Includes gross profit of trading services, including housing. 
Received almost exclusively from higher government authorities. 
Item 1 minus Item 5, i.e. represents more than a current deficit. 
The statistics·for South Africa refer to 1976/77 and cover Classes 
I to XI in Schedule 1.1. 
The statistics for-the USA refer to 1975 and include all 
municipal and county.authorities but not other types of 
authorities. The data are not fully comparable with those of other 
countries as details were not available in the Statistical 
Abstract of the United·states. 
(Source: Browne Committee RP 80/1980 Volume III p.94) 
TABLE 7.2 CONTRIBUTION OF LCCAL AUTHORITIES TO GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCTL {AT FAC"(OR COST) 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975. ·c 7F3 •• :;I 1.~773 19783 
A. Gross domestic ~roduct---- ,--r-- --·-' 
or eu611C au{~ori{1eS: ..... 
1. General govt. services2 
a. Local authorities 204 240 269 315 378 453 527 584 632 
R'OOO 000 
b. All general govt. 1 132 1 367 1 508 1 785 z 115 2 456 2 815 3 183 3 508 
services R'OOO 000 ' 
c. Local authorities as 18,0 17,6 17,8 17,6 17,8 18,4 18,7 18,3 18,0 
% of b. 
2. Government enterprises 
a. Local authorities 223 252 284 325 356 388 429 447 510 
R'OOO 000 
b. All govt. enter- . 1 184 1 345 1 422 1 780 1 976 2 325 2 647 3 177 3 457 _. 
prises R'OOO 000 
_. 
1.0 
c;.Local authorities 18,8 18,7 20,0 18,3 18',0 16,7 16,2 14,1 14,8 
as % of b. 
3. Genera 1 govt·; services 
and enterpises 
a. Local authortties 427 492 553 640 734 841 956 1 031 1 142 
R'OOO 000 
b. Total genl. govt. 2 316 2 712 2 930 3 565 4 091 4 781 5 462 6 360 6 948 
services+enterprises 
c. L~c8}~g~thorities as 18,4 18,1 18,9 18,0 17,9 17,6 17,5 16,2 16,4 
B. Gross domestic eroduct 
as a w~ole 
a. Local authorities 427 492 553 640 734 841 956 1 031 1 142 
b. Total GOP 11 949 13 251 14 987 18 633 23 055 25 731 29 076 . 32 466 36 987 
c. Local authorities 3,6 3,7 3,7 3,4 3,2 3,3 3,3 3,2 3,1 
as % of b. 
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Table 7.2 
1) All statistics were derived from the national accounts, and in 
1976 and 1977 divisional councils were responsible for 
approximately 4 per cent of the gross domestic product of local 
authorities. 
2) Housing schemes of local authorities have been classified as a 
general government service. 
3)' Preliminary. 
(Source: Browne Committee RP 80/1980 Volume III p.92). 
TABLE 7.3: CENTRAL.GOVERNMENTS.SHARE.OF.GDP (FACTOR COST) 
Year ~- · ·GoP·at·ractor Cost Govt . 
. (RM) ·mnr (%} 
1970 1 920,9 12 023 16,0 
1971 2 542,3 13 255 19,2 
1972 2" 787,1 15 036 18,5 
1973 3 414,9 18 675 18,3 
1974 5 500,9 23 083 23,8 
1975 6 803,1 25 864 26,3 
1976 ·8 244,6 29 014 28,4 
1977 8 960,5 32 167 27,8 
1978 9 955,3 36 953 26,9 
1979 11 443,5 44. 054. 26,0 
. 1980 13.590,0 . .... :. 58.089 .... . .·23,4 
·(source: Statistical/Economic Review. Supplement to the Budget 
1982/83 (W.P.B. )l·. 
TABLE 7.4 CONTRIBUTION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES TO GROSS DOMESTIC FIXED INVESTMENT1 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 19763 19773 19783 
A. Gross fixed invest-
ment or EUD11C authorities 
1. Genl. govt. services2 
a. Local authorities 191 229 252 276 346 473 520 495 511 
R'OOO 000 
b. All genl. govt. 615 742 854 836 1"071 1 434 1 575 1 573 1 607 
services R'OOO 000 
c. Local authoriti~s~as 31 ,o 30,9 29,5 33,0 32,3 33,0 33,0 31,5 31,8 
% of b. 
2. Govt. enterprises 
a. Local authorities 92 98 115 133 142 173 205 198 203 
b. All govt. enterprises 423 595 784 804 878 1211 1 634 1 363 1 233 
c. Local authorities as 21,7 16,5 14,7 16,5 16,2 14,3 12,5 14,5 16,5 -N 
% of b. 
3. Gen 1 • govt -~ . services 
and enterprises. 
a. Local authorities 283 327 367 409 488 646 725 693 714 
b. Total genl. govt. 1 038 1 337 1 638 1 640 1 949 2 645 3 209 2 936 2 840 
services+enterprise 
c. Local authorities as 27,3 24,5 22,4 24,9 25,0 24,4 22,6 23,6 25,1 
% 6f b. 
B. Gross domestic fixed 
investment 
a. Local authorities 283 327 367 409 . 488 626 725 693 714 
b. Total gross domestic~ 3 194 3 741 4 332 5 027 6 158 8 110 9 221 9 333 9 894 
fixed investment 
c. Local authorities as 8,9 8-;7 8,5 
% of b. 
8,1 7,9 7,7 7,9 7,4 7,2 
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Table 7.4 
ll 
2) 
All statistics were derived from the national accounts, and 
in 1976 and 1977 divisional councils were responsible for 
7 to 8 per cent of the gross domestic fixed investment of 
local authorities. 
Housing schemes of local authorities have been classified as 
a general government service. 
Preliminary. 
(Source: Browne Committee RP 80/1980 Volume III 
p.93). 
.. 
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3. Trends in Local Government Finances 
Table 7.5 provides an indication of recent trends in the financing of 
local government. Of the three revenue sources presented, rates and 
'other' income, (consisting principally of subsidies) have both suffered 
declines in their relative contributions to current revenue. In order to 
compensate for this, local governments have expanded their trading 
functions, increasing revenue from this source at a compound growth rate 
of 7,9% in real terms since 1960. As a result, the proportion of 
revenue from this source has increased from 51% to 56%, at a rate of 
0,5% p.a. over the eighteen years. (Table 7.5 line 3) 
Despite these changes in its composition, the amount of current revenue 
per rand of property value (line 8) has risen from 5,8c/R to 7,5c/R, a 
compound growth rate of 1,4% p.a. This is undoubtedly a reflection of 
the low growth in real estate values over these years.(11,6% p.a.) in 
relation to the growth of n6minal GOP (15,9% p.a.) and not an indication 
of accelerating expenditure and revenue. 
TABLE 7.5 SOME.RATIOS·: · ALL LOCAL-AUTHORITIES 
1960 1970 1975 1978 Rate of 
-- change % p.a. 1. Components of Current Revenue: • 
2: Rates % 19,5 17,6 18,5 16,3 -1,0 
3. Trading % 51,0 53,6 53,9 55,9 +0,5 
4. Other % 29,5 28,8 27,6 27,7 -0,35 
5. Total Debt/Rateable Valuation %19,5 11,8 -2,7 
6. Total Debt/Total Revenue % 332,7 210,6 178,0 156,6 -4,09 
7. Salaries/Total Expenditure % 43,8 40~7 41,1 33,7 -1,4 
8. Total Current Revenue/Property 
Valuation % 5,8 na na 7,5 +1,4 
9. Rates Revenue/Property 
Valuation % 1,1 na na 1,2 +0,5 
Source: Calculated from Statistics 1980, Table 19.21, Department of 
Statistics. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
s. 
6. 
7. 
B. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
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It is clear theref~re that the property tax has proved very inflexible in 
the South African context, and has led to a decline in current revenues 
relative to the demands made on them. The use of the trading activities 
to fill the gap has apparently been pursued with some success, but this 
source of revenue clearly has its own limitations. 
The most dramatic change, however, has been the decline since 1960 of the 
use of Debt to finance local capital development. line 6 of Table 7.5 
shows that the relationship between total local government debt outstanding 
and total revenue has declined from 332,7% to 156,6%, a relative decline 
of 4,1% per annum. Table 7.6 confirms this impression. In 1975, 99,8% 
of additional financing requirements were met from net additional 
borrowing. 
TABLE 7.6 LOCAL AUTHORITIES.LIABILITIES : FINANCING OF GROSS ADDITIONS 
.. N . t. 1 ct .. r. . . . . . . 't . OFS a a .ape T 1 v ,; A .verage 
1974 Gross na na 8 250 178 399 
AddfE1ons 
Net borrowing na na -3 432 -41 69 585 ~9 
1975 Gross 189 782 91 328· 17 646 239 453 
Additions 
Net borrowing 119 575 63 34 182 37 2 307 13 110 296 ~6 
1976 Gross 93 453 205 406 26 755 276 538 
Additions 
Net borrowing 28 975 31 124 379 60 4 784 18 135 438 ~9 
1977 Gross 111 348 210 158 27 391 264 000 
Additions 
Net borrowing 48 487 43 193 199 49 5711 21 114 047 43 
1978 Gross 117 586 220 317 19 756 228 785 
Additions 
Net borrowing 23 556 20 104 430 47 9 286 47 21 475 9 
1979 •Gross na na 24 038 234 484 
Additions 
Net borrowing na na -8 995 -37 18 326 8 
Source: Department of Statistics Report 13.03.15:- local Government 
Statistics. 
39,8 
39,5 
39,0 
25,8 
1500 .. 
1000 
500 
--- ·- ~- ---- _....,..... __ 
By 1978, this prop·ortion had fallen to 26% despite a fall in that year 
of the cost of local ·government borrowing due to a fall in semi-gilt 
interest rates and a simultaneous increase in the rate of inflation. 
The shortage of local government funds appears therefore to be closely 
related to the low level of borrowing by local governments. 
4.. Conclusion 
Despite the rapid growth of urban population in South Africa, local 
governments have experienced a decline relative to central government. 
Sources of local funds have proved to be inelastic with ·respect to the 
demand for local services, and most significantly, the propensity for 
local governments to borrow has suffered a severe decline. The reasons 
for this are to be found in the political structure of the newly 
forming urban areas. Figure 7.1 shows that the largest proportion of 
Fig 7.1 Rate of Growth of Urban Population 
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Source: Department of Statistics: South African Stati~tics, 1980, Table 1.7. 
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CHAPTER 8 INTERNAL FINANCING OF LOCAL INVESTMENT. 
A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 
1. The Browne Committee:-
Following its deliberations on the question of the provision of capital 
funds to local governments, the Browne Committee recommended that: 
I 
• •••• It should be regarded as a matter of national 
importance that uniform legislation promoting the 
compulsory establishment and building up of capital 
development funds br. passed as soon as possible 
in every Province•.l 
In making this recommendation, the committee drew upon the experience 
of such cities as Durban, .which makes extensive use of internal 
financing techniques. 
TABLE 8.1 THE FINANCING OF THE FIXED CAPITAL ASSETS OF DURBAN 
ACCORDING- TO THE BALANCE. SHEET~ .1960-1978 
1960 1963 1966 1969 1972 1975 1978 
A. Amounts, ., . .. 
R millions 
1. Net external 63,5 81,8 106,6 141,0 135,8 111,5 62,7 
loans 
2. Capital develop- 1,3 2,8 9,2 24,7 67,2 122,5 204,2 
ment fund 
3. Loan redemptions .. 32 ,5·: · . 37 ,8 .. .50,7 . . ."65,1' .. .96,3 .146,9 216,0 
etc. 
4. Total . 97,3. 122,4. 166,5 .. 230 ,8 .299 ,3 380,9 482,9 
B. Percentage 
contri5uti ons 
1. Net external loans 65,3 66,8 64,0 61,1 45,4 . 29,3 13,0 
2. Capital develop- 1,3 2,3 5,5 10,7 22,4 32,1 42,3 
ment fund 
3. Loan redemptions 33,4 . 30,9 30,5 .28,2 32,2 38,6 44,7 
etc. 
4. Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Source: Browne Committee Report RP 80/1980 Vol. I p.134. 
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Table 8.1 indicates the 'success story'. of the Durban municipality which 
has increased its proportion of internal financing from 39% in 1969 to 
87% in 1978. This is enthusiastically endorsed by the Browne Committee: 
• ••• the case of Durban provides a particularly fine 
example of the way in which a capital development 
fund can be successfully operated ••• •2 
The committee is, however, cogniscent of some of the shortcomings of 
this policy: 
• ••• it is sometimes argued that a high degree 
of self-financing by local authorities places 
a relatively heavy burden on residents because 
they have to pay higher rates or tariffs ••• •3 
It therefore tempers its enthusiasm with the warning: 
• •••• it would not necessarily be in the best 
interests of other local authorities to copy 
the Durban model punttiliously.•4 
It is the purpose of this chapter to spell out the disadvantages of 
following internal financing policies, particularly those of the type 
practised by Durban. 
2. The Shortcomings of lnternal Finance 
The fundamental objective of financial policy whether that of a local 
government or a private company, is to meet the cash requirements of the 
capital program in the cheapest way. Chapter 5 outlined some of the 
financial alternatives available.to local governments and presented a 
model in which an optimal mix of internal and external sources was 
determined. This model will now be applied to the Browne Committee's 
'Internal Finance' recommendations to highlight some of its shortcomings. 
The approach to local debt outlined in chapter 6 showed that, in the 
· absence of institutional constraints or subsidies on debt, there is no 
specific proportion of debt that will minimize the cost of capital to 
... -----------!1!!!11!!!!!!!!!'!!!!11!!!!!!!!!~!!!!"!!!!!!!'!!!1!!!!~~'!!"""""'-:"--=--~~--,-~---
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the local government. It follows therefore that in this type of world, 
local governments will be indifferent between methods of financing 
(figure 8.1). 
% 
Fig 8.1 
K. ~--------------------------------------------- , 
X B/S 
An internal funding option, such as that shown in Figure 8.1 at point X 
will be seen as neither better nor worse than option Y which includes 
some borrowing. While option Y will involve more risk than X, the 
additional risk will, in efficient markets, be fully compensated for 
by the risk premium c. From this perspective then there is nothing to 
choose between financing local government investment from current 
revenue, necessitating high levels of current taxes, or debt financing 
necessitating a more risky future stream of services but offering higher 
real returns on property. 
In choosing a specific debt level, whether low for an internal finance 
option, or high for an external option, the local government's actions 
affect the riskiness, and earnings potential of the taxpayers property 
holding, and hence of his wealth portfolio generally. The relative 
merit of a specific choice lies in the extent to which the local govern-
ment risk-choice accords with the property owners' preferences in respect 
of the riskiness of his wealth portfolio. A local government which 
'plays safe' may be sacrificing the opportunity to serve residents better 
by incurring more debt (i.e. more risk) for the sake of an increase in 
·the rate of return which will accrue in the form of a better level of 
service. 
Rate of 
Return 
Fig 8.2 
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~--------------------~------------------------K· 1 
X' B/S 
The choice of an optimum level of risk under these circumstances is 
depicted in Figure 8.2. At debt level x1 the subjective marginal rate 
of compensation for risk, i.e. the slope of risk/return indifference 
curve Ir, is equal to the slop of Ke which approximates the efficient 
capital markets line. At a higher B/S level the communities 
. increasing aversion .towards risk is .not. adequately compensated t5yr·the 
rate of return offered by the market for an asset of the same risk class. 
At a lower B/S level, the risk averse community is more than compensated, 
leaving unexploited opportunities for risk-return 'trades•. Debt/risk 
level x1 is therefore the level at which the market as a whole values 
additional risk at the same rate as does the community. 
b) Advantages of Exchange 
We have applied some of the conventional principles Of portfolio 
selection to the choice between internal and external financing of local 
governments, and have shown-that there is a level of debt which is 
optimal to a local government for financing a given level of investment. 
We turn now to the level of investment itself and apply conventional 
inves_tment theory~ .to throw 1ight on this issue. We will show that a 
refusal to look beyond the confines of the community for funds with 
which to finance investments will have the effect of limiting the 
extent of that investment to the level of the individual savings that 
I 
I 
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local residents are prepared to make through local government. This 
link between investment and financial decisions is unnecessarily 
restrictive and is, as Modigliani and Miller made clear,6 entirely 
absent in a world where markets are efficient. 
'Self-sufficiency' in finance, as in anything else, has the effect of 
narrowing possibilities by neglecting opportunities for gainful trade: 
Figure 8.3 is a conventional model of the marginal efficiency of invest• 
ment. From the perspective of the local government it can be seen as a 
ranking of projects in descending order of public usefulness or 
'priority'. Figure 8.4 expresses this diminishing MEl relationship 
in terms of a simple two-period intertemporal model. The axes, C0 and 
C1, are consumption in periods 0 and 1 respectively. Consumption 
sacrificed in period 0 brings returns in period 1, that is, investment 
is positively productive. 
The transformation function T1 To models the rate at which consumption 
in C0 is transformed into consumption in C1. Its~shape reflects the. 
diminishing returns characteristic represented in Figure 8.3. 
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Figure 8.5 represents the intertemporal preferences 
of the local community. The shape of the Indifference curve, I, 
illustrates that increasing sacrifices of present consumption require 
in compensation greater and greater amounts of future consumption. 
Figure 8.6 ~ombines the local communities transformation function 
T0 Tt with its substitution map r I'l" in an intertemporal model 
which generates an optimal saving/investment/consumption level, Q. 
This is where the marginal rate of transformation and substitution· 
coincide and are expressed in the internal rate of interest, PP. 
Figure 8.7 introduces the community into a world where the market rate 
of interest MM is lower than the 'internal rate' PP. Intertemporal 
trading, i.e. borrowing and repayment will enable a new, higher 
optimum to be reached at S which raises the communities' satisfaction 
from I' to I". Investment, being freed from the belt-tightening 
consequences of local saving is-expanded While present consumption is 
increased. Future production is expanded by R leaving enough for 
interest payments and additional consumption in period C. 
This trading .optimum, S, will be approached by any firm or local 
government which simply tries to finance investment from the cheapest 
source available. The local government which ignores the signals of 
the market place and opts for financial 'self-sufficiency• will 
condemn its residents to a lower level of services for a higher level 
of current taxes. The property market will respond to this relatively 
unfavourable tax/amenities package by a reduction in prices relative to 
those communities which follow a more advantageous policy. 
c) The Cost of Taxes 
The choice of financial source for a local government is as we have 
shown identical in principle to the choice made by an individual or 
firm. It appears to be ambiguous in practice because, while debt 
has a market price or opportunity cost, taxes seem to carry no such ' 
indicator. The model presented in chapter 6 showed that, since personal 
and local government debt are interchangeable in the model, tax money 
paid to local government has the same opportunity cost as money 
invested in any other market institution. That is, it could, in 
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its next best application, be earning as much as any investment in an 
equally risky asset. The precise riskiness and return of local 
investments is however not as clearly on view to officials as the rate 
of interest on local debt, revealing itself only through the operation 
of the real estate market. It is often erroneously assumed therefore 
that local taxes are a costless source of finance because the increasing 
disutility of sacrifices of current income may not be apparent to local 
administrators. Taxes are seen therefore as cheaper than debt. This 
approach is contradicted by the model which sees residents as having 
the opportunity to invest privately with numerous institutions other 
than local governments, earning a market related interest rate. 
Summary 
Internal funding can be seen therefore as a disregard on the part of 
local officials for the relative costs of debt and taxes. Debt is seen 
as costly because interest is pai~, taxes are seen as costless because 
they are compulsory contributions. It is not, however, compulsory to 
incur tax liability through residence in a high tax area, so high taxes 
to_ finance investment are substitutable, through migration for lower 
taxes combined with personal debt. Taxes therefore have an imputable 
cost equal to the return on an investment yielding an income stream of 
a riskiness equal to that of local amenities and infrastructure. 
Refusal to recognize this cost, and to engage in financial transactions 
such as borrowing to minimize it will lead local officials to invest 
1ess and tax more than is necessary. Welfare of residents will fall 
short of maximum and property values will fall in relation to other 
areas and other types of asset. 
3. Some Claims made for Internal Finantino 
Several claims are made by the Browne Committee and by other sources in 
support of internal funding. These deserve some comment, in the light 
~f the above models. 
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a) Savings on interest 
The Browne Committee claims this as one of the benefits of self-
financing.(p.l33 para. 12.6.4 (iv)). In the sense that self-financing 
is a cheaper source of finance, this is entirely illusory. As was 
pointed out,_ taxpayers money has a cost equivalent to the interest rate 
obtainable privately on the market. This is in most cases far higher 
than the semi-gilt interest rates local governments pay on debt (see 
Figure 8.8). 
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Financing through debt is by far the cheaper method for most municipal-
ities. 
In the sense that less money is paid out for interest and redemption in 
any specific year, internal financing does •save money•. What it 
sacrifices, however, in terms of investments not made or, if investment 
level is maintained, in terms of consumption forgone in previous 
periods could easi-ly be far greater than this •saving•. Far from 
saving money, internal funding in fact imposes unnecessary costs on 
taxpayers. 
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b) Increased disposal over Funds 
The Browne Committee further claims that: •self-financing will enable 
the local authority to increase its disposal over funds ••• • (p.l33). 
By this is meant that a greater level of internal funding will enable 
more debt to be issued at the same leverage level, and therefore a 
greater level of investment to be undertaken. There are several object-
ions to this. Firstly, what is advocated is not a specific method of 
finance, but a higher level of_investment. No suggestion is made that 
internal finance be used instead of debt, but that it be seen as a base 
on which financial leverage can operate by incurring more debt at the · 
same B/S ratio. Municipalities are exhorted not to finance internally, 
but to simply expand investment while keeping financial policy unchanged. 
Secondly~ in·. terms of the theories out 1 i ned above, it is by no means 
·obvious that additional investment, financed through taxes and debt, 
will be a good thing. Figure 8.7 showed that this decision depends on 
the communities capacity to make .useful investments, on the interest 
rate, and on the communities willingness to make present sacrifices for 
the sake of future gains. This in turn depends very much on the level 
of the communities income. 
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Figure 8.9 shows a poor community with a low income and therefore a 
great reluctance to sacrifice present consumption, which is already at 
low levels, for the sake of future consumption. Such a community may 
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reasonably wish to save little or none of its present income, financing 
investment, and even some of its consumption from borrowing. 
The Browne Committee's recommendation may, therefore, have a very 
unfortunate effect on some communities, particularly the poorer ones, 
leading them to make sacrifices that are not warranted. 
c) Better rating _ 
It is further suggested that by reducing debt, the local government may 
improve its 'rating' and so attract cheaper debt finance. This argument 
is completely valid, and was addressed in chapter 6 of this thesis. 
Figure 6.10, reproduced below as figure 8.10, illustrates the effect 
that bankruptcy costs have in raising Ki, the return to debt at high·. 
leverage levels. The advice to local governments that flows from this 
analysis, however, is not that they should avoid debt, so defeating the 
purpose of the internal funding, but that the debt/equity level should 
be optimized at the level which assures the lowest overall cost of 
capital (Ko). 
F;g 8.10 
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d) Intergenerational equity 
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Government debt, being a commitment on behalf of future generations, is 
seen erroneously as inherently inequitable. Reliance on internal sources 
thus appears to have the merit of maintaining intergenerational equity. 
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This advantage is as illusory as the other e~:ES c~•en:- It is 
in the nature of things that generations sh~lc i~e-~~ a specific state-
of-the-world from their precursors. This state-~-~rld consists of 
an endowment of assets and obligations. A generatior .nich refused to 
pass on obligations to future generations would be ur4t1e to pass on 
as sets, or investments as well. This latter~ may easily 
be far more onerous than the debt incurred to finance ~ investment. 
Generations cannot be sealed off from each other by the simple expedient 
of internal financing. They are inextricably linked i~ a way that is 
characterised by uncertainty and by the impossibility cf future 
generations taking part in present deci~on .aking ~ses. Present 
generations must take actions which affect the future, and they must 
do so without perfect knowledge. This is the unavoimtle consequence 
of mans existence in time, and cannot be avoided by clever~financial 
p~licies. Decisions in the present are made on the basis of expectations 
of the future, as embodied in relative present prices and interest 
rates; Investment and financial decisions made on thE basis of this 
information are inherently the best informed decisions that could have 
been made. As Kantor states: 'In an efficient .arket rrices fully 
reflect available information' J Local goverraents, bJ borrowing and 
repaying money at market rates of interest are acting an the basis of 
this available information in a way that is responsiblE, and that cannot 
be improved on by appeal to higher authority. 
4. Methods of Internal ·rinanting 
It is clear, then, that internal funding has severe defects as a means 
of local government financing, and that the clai.s .eriE on its behalf are 
fundamentally specious. In the following section we will outline some 
of the methods by which internal financing is pursuee, and will comment 
on the special claims made for them. 
a) Short term financing 
A local government which finances its capital progrcm vith short term 
debt will be faced. in due course with a heavy interest and redemption 
burden. In this way the internal component of the fi~encial policy is 
increased despite the continued rise of debt. This ~edure has proved 
useful for circumventing state controls on debt vhi~ may be very 
I 
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restrictive. Rapid retirement enables the local government to issue 
debt more frequently and to finance a larger capital budget than would 
have been possible under existing debt limits. Short term debt 
financing must be seen, therefore, not as a response to real economic 
forces, but as a response to regulation. Like so many such responses, 
it is extremely costly, for reasons we have outlined above. In addition, 
the local government may, in so doing, fall foul of an adverse term 
structure of interest rates or 'yield curve'. Despite many claims to 
the contrary,8 financing in the short term does not have the potential 
to reliably reduce interest costs. Short term rates are not always 
lower than long term rates, but may be higher or lower, depending on 
inflationary and other expectations. Even if it is· cheaper to borrow 
short term, this may not be a good strategy, since the 'long term' does 
inevitably arrive, bringing with it higher rates, compared to which 
yesterday's 'high' long rates may seem very low. Financing exclusively 
. . 
in the short term constitutes, in effect, an attempt to outguess the 
financial market. While chance may bring some success at this, it is 
not possible to do this consistently in efficient markets. 
The prudent capital budget will contain a mixture of both long and short 
term liabilities designed to accommodate projected variations in the 
local governments cash flows. 
b) Purchasing awn stock 
Several local authorities in South Africa use this,method as a means of 
increasing the proportion of internal finance in their structure. As 
such, there is no reason at all to criticize this practice, as long as 
the debt level finally selected conforms to the principles outlined in 
chapter 6. On the contrary, making a market in its own stock can be 
highly beneficial, particularly when the secondary market in municipal 
semi-gilts is as thin·as it is in South Africa. By increasing the trade-
ability of its paper the local government can achieve a better rating, 
and attract funds at a lower interest rate. 
In the presence of. debt limits, however, this practice ~ould seem to be 
an unwarranted luxury. Maintaining a proportion of 'slack' debt for 
trading purposes reduces the amount of permissible 'active' debt below 
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the restrictive levels sanctioned by central government. This must have 
the effect of restricting capital development. 
c) The Capital Development Fun~ 
So far in this chapter we have dealt with the shortcomings of internal 
funding as such. While this critique applies of course to the Capital 
Development Fund (CDF). as a specific method of internal funding, this 
policy has its own particular shortcomings. Contrary to the recommend-
ations of the Browne Committee, the CDF is an inappropriate vehicle for 
internal financing, a policy which is in itself defective as a local 
government financial policy. . . 
The Capital Development Fund is a consolidated 'sinking fund' which 
serves as an accumulator for retained taxes, investment income and 
proceeds from property sales. Loans are made -from this fund to the 
various departments of the local government for capital projects. 
Interest is charged at an:.'average' rate, which is commonly lower than 
-the market rate on municipal debt. Undistributed funds are invested 
in a portfolio of assets which earn market rates of interest with 
various.institutions. 
The portion of the CDFwhich .is.internally·'invested' simply constitutes 
internal financing and as such warrants no further comment except to 
point out that the low rate of interest charged in no way reflects· the 
true opportunity cost of funds, being merely a 'shadow' figure. Claims 
that CDF finance is 'cheap' is accordingly misinformed. It is however 
the externally invested portion that requires further comment at this 
stage. 
External investments. are made in order to augment, by means of earnings, 
the funds available for capital development. This they certainly do, 
but the question remains: do the earnings exceed the cost of the finance? 
As was pointed out in section 3, the cost of accumulated taxpayers money 
is the interest r~te obtainable by private citizens on the market. To 
justify the existence of the CDF, local governments would have to show 
that they can earn a greater return than the taxpayer can in his 
personal capacity. If they are unable to do so, then it would clearly 
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be advantageous to tax less, leaving the money in the taxpayers purse to 
be used according to personal preferences and priorities. As we will 
show the latter course is the appropriate one. 
In the present statutory environment confronting most local governments, 
external investment is singled out for special consideration. The 
appropriate Provincial Ordinances9 specify a limited range of securities 
in which local governments may invest without provincial sanction. 
These consist in practice of fi~ea interest securities with banks, 
building societies and other local authorities. The prescribed nature 
-
of this portfolio places severe limitations on the local governments 
ability to acquire and administer a well diversified portfolio of 
assets. It is accordingly unable to earn a return on this portfolio 
which is competitive with the returns on private investments. Despite 
the fact that the same interest rate is earned on any given investment 
irrespective of whether it is made by a local government or by a~ 
private investor, the local government is forced to add more risk to its 
portfolio--by ·the acquisition of say, a semi-gilt bond, than is the private 
investor. The private investor, in acquiring the semi-gilt will be 
adding this'security to a diversified portfolio, changing its riskiness 
in a way that, in efficient markets, just offsets the change in return 
of the portfolio as a whole. The local authority, because its acquisitions 
are added to a restricted portfolio, is not able to make ~fficient trades 
o~ this kind and is thus forced to accept a portfolio which earns a lower 
return than many other portfolios in.the same risk class. 
Because of these restrictions, local authorities are not well constituted 
for the purposes of external investment. The apparent revenue-earning 
function of the CDF is largely illusory, being based, as were the 
,,. -advcmtages of internal financing generally, on a misconception regarding 
th£ .\.•~•st of taxpayers money. 
Anotk (' supposed benefit ascribed to the CDF is the role they seem to 
play in avoiding financial risk at no apparent cost. 
'Capital Development Funds perform an extremely 
valuable function in insulating the local 
authority.,.from the vagaries of the capital 
market ••• • 10 
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This idea again embodies the view that the municipality can •beat the 
market•. In reality they are involved in as much guesswork as anyone 
else, and as likely to be wrong in their guesses. If the CDF finds 
itself facing unexpectedly rising interest rates, then it will lose 
money. If real interest rates fall, it will gain money. In the long 
run in efficient markets it will -make no more than normal returns, 
commensurate-with the level of risk of the securities held. Far from 
providing a cushion against the fluctuations of the market, the CDF 
itself is likely to fluctuate even more strongly than the market, for 
the reasons already given. 
The only genuine 'cushion• the.COF can provide is to allow··the local 
authority flexibility in the timing of its debt issue. This is a 
genuinely useful function, one which is addressed by finance texts under· 
the title 'liquidity management•. It is not a form of financing, and 
does not substitute for debt financing ·or any other form. It is merely 
a fund, held in a mixture of more and'less liquid form which enables 
the municipality to choose the precise moment at which to offer its 
paper on the market, or to meet other contingencies. In order to 
4 beat the market• in this way the muncipality must make guesses in 
competition with others. If it misses the correct moment, it will have 
to pay a higher rate. In the South African semi-gilt·market, fine 
timing of this kind is not possible since the annual 'calendar• of bond 
issues is determined by the Department of Finance, and not by the 
municipalities themselves. 
The Capital Development Fund is therefore not a means to 'cushion• the 
municipality from the capital market. If cushioning is wanted, there 
are many financial institutions which will be eager to provide this kind 
of 'insurance• by, for example, the purchase of long term debt. The 
muni.cipality will have to pay for this service, in the long term, but is 
certainly not in a position to provide 'self-insurance• at a cheaper 
rate unless, of course, it is privy to inside information, not known to 
other operators in the market. 
143 
5. ·conclusion 
We have_shown that capital development funds, as recommended by the 
Browne Committee do not live up to their promise of lower interest 
rates, asset replacement and market stabilisation. They in-fact cost 
local taxpayers thousands of rands each year in terms of amenities 
sacrificed, negative returns earned on a money-losing financial port-
folio, and money paid in taxes rather than spent, saved or invested 
by the individual taxpayers themselves. 
Their continued use by local governments can be ascribed either to a 
great reluctance to.seek external finance on the part of officials, or 
to an inability to seek such finance due to statutory or other limit-
ations. As such the CDF may be a successful regulation-avoidance 
technique, but it does not serve to maximize local welfare. 
Insistence by provincial and central government on the use of the CDF 
and other internal funding procedures can only serve to inhibit the 
development potential of local communities in South Africa. 
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CHAPTER 9 LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORM IN SOUTH AFRICA -
A CRITIQUE OF THE PRESIDENTS COUNCIL PROPOSALS 
In earlier chapters, public goods in general and local public goods in 
particular have been situated theoretically within the mainstream of 
micro-economic theory. Through the Buchanan approach to institutional 
choice, public goods were analysed in terms of the kinds of 
institutions which provide them, in contrast to the Samuelsonian 
approach which saw them as a specific category of goods with a recog-
nizable set of characteristics which defined them as 'intrinsically' 
public. This analysis led us to conceive of all public institutions 
including local governments not as purely political entities, but also 
as competitively selected institutions providing certain goods in the 
most efficient way. 
The institution of the local government was accordingly'identified as 
the organisational fonm which exists and survives because it is able 
to supply a set of valued commodities at competitive costs, and to 
capture,through the property tax, some Of the rents generated by its 
development of amenities and infrastructure. 
The Tiebout •voting-with-the-feet• model -was presented to-show how 
demand and supply for local amenities have expression in the property 
market, and that they do in fact react upon each other through the 
medium of local government. The property market upon which the local 
government has such an important influence, 'represents a signalling 
mechanism with the potential to generate an optimal pattern and 
level of local public goods; that is providing the local authority 
operates within a ·suitable legal and constitutional framework. 
'\ 
This chapter will identify the nature of the legal framework for 
local authorities in South Africa and will discuss the proposals made 
by the Presidents CQuncil 1 using the analysis presented in previous 
chapters. 
The great strength of the present constitutional proposals has been 
to recognize the importance of the commonality of interests between 
different sections of the South African population. It has been 
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formally acknowledged that Whites, Coloureds and Indians share, in some 
respects at least, the same problems and interests. It has also been 
acknowledged that, for the various groups to be able to develop and 
co-exist, suitable institutions of a social, political and economic 
nature must be created or allowed to emerge. Local government is 
seen by the policy architects of the Presidents Council as the key 
' institution for this purpose. To this extent, therefore, the Presidents 
Council proposals are accommodated within the analytical framework 
of this thesis: local autonomY is seen as a potential force for 
development and maximum social welfare of the non-white groups. 
Beyond agreement on these general issues, however, differences arise. 
1. Metropolitan Government 
In its eighteenth recommendation, the Presidents Council suggest~d 
that, where appropriate, a metropolitan level of government should be 
established in place of the provincial level: 
'the 'hard' functions of government should be 
dealt with by a nominated board {rural or 
urban), utility company or metropolitan auth-
ority to which-each of the local authorities 
concerned would nominate at least one 
representative•. 2 
By 'hard' functions, the committee has in mind activities such as 
water supply, electricity supply, sewerage or drainage, whereas by 
•soft' functions is meant that category of goods which appear 'location 
specific', such as parks or libraries. 
The institutional choice approach used in this thesis throws some 
critical light on this proposal. 
a) Hard and soft functions 
The process of competition among local amenity producing institutions 
will, as discussed above, lead to a continuing effort by local govern-
ment to provide the most desired package of local goods_, at the cheap-
est possible tax price. Failure to do so could lead to a vote-with-
I 
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the-feet in favour of competing communities, resulting in a relative 
fall of local property values and of the property tax base. We would 
predict from this theory that, in addition to assiduously seeking 
value enhancing public projects, communities would equally carefully 
seek cost saving collective arrangements with neighbouring authorities 
or firms. This is indeed what can be observed on a daily basis in 
almost any municipality. 
Those functions where economies of scale are obtainable3 such as water 
provision, wastewater treatment, refuse disposal and, to some extent, 
refuse collection, are commonly the subject of collective agreements. 
For example, water and electricity are provided to a population far 
larger than that of the city of Cape Town through a set of contractual 
arrangements. Refuse removal and disposal is performed on behalf of 
some local governments on a contractual basis by a local firm which is 
not confined to the scale of a single municipality. Fire protection 
services are often shared, despite the apparent absence of opportunities 
for scale economies. local governments apparently find room for 
mutual co-operation where professional consultants to the Presidents 
Council do not! 4 Daily experience confirms our contention that the 
choice between local or metropolitan government is in fact a choice 
between alternative institutional forms each of which may have the 
potential ~o supply some, but not all services at minimum cost. This 
choice does not have to be made at a constitutional planning level, but 
at a local level. An ongoing, competitive social process in which 
different institutions compete for the opportunity to supply a service, 
just as firms compete for survival in the market place, would resolve 
the question of which authority or organisation should produce the 
required service. 
It is not appropriate or even possible for the constitutional committee 
to make specific recommendations about which functions are best performed 
at local level (soft) and which are best performed at metropolitan 
level (hard). All that can be done is to provide an appropriate legis-
lative framework within which agreements between governments at all 
levels can be made and enforced, and new local governments can be 
established for presently accepted purposes or even for new specialised 
purposes. local transport, irrigation or education authorities, for 
example, may be the most efficient way to provide these specific 
services, yet the borders of each respective authority may be entirely 
different. The boundaries appropriate to a Cape metropolitan water 
authority, for example, may be entirely inappropriate to a Cape 
metropolitan refuse removal authority. Similarly, the taxing power 
of a school.board may be quite unsuitable for a traffic police force. 
The process of choosing the most efficient social institution may 
result in separate provision of these services by differently 
constituted 'governments' with different boundaries. On the other hand 
it may as easily transpire that a single authority will efficiently 
perform the most·unlikely combination of services as a result of the 
cost minimizing, satisfaction maxinising process of institutional 
choice. Condominium developments, for example, perform such disparate 
services as swimming pool provision, laundromat services, security 
guards and cable television, apparently to the advantage of shareholders. 
The best a constitution can do is provide a framework in which these 
rational choices can be made and to legally guarantee the rights of 
individuals and groups within these collective agreements. It is quite 
inappropriate for a constitutional committee to attempt to codify 
decisions which are properly the result of an ongoing social process. 
b) Representation 
The Presidents Council makes the recommendation that local governments 
should be represented on metropolitan councils. Indeed the recommend-
ation is ~tronger:.that metropolitan level acquires its authority 
from the local level. 5 If by this the Presidents Council means that 
metropolitan government is a result of mutual agreement between partic-
ipating local governments, then the concept is to be applauded. The 
question arises though, as to why any official notice needs to be taken 
of such an agreement other than for the purpose of drawing up enabling 
legislation. The theoretical approach adopted in preceding chapters 
suggests that no regulation is needed to force local governments to 
pursue the interests of residents other than those ensuring an 
environment of personal mobility an: secure tenure of real estate. 
It seems clear though, that what the Presidents Council has in mind is 
not enabling legislation at all, but coercive legislation aimed at 
forcing local governments to take part in a metropolitan tier of 
government with some clearly laid out functions. As long as there is 
no possibility for a.local government to 'opt out' of metropolitan 
government, an option which the concept of 'hard functions'~seems to 
preclude, there can be no truth in the statement that 'the authority 
of the metropolitan body will be derived from the constituent members•. 6 
It seems far more likely that the intention is to represent local 
governments in a higher authority.subject to the will of the majority 
of representatives. Dissenting communities will presumably have to 
accept the ruling of the majority and consent to policies which do 
not serve them for the sake of other policies which do. 
While the Presidents Council provides us with no framework within 
which to evaluate this proposal, the economic theories of voting, 
developed by Buchanan and Tullock and presented in chapter 2 of this 
thesis are of considerable usefulness. 
Of special importance in the medianvotermodel, which predicts that 
expenditure patterns will, in a majority ~ule situation reflect the 
priorities of the median voter. Incorporation into a metropolitan 
democratic institution will have- the effect of altering the nature 
of the median voter, and hence of the expenditure policies. A 
relatively poor community joining a wealthy metropolis will find the 
thrust of public policy being aimed at an income group far higher than 
the group it would have targeted independently. Similarly, a rich 
community will find itself committed-to decisions serving income groups 
lower than that of its own median voter. 
Incorporation seems, therefore, a far cry from the 'customer• relation-
ship presently enjoyed between co-operating local authorities. An 
authority which 'buys' services from a neighbour or enters into any 
other form of collective agreement does so because both parties expect 
to benefit from this action. The agreement is thus unanimous in the 
-Wic~sellian sense. 7 This does not mean that all parties are fully 
satisfied. The buyer would like better service at a lower price, 
while the seller would like the opposite, together with the 
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monopoly powers to guarantee it! · The agreed price may not be regarded 
as ideal yet the presence of a contract signifies that all parties have 
unanimously agreed to accept a compromise position. Anything short of 
unanimity in this regard would abort the agreement. All parties would 
go their own ways disappointed but unharmed by the unsuccessful attempt 
at socio-economic co-operation. 
An 'unsuccessful' political decision, on the other hand, has tremendous 
potential to harm the participants in the process. Adverse decisions 
can impose actual costs on some, while even a neutral decision, or no 
decision at all, imposes costs in the form of participation in the 
process. 
A community which exchanged its autonomy for representation on a 
metropolitan authority would be exposing itself to this potential harm 
as a result of adverse decisions taken by the majority of fellow rep-
resentatives. A Junanimity' voting rule would eliminate this risk 
completely, but as every committee.member knows, unanimity is extremely 
difficult and costly to acnieve, especially when people of different, 
non-homogenous interests are involved. Some issues, such as the 
construction of roads and drainage may take weeks to resolve at metro-
politan level, but be easily and cheaply decided at local level. To 
justify this minimum cost of reaching unanimous decisions there must be 
commensurate expected benefits to be gained from the collective action 
that made the decision costs necessary •. A 'hard' function required by 
regulation to be dealt with at metropolitan, committee level has, 
therefore, the potential to--impose costs on the provision of the service 
that may be avoided by other institutional forms. 
Thus far in the discussion of some aspects of the definition of 'hard' 
and ~soft' functions, we have accepted the structure of the service as 
given. This is not the case. It is by no means given that the process 
of supplying water is a single, cohesive social function, while the 
supply of commodities such as food or clothing consist of many aspects, 
each of which may be performed beneficially by separate agencies. In 
reality, the supply of water, for example, is performed by many 
agencies, even within the monopoly currently exercised by government. 
It is not uncommon to find the supplies of drinking water, urban 
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irrigation water, rural irrigation water and industrial water being 
handled 'in the same geographical area, by separate bodies. Neither is 
it uncommon to find different aspects of police work, such as security 
of buildings, CID investigation, forensic laboratory work, training of 
personnel, control of mobile patrols, civil defence and many others 
being performed by many different agencies, some governmental in their 
nature, others not. This division of labour is indeed a feature of 
the market economy, and takes place continuously in a dynamic competit-
ive process. The outcomes of this process may be understood and 
predicted by means of the economic theories of industrial organisation, 
but cannot be duplicated by presidential decree, however well informed 
it may be. 
c) Local Preferences 
The choice of neighbourhood is, as has been discussed, an economic act 
which reveals preferences for collections of. public goods. As such it 
is an important mechanism in the articulation of demand for local 
amenities. The merging of local tast~s and priorities into a collective 
set of metropolitan priorities will reduce the variety of local comm-
unities which are available to the house-seeker and will inhibit the 
mechanisms of demand for local .public goods, with resulting inefficiency. 
This will mean that residents will be more dependent on the political 
process to express their preferences, and to look after their interests 
in the field of local amenities and services. It is common cause that 
the political process in South Africa has, in the past, been anything 
but even handed. It is altogether likely ~hat metropolitan cou~cils 
will become an arena in which .small commun_ities are dominated by eager 
Qnes,not the forum for expression of,differing preferences and priorities. 
2. Revenue·sharing 
One of the way~ traditionall~ for central government to impose its 
policies and judgements on local authorities is to control a large 
proportion of their funds, through grants and subsidies. It is with 
very little surprise therefore that we read recommendation thirty four, 
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which levels some offhand accusations at the property tax and then 
recommendation thirty five which, without further ado accepts in 
principle the idea of 'neutral funds' and goes on in paragraph ii and 
iii to outline the enforced standardisation of facilities and the 
'determination of priorities'. The Presidents Council clearly envis-
ages a situation in which metropolitan and regional governments have 
strong control over local government actions through the discretionary 
disposal of •neutral funds'. Far from being a liberal, democratic 
recommendation, it holds in-itself the seeds of authoritarianism. 
Paradoxically, the recommendation stems from a desire ~o counter the 
present maldistribution of existing sources of rates income• (p.97), 
a laudable enough aim. The suggestion is made that 'neutral' funds, 
{i.e. those not originating from taxes en residential property), should 
be redistributed on· a regional basis so that all municipalities, 
-
- . . 
residential or non-residential, should have access to rates from 
corrmercial·-"and industrial property. 
In the South African context, this recommendation does at first flush 
seem attractive. It is common to find communities of 'sub-economic' 
and ~economic' but low-income residents living, as residents of Black-
heath in the Cape Province do, literally across the road from an 
industrial. complex (Leylands Blackheath plant) but without access to 
it as a tax base since it is sited in the neighbouring (white) local 
authority. Sharing the revenue of the Leyland plant would seem to 
be eminently fair. 
There are, however, a number of reasons why such a revenue sharing 
plan would be less than ideal: 
a) The reason fo~ the problem does not lie in the absence of revenue 
sharing but in the nature of the state housing policies, the limitations 
on mobility which flow from the Group Areas and related .Acts, and the 
unsuitable constitutional position of coloured local authorities. It 
is to these real causes that we must look for a cure, not to a 
temporary palliative which will exacerbate the problem in the long run. 
b) Local authorities are well aware of the beneficial nature of local, 
properly housed and situated industrial developments. Many towns and 
cities make strenuous efforts to attract business in competition with 
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their neighbours by developing local factory sites, service roads, rail 
links and· to make business aware of these services by advertising and 
other media presentations. They have a strong incentive to do this 
because the nature of commercial and industrial developments is such 
that they are able to expand the tax base without making excessive 
demands on local resources, thus helpinQ to finance services for 
residents. Any suggestion, such as that made by the Presidents 
Council, that industry be looked upon as 'common' rateable property 
for a wide range of communities will certainly be met with cries of 
horror from those who have deliberately attempted to attract economic 
development by the provision of an attractive business environment. 
Aside from 'the fairness' considerations, and perhaps even more 
important, is the possibility that local governments will no longer 
consider it worthwhile to continue to do this. 
lf~a share of all business taxes in metropolitan Cape Town will accrue 
to each municipality, regaroless of where the business is situated, 
it will become rational for municipalities to actively discourage 
unsightly, pollution producing factories. The opportunities for 
'free-riding' on_ the backs of other local communities will expand and 
the potential benefits of having local industries will dissipate. 
Costs· of roads and-transport will rise as factories are situated far 
away from residential areas. Activities presently performed by local 
government will,have to be performed_by central or regional government 
with attendant costs and inefficiencies. Investment in local areas 
will decline to be replaced by investment in more central areas. If 
the costs associated with this mode of local amenity production are very 
great, it is likely that businesses themselves will see the opportunity 
to provide housing and local amenities themselves by means of 'company 
towns'. In so doing, they will prevent the actual dissipation and 
'wasteage of the benefits that local business can bring to residential 
areas. From the perspective of home owners as a group, this development, 
or inevitable variations on it, will have the same effects. The 
benefits and consumer surpluses generated by the activities of local 
governments will be lost to local residents, and captured by other, 
more·efficient institutional structures. 
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c) Tax Neutrality 
Attention was drawn in a previous chapter to the fundamental non-
neutrality of all taxes, and to the shortcomings of the various 
'neutral' taxes proposed by the Presidents Council: 
Business Licences: Suffer from the defect of being highly discriminat-
ory, commonly being used to protect local sectional interests. The 
potential for corruption and favouritism is very great.8 
Turnover Taxes: Being a tax which is imposed at all points in the 
production process, manufacture, wholesale distribution or retail 
distribution, this tax can encourage the conglomeration of these 
activities under one roof. There remain. however, some advantages 
to the local use of certain forms of this tax, as was pointed out 
in chapter 4. 
Employment Levy: This is a highly regressive form of local income 
tax which, if it does not fall directly on employees, will be passed 
on to unemployed labour. The use of this tax to 'encourage deconcen-
tration• as envisaged by the Presidents Council may be in line with 
his tori ca 1 _ciecentralisa ti on _ _po 1 i.cy, --.but_ is certainly not j n 1 i ne 
with the _spirit of t~e Prime Minister's 1 Good Hope• proposals, which 
spoke emphatically of 'carrots•, not 'sticks'. 
d) Redistribution of·Income 
Underlying the President Council's discussion of revenue sharing was 
the apparent wish to see income redistributed from Whites to Coloureds. 
' While this is a laudable intention, it cries out for some comment: 
f). If we are serious about redistribution, it is as well to start as 
-~-mean to go on and to talk of low and high income groups as the 
recipients and sources of redistributed funds. It is misleading to 
refer, as does the Presidents Council, to t~ese-groups as 'black .. 
and 'white•. These terms are not (hopefully) suitable proxies for 
•poor' and 'rich'. 
. . 
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ii) The foregoing model, involving inter-institutional competition, 
shows ·that the local 1evel of government is an inappropriate site for 
redistributive activities. As agents of redistribution they suffer 
from the defect of not being able to hold donors captive, nor being 
able to exclude potential recipients of public largesse. As a 
result, 'Robin Hood' local governments find themselves losing well-
off citizens to neighbouring, more parsimonious cities, and attract-
ing to themselves the needy of all areas. Thus the 'goose that lays 
the golden egg' is effectively killed, the base for redistribution 
destroyed. 
Similarly, as a proposed recipient of central government redistribution 
the local government suffers from certain defects: Being producers 
of a narrow range of goods they are confined to passing these 
subsidies on to residents through lower taxes or charges for these 
goods, or increasing the quantity of local amenities produced. 
In so doing, it must make use of its own judgement as to which of 
these services will best serve the poor. This is a process which is 
fraught with error and distortion. No such judgement is needed by a 
central government which simply provides a personal subsidy on a 
means test basis to individual people. Recipients of such a subsidy 
are not distinguishable from any other citizen, and so do not need any 
further organisations or structures, such as low-income housing 
projects. charity-clinics etc to serve their needs. They present them-
selves to the market as any other customer with an income which, 
though augmented by redistributive subsidies, remains limited in 
relation to needs. The revelation of preferences for goods, both 
personal and public would then take place in the normal way, through 
the acts of purchase and sale. 
Redistribution on the local government level, however, raises many 
problems, in addition to the ones~already mentioned. Possibly foremost 
among these is the understandable reluctance of local governments to 
accept responsibility for potential recipients despite an undertaking 
by central government to foot the bill. Local officials have limited 
time and resources and are (commendably) reluctant to use them on 
activities which do not benefit local residents and ratepayers. The 
construction and administration of subsidised housing clearly falls 
into this category, in the judgement of many local governments. 
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It is thus the unfortunate result of the present method of subsidis-
atton through the local government that people who would no!""lally 
present themselves as customers, shareholders and residents, and whom 
the local government would try to serve and attract, become a source 
of cost and expense, which it is in their interests to repel. This 
they do by attempting to persuade some nther authority to accept the 
responsibility of redistributive functions, resulting in a 'passing the 
buck' process, which is harmful to the interests· of the recipients of 
redistribution. 
The economic theory of the local government presented in this thesis 
does not, therefore, endorse the proposal of the Presidents Council to 
use the local level of government as a site for redistributive activit-
ies, whether the redistributive funds originate locally or centrally. 
3. Black local Authorities 
Perhaps the most severe shortcoming of the Presidents Council report 
is the scant attention it pays to the position of Blacks in the 
constitutional structure. Beyond noting that 'It is government policy 
to establish Black local authorities with municipal status• (4) and 
the endorsement of the Browne Committee's view that Black local govern-
ments can.appropriately co-opera~e with white and coloured neighbours 
in the provision of services which yield s~ale economies (5)~ the 
Presidents Council has little to say about Blacks and the way in which 
local services are to be provided to them. In reality it is black and 
coloured local authorities that merit special attention because of the 
peculiar institutional structure under which they now operate: 
a) Property·ownership 
The economic theory of public goods as presented in this thesis stresses 
the importance of the institutions of private property and of a market 
in real estate for the existence and proper functioning of a 'market' 
for local public goods and services. The absence of a genuine black 
property market is thus of great importance to prospective black local 
authorities. It means that the essential link between local government 
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decisions and the residents who are affected by those decisions is 
absent. lhe conditions for the 'natural' emergence of responsible local 
government are therefore not present. 
The alternative, at present, to private property ownership is the state 
financed, local government administered housing scheme, or township. 
These schemes have a very poor record with regard to the provision of 
services and amenities for reasons that are very easy to understand: 
The local authorities' relationship to the resident of a township is 
that of landlord and tenant. In the normal course of events, this 
should present no obstacle, since owners and renters of property share 
many common interests.as successful private rental schemes all over the 
world show. The difficulty arises, however, as a result of the redist-
ri.bution nature of this housing. Most townships consist almost 
exclusively of houses erected expressly for the purpose of letting to 
people with very low incomes. Rents are subsidised through the mechan-
ism of very low interest loans made through the National Housing Fund 
to cover the cost of construction. These schemes are administered by 
local authorities, often Administration Boards or Divisional Councils, 
who are requtred to balance the annual budget of these schemes on an 
individual basis. This they often find impossible, or are able to do 
so only by maintaining a very low standard of services. 
b) Location 
Part of the process of provision of low income housing in South Africa 
is the choice of the location of this housing. This choice 
commonly goes towards the mo~t unfavourable areas for human 
( . -
hab.itation.· While it is true that the market process itsely 
typically results in .the structuring .of cities into homogeneous zones,9 
the process of bureaucratic allocation has not proved a good substitute 
for the·mar.ket process, and many townships· find themselves fsolated in 
areas that·are particularly expensive to serve withcamenities. fhis 
further adds to their costliness and· to the burden they place on their 
local government. 
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Low-income housing schemes are therefore not a source of revenue to 
local g~vernments, but a source of potential loss. As such, their 
presence may not be welcomed by local governments, but actively dis-
couraged. The provision of low-income housing, financed by central 
government, is not seen as an opportunity by local authorities, but 
as a burdensome duty, which they rationally seek to avoid as far as it 
is legally and morally possible to do so. 
Under these circumstances any local government serving black communi-
ties have no incentive to improve their service to their residents, 
and will be particularly disinclined to borrow on their behalf to 
finance capital projects. Borrowing, as has been discusse~will only 
be undertaken in the expectation of rewards or return. There can be 
no such expectation in the kind of environment surrounding the 
provision of black housing in South Africa. 
c) The Political Process 
In this environment the political process must carry a particularly 
heavy burden~0 The ballot box remains as the only channel through which 
local residents can communicate their own assessment of preferences 
and priorities. Their attitude towards alternative public projects 
cannot be expressed in the normal way through the choice and purchase 
of accommodation, but must be articulated through nomination and 
election of competing representatives. It is clear, therefore, that 
the political process assumes if anything a gre~ter significance for 
the black communities than it does for the white. The neglect by the 
Presidents Council of the constitutional position of black local 
government and of any mention of the many restrictions that make black 
{ 
local authorities unique in South Africa is therefore a very serious 
ommission. 
4. Conclusion 
The theoretical framework provided by the Tiebout model .and by the 
institutional choice approach has led to a fundamental critique of the 
Presidents Council proposals. At a general level these proposals er.r 
in attempting to codify what are essentially the-results of a dynamic 
~---. 
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social process. They try to embody in a constitution issues such as 
the existence of metropolitan levels of government and the sharing of 
services. ·Instead they should concentrate on drawing up a framework 
within which people and communities can freely associate politically 
and economically, in order to generate mutually acceptable solutions 
to these issues, and within which the rights of each party are protected. 
The neglect of the situation of Blacks in South Africa is a major defect 
of the report, since the issues in question are issues which specific-
ally concern them. Any constitution must address the question of 
black local authorities and the intimately connected issue of property 
ownership, mobility and local representation, even if it does neglect 
the question of national representation. 
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CHAPTER 10 CONCLUSION 
1. ·summary 
In this thesis we have examined the difficulties experienced by local 
communities in providing themselves with amenities and infrastructure. 
In order to place the problem in a generalised context, the theory of 
public goods was examined with particular emphasis falling on Buchanan's 
institutional choice approach. Public goods were seen as good produced 
by a government, an institution which is able to internalize the 
externalities inherent in the consumption and production of some goods 
and services. Allocation of resources to this category of goods takes 
place in the context of the institution which produces it, in this case 
through the political process. 
Local public goods.were seen as goods and services which as a result of 
.a competitive process between different kinds of institutions and 
between different institutions of the same kind, are produced by public 
authorities at community or .. regional level. The market process affect-
ing loca1 public goods-:producjng institutions was explored by C.M. 
Tiebout in his 'voting-with-the-feet' model of interjurisdictional 
competition.· Chapter three of this thesis presented the Tiebout model, 
and examined the empirical evidence available on it. 
In chapter four, a closer look was taken at the variety of ways that 
local authorities can finance the provision of amenities and infra-
structure, including taxes, grants and user charges. Following this, 
in chapter five a model of local government capital financing was 
developed which made use of the institutional choice framework developed 
' ··Jc earlier. Looking upon the local government as an institution analogous 
~·i,·;.<•;,~n many ways to a firm, financial policy was modelled by a method drawn 
~ ~ !..;' 
<·Wrom corporate finance theory, the Modl i gi ani -Mi 11 er approach. 
Using this model we were able to show that in the absence of market 
asymmetry, communities are indifferent between levels of debt, choosing 
a specific level only in order to satisfy local governments' risk 
preference. An administration whose natural risk aversion is not 
countered by democratic pressure will tend to avoid debt, while a 
genuinely representative government will choose a level which 
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approaches optimum. 
Existing asynmetries in the process of capi·talising local government 
debt policies through the property market have effects on the debt 
policy, but do not change the process through which the financial 
decisions are made. Because debt is effectively subsidised in terms of 
tax, legislation and other factors, the tradeoff between return and risk 
on local governments services is not as great as for other assets. 
This, and other factors provides a general bias towards debt. 
In the light of this theory, existing shortages of local government 
finances were analysed, and found to originate in a growing aversion 
to debt, and an increasing tendency towards internal financing. 
Chapter Eight was devoted to a criticism of internal financing and of 
the Capital Development Fund as a specific method of internal funding. 
By drawing on we 11 es tab 1 i shed portfo 1 i o theory, and the theory of 
intertemporal allocation we were able to show that internal financing 
.is not the policy that would be chosen by a community which endeavours 
to maximize the welfare of its residents. Thus despite official 
enthusiasm, internal funding is not necessarily in the interests of 
local communities. 
Other official proposals regarding local government, particularly those 
emanating from the Presidents Council, were addressed in chapter Nine. 
The concept of metropolitan government was examined in the context of 
the institutional choice approach and was found to have some short-
comings. Co-operation between local governments, it is suggested, 
will take place on a voluntary basis, outside of the guiding hand of 
central government. Revenue sharing through the use of 'neutral funds' 
wa~ also discussed and found to conflict with the model presented. 
By breaking the· link between property value and local government income, 
revenue sharing destroys the incentive to attract business and 
industry by providing them with services and facilities. Finally, the 
predicament of black local authorities was briefly touched upon in order 
to illustrate that their omission from the Presidents Council frame of 
reference constitutes a serious shortcoming. 
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This thesis has, therefore approached the issue of local governments 
and their financing in a highly analytical way, dr~wing its inspiration 
from the theoretical fields of public choice, the theory of public 
goods, corporate financial theory, intertemporal analysis, and the 
theory of tax incidence and market valuation. In the remainder of 
this conclusion we will place·the issue of local autonomy within the 
current political context of South Africa and will spell out the 
conditions which are essential to the efficient operation of local 
government. 
2. The Political Context 
In the current 'reformist' climate of South African politics, the 
concept of local autonomy plays a very special role. Government 
constitutional planners see the idea of local autonomY as a means of 
operationalizing the ethnic and racial separation of communities. The 
many opponents of government minimize the importance of autonomy of 
local communities, and of the ethnic heterogeneity of the South African 
population. They stress the unity of the people and press their claim 
to gener~l enfranchisement by rejecting-as a-red herring~ the offer 
of representation at a local level. 
The struggle for and against apartheid has thus come to rest (briefly 
perhaps?),on the issue of local autonomy, and the role of local 
authorities. Apartheid planners would like to see all local areas 
racially homogenous, self-financing, self-'governing' in the·sense of 
determining their expenditure policy. This, in their eyes, would have 
the merits o~ insulating central govern~ent from grass roots issues such 
as education, housing, local facilities, transport and at the same time 
creating a situation in which opponents of apartheid are set against 
each other in interregional competition. 
Opponents of apartheid have their eyes set firmly on the prize of 
universal franchise, and rightly see local autonomy as a diversion, a 
device to'take their attention away from this goal. Their rejection of 
local autonOmY is often a refusal to be diverted, a determination to 
stick to their guns. Accordingly, they point out some of the apparent 
---------- ..----
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pitfalls of local autonomy. They point out the origins of the 
communities (on the drawing boards of apartheid planners), their 
consequent isolation from services, markets, and from commercial and 
industrial revenue bases. They point out the dependence of local 
areas on the metropolitan cores, a dependence which is said to create 
and perpetuate the poverty of the local area~. Control over local 
affairs is therefore not seen to be the solution to the problems of 
local areas, since these problems have their origin in the nature of 
the local area's relationship with the wider community. 
Simultaneously, however, local issues form the focus of a great deal 
of the ongoing struggle. Communities are increasingly organizing them-
selves around issues such as electricity, bus fares, drainage, streets, 
housing maintenance and others, many of wh~ch are seemingly trivial • 
. vet it is in the articulation and resolution of these issues that 
communities are finding identity and expressing common so1idarity. 
·There exists, apparently, a contradiction: Either local issues are 
vital, and a valid area for social action, or they are irrelevant, a 
decoy, a distraction from the real issues at national, even inter-
national level. They clearly cannot be both. 
It is against the background of this contradictory position that the 
role of the local authority must be viewed in South Africa today. 
It must be remembered that the ideas of local autonomy are currently 
vehicles for conflicting economic and class interests, not merely 
theoretical constructs which stand on their own. 
Having characterised local government as an institution of the market 
economy, it remains.necessary to spell out the conditions needed for 
its efficient oper~tion. 
a) Mobility 
Perhaps the most vital assumption on which the Tiebout 'voting-with-the-
feet' hypothesis rests is, that people can choose their place of 
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residence: 
'Consumer-voters are fully mobile and will 
move to that community where their prefer-
ence patterns ••• are best satisfied'l 
This choice performs the function in the Tiebout model of revealing 
preferences for local goods combinations, a function more familiarly 
performed by the act of purchase of private goods. 
'Spatial mobility provides the local public-
goods counterp~rt to the private market's 
shopping trip' 
The ability, therefore, to move freely (although not costlessly)· 
~etween communities is therefore a vital element in a system of local 
. autonomY. The existence in South Africa of severe statutory limits 
to mobility must inevitably jeopardize the effectiveness of local 
governments in providing public goods .. in desired combinations. 
Tiebout•.s third assumption that: 
'there are a large number of communi ties 
in which the consumer-voters may choose 
.to live'3 
reflects his concern at the wide variety of public goods combinations 
that are feasible and the wide disparity of tastes and preferences 
that display themselves. Movement between communities will ensure, 
in equilibrium, equality of the marginal cost of moving and the 
I 
marginal benefit to be gained. This equity will be clearly more 
access~ble if the differences between communities are lessened by other 
commun1ties which in this sense, bridge the gap. 
It·is unlikely that proposals for the creation of black or coloured 
local governments will allow the variety or multiplicity of local 
·government that is envisaged in the liebout competition model. 
Present administration of coloured local areas within-the Cape 
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Divisional Councils is certainly not conducive to encouraging multi-
plicity, nor is the administration of black areas within Admini.strati.on 
Boards. 
cl Powers of Local Governments 
If local areas are to be truly autonomous, they must have suitable 
powers of action, viz.: the powers to tax, to spend, to contract with 
other local governments or private finms, and to proclaim, subject 
to circumscribed limits, regulations and bylaws. 
i} Power to tax: 
In chapter four we dealt with the importance of an internal revenue 
base. Receiving revenue from sources .inside the local community, 
rather than from outside it (eg. central revenue sharing schemes) 
cements the bonds between community and govern~ent, fosters account-
ability and limits wastage or misallocation of resources. 
H)' Power to spend: 
It is vital that local government be able to respond to perceived 
resident preferences through their expenditure pattern. Any limits on 
expenditure will prevent them from doing so, and therefore from 
optimally allocating resources to public goods. 
£cc~~1se local services are so diverse and are produced under diverse 
ci~~·mstances, it is essential that communities be able to combine 
together for the provision of some aspects of these services where 
economies of scale are available. This they do at pre~ent, and must 
be enabled to continue to do, through-mutual contracts, or through 
contracting with a third party, or a firm or other government 
institution. 
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Where this facility is available, discussion of the optimal 'size• of 
a local coJJIJlunity loses its significance. A community which is too 
small to produce electricity economically will find mutual benefit 
in purchasing it from a larger neighbour, or from joining its like-
sized neighbours in a 'metropolitan' venture. If this same community 
should find that its f~re department could serve a larger area, it 
will find advantage in offering its services to its neighbours. 
Freedom of contract combined with the other conditions for local 
autono~ will ensure that communities are able to benefit from 
whatever economies of scale are available, without being committed to 
sharing all things with a given collection of neighbours, whether there 
are benefits to be had or not • 
. iv}": Power to Regulate: 
As an institution which exists fundamentally to internalize the extern-
alities that community living generates, the local government needs to 
be able to pass and enforce regulations, particularly those affecting 
land use. By means of such regulations, individuals are prevented 
from imposing externality costs on the community by, for example, 
the construction of high rise buildings which reduce the scenic value 
of the community to its residents. In this way, uncertainty regarding 
the services which flow from residential buildings is reduced and the 
value of the whole community is enhanced. In this sense, then, zoning 
regulations are an important public good; and must receive attention 
in the design of a constitution for local autonomy. 
The model presented in this thesis clearly outlines the importance of 
a market for real estate in the allocation of resources to local public 
goods. It is through the purchase of ~roperty that ~ne acquires a 
stake in the services provided by a local government. The value of 
those services become, we have argued, embodied in the capital value 
of the real estate. This capitalisation process is clearly inhibited 
by the severe limits placed on property ownership in South Africa. 
The prohibition on land ownership by Blacks in South Africa has the 
effect of simultaneously preventing Blacks from acquiring an interest 
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in their local governments. The natural pressure to create local 
authorities is accordingly diminished, as is the accountability of 
existing 1oca1 administrations. 
A similarly inhibiting role is performed by the system of housing 
subsidy, which effecti.vely prevents the price of housing from reflect-
ing any characteristics of the building site or local amenities. The 
essential link between government and community is therefore broken, 
and the economic processes of resource allocation rendered inoperative. 
e) Representation: 
Where the foregoing conditions are present competition between juris-
diction will as we have discussed, ensure responsive provision of local 
services. Where they do not exist, or exist only in limited form, 
the allocation of resources to local public goods will diverge from 
the socially preferred mix and level. 
Even where the economic mechanisms are in existence and are operating 
in an efficient way, it remains essential that the political process 
at the local level be a truly representative one. In chapter two we 
discussed the significance of the political process in the process of 
articulating supply and demand forces within public goods institutions. 
Epple and Zelenitz4 confirm that competition among jurisdictions does 
not, by itself, guarantee public sector efficienty. Despite the 
ability of residents to vote with their feet, land itself, due to its 
immobility, generates rents, some of which can be captured by local 
government by for example expanding activities beyond efficient levels. 
This conclusion is of vital significance to communities in South Africa 
which are being offered, in many cases a 'dispensation' which is not 
only defective in terms of the economic characteristics-outlined above, 
but in:addition fails to provide appropriate democratic processes for 
articulating local preferences and priorities. 
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Autonomous local communities are an important institution in the market 
economY through which an essential category of goods and services are 
provided. Recent political moves towards their establishment can have 
very favourable consequences for the provision of local services. 
The danger exists, however, that local governments will be created, 
which because they are ~acking in the essential characteristics we 
have outlined above, will be unable to perform effectively. Instead 
of providing greatly appreciated local services, they will provide 
less important ones. Instead of striving to follow a rational, 
effective financial policy, local officials will play safe, by follow-
.ing central government suggestions instead of pursuing the interests 
of local communities. 
Autonomous local government is an essential institution for providing 
much needed local services to the rapidly growing cities of South 
Africa. It is to be hoped that current policy directives will 
encourage them, not stifle them. 
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